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Preface 
The present study is part of the project “Public Policies and Demand for Organic Food: An 
International Comparison of Policy Effects and Policy Determinants” (COP). It is carried out in 
WP II that concerns the supply-side policies and demand. In the WP it is an initial task to formulate 
a theoretical approach as the conceptual framework to be used in comparative studies. The present 
study will be the foundation for the conceptual framework. It investigates contributions from 
various economic theories and extracts core theoretical fragments into a framework suitable for 
analysing the evolution of organic agriculture. In the conclusion the study is presenting a basis for 
indicators that can be used for comparative studies. It is underlined that the indicators are tentative 
and that they have to be tested and adjusted in future studies. 
 
The report is written by Ole Horn Rasmussen that for four month has been attached to the WP as 
research assistant. A great part of his theoretical contribution here is based on his former PhD 
studies on structural change and transformation related to the evolution of organic agriculture.  
 
 
Aalborg in December 2007-12-21 
 
 
Jan Holm Ingemann, head of WP II 
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The Problem 
The aim of the COP-project is to solve the problem related to how politics may assist to increase the 
demand for organic food?  
 
How may public policy contribute to a transformation of agriculture and system of food production 
towards organic agriculture and organic food? 
 
The motive for this research report is construction of a theoretical model of reference for the study. 
The research report seeks to answer two questions:  
 
1.  What kind of empiric indicators may contribute to an answer to the problem in the COP-
project?  
2.  What is the adequate theoretical model from the perspective of economics for the COP-
project? 
 
Basis for the answer is selected elements from my Ph.D. dissertation “Evolution of Organic 
Agriculture within theoretical frameworks of Structural Change and Transformation (Rasmussen, 
2007). It is assumed that the evolution of the market for organic food is a result of a social process 
of structural change. The key-words in the process of selection of elements from the dissertation 
are: Politics, market, transformative capacity, organic agriculture and empiric indicators.   
 
Background 
The primary agricultural sector is not a static and once-and-for-all defined concept. In 1985, the 
official figures for the number of organic farms and organic area was about non-existent. After a 
slow beginning, however, both farm numbers and organic agricultural area have grown 
significantly. Ingemann contributes with  analyses of organic agriculture as a historic phenomenon. 
(Ingemann 1998: ; Ingemann 1999: ; Ingemann 2000a: ; Ingemann 2001c: ; Ingemann 2003: ; 
Ingemann 2006). His primary focus is Denmark. We are going to describe three different 
approaches in which he analyses organic agriculture. 
The first approach (Ingemann, 2006) is based upon inductive research in which 
Ingemann defines different milestones that he claims are crucial for the evolution. He defines five 
époques: 
 
1.  The pioneers or grassroots – 1970s. Milestone = the first organic farms are established. 
2.  The process of rallying – expansion – 1981/82. Milestone = establishment of organic 
organisation and the national organic farming school. 
3.  Inclusion – expansion – 1987. Milestone = governmental authorisation scheme and 
labelling (1990). 
4.  Absorption – 1992 – consolidation, decreasing rate of expansion. Milestone = supermarket 
chains increase marketing efforts. 
5.  Funky business – 2002. Milestone = ? Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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    Department of Economics, Politics and Public Administration 
  6 
 
Ingemann’s empirical description stops with 1999. 
The next example in his work refers to the theoretical universe of the product life 
cycle, which Ingemann tests in another work (Abrahamsen 1998). The empirical reference is 
international, covering the countries of western Europe, together with Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand and the USA. He introduces organic food as an innovation and categorises the food-
producing agents in four groups that appear during the evolution of organic agriculture: first, the 
pioneers; second, the sprinters; third, the average; and finally, the afterthought agents. Ingemann 
illustrates this process by placing time on the x-axis and amount on the y-axis. The curve is well 
known for innovations with a slow introduction and a slight increase when the sprinters become 
involved in the process. When the average enters, the curve increases rapidly. The curve then 
flattens and the afterthought agents enter. Ingemann’s idea is to identify the “first movers” among 
countries based upon the supply of and demand for organic food products. The conclusion is that 
they expect an increased demand for organic food in the years to come, and because Denmark is the 
only country among the sprinters with the production capacity and an institutional set-up with 
export focus, their possibilities to win market share receives a positive assessment. 
  In the final example, Ingemann considers how organic farming may develop under 
pure market conditions. In order to answer the question, Ingemann first states that he must know 
which institutional framework the organic sector must deal with. Second, he must know how the 
organic actors will exploit this framework. Part of this premise is the condition under which organic 
agriculture is going to compete with conventional agriculture. To discuss these two questions, 
Ingemann first argues that the market is an abstract notion. In practice, the market must be 
understood in connection with politics: “… it must be concluded that the market and state – and 
parallel to this, the economy and politics – do not mutually exclude one another; rather, they 
mutually condition one another” (Ingemann, 2000: 43). Moreover, there are actors who, 
independent of the market and state, make decisions of importance for the development. Second, 
Ingemann points out that a crucial element for the future of organic agricultural is whether 
conventional agriculture will “make its political, market-related and production-related expertise 
available for organic agriculture, or do the organic farmers need to ‘start from the beginning’, e.g. 
by establishing jointly owned processing companies” (Ingemann, 2000: 44)
1. There will be a 
number of decisive political choices within society, the EU, international institutions and within the 
agricultural sector. The main reason for making these choices is that the supply and demand for 
food is a zero-sum game.  
These observations bring up a crucial and initial question concerning the demarcation 
of the project. Is it possible to research organic agriculture as a sole and isolated object? Of course it 
is possible; the real question is the quality of the result this provides. As indicated especially in the 
later examples of Ingemann’s work (Ingemann, 2000), we have an inherent element of competition 
between the different farm systems. Such competition may be assumed to influence how the 
primary agrarian sector evolves. Consequently, an approach based upon general knowledge of 
agriculture and its historical development in which organic agriculture appears as an integrated part 
of agriculture represents a potential framework for a study. The appearance of organic agriculture 
                                                 
1 Ingemann indirectly states that the predominant actor in agriculture, the conventional and chemical-dependent 
agriculture, today works in order to favour themselves and not organic agriculture. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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illustrates the change that the agrarian sector has undergone and this leads us to the conclusion that 
we are going to study organic agriculture as an element in the process of the structural change of 
primary agriculture. What is an appropriate apporach?  
The first example of, what we have named the main-stream or neoclassical approach, 
is The Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Fishery in Denmark (The Danish Ministry for Food 
1998). They do not use a formal model; however, the logic in their contribution points in the 
direction of a main-stream approach. They define agricultural structural change as a mixture 
between the development of macroeconomic importance (part of the aggregate economy and 
export), number of farms, size of farms and specialisation of production
2. The reasons why the 
number of farms has decreased in number, increased in average size
3 and increased in specialisation 
primarily refer to the economy of size. The definition of economy of size consists of three elements: 
1. the ability of management; 2. the opportunity to obtain discounts; and 3. the advantages of large-
scale production. The Ministry stresses that economy of size has been achieved because larger 
farms are better able to exploit technological advances in agriculture
4. Second, the large farms 
employ relatively less input in the form of labour. In addition to these reasons for the experienced 
structural development, there are four further elements of special importance: 1. agricultural law, 2. 
economic subsidies, 3. environmental politics and 4. taxation rules. These four elements can 
influence the structural development in order to accelerate the process of increased concentration or 
slow down the same process. The conclusion of the Ministry is that “Despite this somewhat mixed 
impression of the various actor’s influence on the structure, as a rule, several of these factors will 
influence the stuctural development in interplay with the development of productivity” (The Danish 
Ministry for Food 1998: 12). This quote indicates that the Ministry implicitly treats the process of 
structural development as if there is no – as viewed from the perspective of economic theory and 
technology – upper limits for the economics of size. If there is a limit, it is a political limit. 
Structural development becomes something akin to a natural law of the economy. The process of 
structural development becomes even stranger when the Ministry writes: 
 
The general tendency in the structural development in agriculture must thus first and 
foremost be assessed to be linked to the tendencies in the general economic and 
market forces and with the productivity pressures these forces release, both in 
agriculture and other business sectors (The Danish Ministry for Food 1998: 143). 
 
The conclusion must be that the Ministry considers the structural development of agriculture to be 
the result of the economic “rules of the game” in a market economy. The “rules of the game” are 
implicitly assumed to be like a natural law and thus static. The rules, however they are defined, 
create pressure for increased agricultural productivity. Concentration and specialisation offer the 
means. 
                                                 
2 Their description of structural development covers eight different variables: number of farms, number of part-time and 
full-time farms, composition of production (specialisation), number of animal units, organic agriculture, ownership and 
change between generations, rural development, and structural development in other countries. In the conclusion, the 
Ministry reduces these eight variables to three variables plus the macroeconomic figures. 
3 The number of farms over 50 hectares has increased dramatically. The number of farms between 5-50 hectares has 
decreased dramatically, while the number of farms less than 5 hectares has increased. This tendency – the growth of 
larger and larger farms – continues in the period 1996-2005. 
4 There is no definition of technological advance. However, the Ministry explicitly mentions machines and buildings. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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  Nedergaard et al. represent another example within the main-stream approach 
(Nedergaard 1993). Their focus is not directly on structural development; rather, it is on EU 
agricultural policy. However, they argue that structural development is a consequence of the 
interplay between the function of the market and the political initiatives concerning regulation. 
Their model can therefore be treated as a model for explaining structural development. They 
develop a model for investigating this topic. Like other theoreticians on this subject, e.g (Kyed 
2001) and (Zobbe 2001), the theoretical foundation is neoclassical economics and welfare 
economics, on the one side, and public choice on the other. At the micro level of the economy, 
market failures influence both the supply and demand sides. The assumption is that market failure 
leads to political regulation. The character of these acts of regulation is a result of an equilibrium 
between the supply of the decisions made by bureaucrats and politicians and the demand for 
decisions from agriculture (the producers) and the consumers. The demand side is asymmetrical, 
because the organisation of agriculture is much stronger than the organisation of the consumers. 
This process has a dual effect at the macro level: first, there is a loss of economic welfare in the 
agrarian sector and in the social economic effectiveness; second, there is a coordination problem 
with national interests versus common EU interests
5. 
The final example is the former head of the Danish Economic Council (Kærgård 
2002). With a 250-year time horizon, he evaluates the reasons why the evolution of Danish 
agriculture has turned out as it has. His first focus is on the agrarian reforms of the late of 1700s. 
His next focus is about 1880. He points out that it is transparent that organisation, technology and 
the microeconomic conditions “go hand-in-hand”. His third focus is the change from 1950 to the 
present. This change occurred due to the combination of technological opportunities and the 
economy. Because of increasing wages, new technology is introduced and the advantage of large-
scale production increases. Because of chemistry, the dependency between animal production and 
plant production decreases, and specialisation becomes possible. This leads Kærgård to conclude:  
 
The right push at the right time can promote or change a development trend, but one 
must realize, that a very significant part of the changes are directed by underlying 
economic and technological conditions. As politicians one shall not overestimate the 
possibilities in order to drive the development (Kærgård, 2002: 152). 
 
                                                 
5 The theoreticians are well aware of the critique directed against their theoretical foundation. They summarize the 
critique of welfare economics: 1. Welfare economics assumes that politicians and bureaucrats are immune to their own 
interests. 2. Welfare economics ignores the political process. 3. Welfare economics assumes a rational, science-based 
political process. 4. In most cases, it is impossible to assess which political instruments are best. 5. Welfare economics 
assumes equilibrium in the market and, in practice, ignores externalities. 6. Welfare economics assumes perfect 
information, which is not the case for politicians and bureaucrats. 7. Analysis of opportunity cost is often ignored in the 
political process. 8. In welfare economics, there is focus on the analysis of alternative political instruments, but the 
realism of these instruments is often ignored because political behaviour is regarded as irrational. Consequently, 
research based upon economic rationality cannot be used. Political behaviour is only rational if it suits the economic 
models. Because of the different interests, this is never the case. This critique is the reason why rational choice enters 
their model. Their idea is that the individuals operating in the market also act in the political arena as voters, members 
of an interest group, politicians, bureaucrats etc. They want to combine behaviour in the market and behaviour in the 
political process. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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The reason for agricultural structural change is the economics of scale and the availability of new 
technology. This has been and will remain a process in which the political influences are limited. 
The law of economics and the external input from technological progress are decisive. 
To sum things up, then, all of the three theoreticians base their arguments upon neoclassical 
mainstream economics, and their explanations end up being rather simple, reflecting economic 
nature-like laws. With the exception of one of the theoreticians, organic agriculture does not enter 
their work. In that case, organic agriculture is only described with reference to size, numbers and 
examples of organic products. Elsewhere, we must conclude that the theoreticians treat organic 
agriculture as an integrated part of agriculture. By this, we obtain support for our initial decision to 
study organic agriculture as a part of agriculture.  
For more than 25 years, Ingemann has been involved in agricultural economics 
research and especially Danish agriculture. Precisely the potential within the coordination process is 
crucial in Ingemann’s agricultural economics. This potential is not new. In fact, it was the motive 
behind the establishment of the co-operatives in 1882. Another way of presenting the model is with 
reference to the figure below:  
 
 
Source: Ingemann (1998: 23, own translation) 
 
Farmer 
 
Farmer 
Business 
economy 
Nature 
Political organisations 
      Policy and politics 
Lines of trade 
Expectations 
Institutional set-up 
Social 
Economy 
Micro  Macro  Meso 
Figure 1: The Ingemann reference model – Economy, politics and behaviour Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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There are two dimensions of praxis: economic praxis and political praxis. Ingemann combines these 
dimensions with the three societal levels: micro, meso and macro. His model makes it relevant to 
discuss a total of six cells in which the dynamic interplay is going on
6.  
What are Ingemann’s theoretical foundations? It would seem as though Ingemann is pluralistic. 
Ingemann’s general position is that any idea of a “natural” structural development or development 
due to the market mechanism does not make sense. The history of Danish agriculture is one of 
negotiations. The private and public sectors have since become intertwined. The answers to 
questions about who is responsible for policy and authoritative decisions become murky. 
Ingemann’s second theoretical dimension involves his use of neoclassical economics, on the one 
side, via Cochrane
7; on the other side, he is firmly critical towards the theory concerning economics 
of size or economics of scale (Ingemann, 1998). The point of departure is his questioning of the 
notion of the efficient farm. Ingemann’s third dimension deals with political regulation and 
subventions or subsidies. Ingemann points out that the reason why reflects two notions, which must 
influence the agents within the agrarian sector
8: 
 
1.  The notion of incentives 
2.  The notion of legal frameworks 
 
While the first category is primarily economic, the second category reflects political orders and 
bans. Both categories deal with an interest for particular behaviours. Within these categories, the 
economic and political creation of expectations is essential in order to understand structural 
development.  “Something must tie the actions together and form a common basis for human 
actions individually as well as socially. This ‘something’ will here be conceptualised as notions” 
(Ingemann 1999: 25)
 . Ingemann argues that material conditions can never be sufficient in order to 
understand evolution; however, material conditions must be considered. Based upon preferences 
and expectations, the notions create actions. In order to understand evolutionary change, we must 
focus on the competition between different and competing notions. This competition is an indicator 
of social and evolutionary change. With his invention of “The Two-dimensional Concept of 
Quality” (Ingemann, 1998b) and an explicit link to organic agriculture, Ingemann demonstrates how 
a new competing notion has entered Danish agriculture
9. Ingemann’s reference to his understanding 
of notions creates a certain focus. This focus is institutional and organisational.  
Methodological reflections 
We have presented a concise analysis of how different theoreticians interpret agricultural structural 
change. Based upon these insights, we find that a long-term perspective is the tentative most 
promising choice as framework for our own analysis. Moreover, we tentatively find that changes in 
                                                 
6 The reference to six cells is explicitly stated in his 1998 work. In the book section from 2002, he explicitly 
incorporates two new dimensions: the material and immaterial dimensions. The potential of cells thus expands to 
twelve. 
7 Cochrane’s work is dealt with in a separate chapter. 
8 We must note this shift of focus. After a macroeconomic focus, he returns to a microeconomic focus. 
9 Very briefly, the concept of the two-dimensional concept of quality states that quality is no longer narrowly related to 
the product itself (taste, appearance and smell). The new concept takes into account the process by which the product 
has been produced (animal ethics, sustainability and health). The concept of quality has evolved from one to two 
dimensions. In the case of organic food, the labelling with the ø-brand and the royal crown symbolize this dual quality. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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agriculture are connected to changes in the steering system of the general economy, where the 
process of agricultural coordination is central. The organisation of the economy matters for 
structural change. We have now made our first choice about our frame of reference to our study.  
Because the research question focuses on transformative capacity the idea of 
“transformation” is central. Polanyi (Polanyi 1944 (1957)) places the concept of transformation as a 
main pillar in his theoretical work. The term refers to a specific situation in a particular economic 
system, the market economy, where a radical shift occurs in relation to the fundamental steering 
mechanism. Polanyi does not explicitly define the term “transformation”; however, he uses the term 
in order to characterise the outcome or result of a societal process. The important issue is our 
tentative assumption that the involvement of a transformation perspective may contribute to our 
study of organic agriculture as a phenomenon. The idea of using the term “transformation” will, 
from a methodological point of view, contribute to maintaining focus on the definition of the 
fundamental steering mechanisms or the idea of steering mechanisms within the process of the 
structural change of primary agriculture. Within these considerations, we make a preliminary 
definition of transformation: transformation of agriculture occurs when we experience a radical 
change in at least one of the central rules of the game within agriculture; transformation results. The 
game is defined dually as agriculture, which is the static dimension, and as the process of 
agricultural structural change, which is the dynamic dimension. This is our point of departure. 
As a matter of definition, there are two general perspectives in economy when 
referring to economic theory. We have macroeconomics and microeconomics. “Microeconomic 
theory … analyses the behaviour of individual units, while macroeconomics focuses on the 
behaviour of the economy as a whole” (Asimakopulos 1978: 10). Because we are dealing with the 
development of a sector, the meso-perspective must be introduced. Consequently, reference to 
economy must at least consider these three perspectives. The second key element, politics, may also 
refer to at least three different perspectives (Heidenheimer 1986: ; Dalsgaard 1992): the first 
political perspective refers to the content of politics, i.e. policy. The second refers to the process of 
making policy, i.e. politics. The third and final perspective is about the structural framework within 
which politics are formed, i.e. the polity . Consequently, instead of using the single term 
“regulation” as being analogous to politics, the idea is to search for a more subtle contribution by 
subdividing politics into three perspectives.  
Despite the global importance of the agrarian sector, there is a weak historical, 
continual, agricultural tradition for a broader, pluralistic theoretical economics within the 
international research community. Agricultural economic research in the 20
th century has been 
marked by an increased tendency to choose a fragmented focus as represented by e.g. discussions 
related to politics (Sheingate 2001: ; Coleman 2002), technology (Sanderson 1985: ; Lansink 2002), 
the environment (Andersen 2001) or management (Schjønning 2003: ; Ménard 2005). One of the 
exceptions is discussions related to developing countries, where a more pluralistic approach can be 
identified (e.g. (Lehman 1986: ; Shanin 1988: ; Das 2001: ; Sivakumar 2001). The weak 
international tradition combined with a lack of any economic agricultural theoretical debate with 
reference to a “transformation perspective” leads us to the ambition to write up against the idea of 
an uninvented future New Research Programme of Agricultural Transformation. The initial 
hypothesis is that an answer to the problem is a complex function of the identified and unidentified 
empirical observations and theoretical explanations. A contribution to clarifying this function is 
supposed to lead to an improved understanding of the problem in question.  Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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We are inspired by the methodological idea of Lakatos. He does not lay down 
standard procedures for solving scientific problems. According to Latsis, his position is; “… It is 
concerned with the ‘logic of appraisal’, that is, the normative problem of providing criteria for 
scientific progress … As a normative methodology of science, it is empirically irrefutable because it 
is a definition” (Latsis 1976: 155). Lakatos rejects the usefulness of the appraisal of isolated 
individual theories. He talks about clusters of interconnected theories or scientific research 
programmes (SRP). Our theoretician points out that no individual scientific hypothesis is 
conclusively verifiable or falsifiable. This is because we always use auxiliary statements in the test 
of the particular hypothesis, and we can never be sure whether we have confirmed or refuted the 
hypothesis itself.  
Economics is about models and the question of choosing a model with the potential to 
be the tool capable of contributing an answer to the research question. This is a statement from 
Keynes. He underlines this alternatively: 
 
The object of our analysis is, not to provide a machine, or method of blind 
manipulation, which will furnish an infallible answer, but to provide ourselves with an 
organised and orderly method of thinking out particular problems; and after we have 
reached a provisional conclusion by isolating the complicating factors one by one, we 
have to go back on ourselves and allow, as well as we can, for the probable 
interactions of the factors among themselves. This is the nature of economic thinking. 
Any other way of applying our formal principles of thought (without which, however, 
we shall be lost in the wood) will lead us into error (Keynes 1936 (1973): 297). 
 
Dealing with agriculture means dealing with a theme of great complexity. The search for economic 
theoretical approaches is part of our methodology, which initially is “hybrid”. Inspiration is drawn 
from different theoreticians. The most influential theoreticians are Roy Bhaskar and Tony Lawson 
(Lawson 1997: ; Lawson 2003a: ; Lawson 2003b), Jon Elster (Elster 1983: ; Elster 1986: ; Elster 
1989), Gudmund Hernes (Hernes 1978: ; Hernes 1984) and Lakatos. While Elster’s universe is the 
micro-foundation of the economy and a general neglect of anything other than the micro-universe, 
the philosophy of Tony Lawson as based upon Bhaskar points in the direction of the meta-universe. 
   
Reader’s guide 
First, we have chosen from among the classical economists. Second, we have chosen to supplement 
the above-mentioned agricultural economic approaches with a former leading Russian and former 
leading American agricultural economist. The latter theoretician makes Hvelplund relevant. As the 
representative for Institutional and Evolutionary economics, we have chosen one of the founders, 
the American economist Thorstein Veblen. The latter category is ecological economics. Here we 
find contributions from a former leading economist, the Romanian born Georgescu-Roegen. From 
the inner circle of the journal “Ecological Economics”, we first select the American co-evolutionary 
economist Richard B. Norgaard. Robert Costanza, another economist within the inner circle of 
“Ecological Economics”, uses the theory of social traps, which finally inspire us to look closely at 
this theoretical apparatus. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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Having all the different theoreticians from classical economics, institutional and evolutionary 
economics, agricultural economics and ecological economics, we make a compilation and draw a 
conclusion. The research report is structured in the following order: 
 
1.  Section one: Chayanov, Cochrane and Hvelplund   
2.  Section two: Quesnay and the French physiocrats, Adam Smith, Malthus, Ricardo and Von 
Thünen 
3.  Section three: Veblen 
4.  Section four: Bioeconomics (Georgescu-Roegen), Co-evolutionary economics (Norgaard) 
and Social Traps 
5.  Section five: Compilation and search for empiric indicators within the theoreticians with 
reference to agricultural structural change, the phenomenon organic agriculture, organic 
agriculture and transformation, and empiric indicators. 
6.  Section six: Conclusion – model for Conceptual Framework 
 
Section One 
Chayanov 
Introduction 
Chayanov provides a new perspective on agricultural economics. He never completed his work, but 
the elements we claim to contribute to his initial paradigm are three pillars: 
 
1.  A theory of the co-existence of different types of farms 
2.  An organisational theory of the peasant family farm 
3.  A contribution to a dynamic theory of agricultural structural change 
 
These pillars will now be outlined. 
The theory of co-existence 
The point of departure and first cornerstone are based upon his definition of eight different 
economic systems (Chayanov 1925 (1966)). 
 
1.  Capitalism 
2.  Family economy 1 – commodity economy 
3.  Family economy 2 – natural economy 
4.  Slave economy 
5.  Quitrent serf economy 
6.  Feudal system 1 – landlord economy 
7.  Feudal system 2 – peasant economy 
8.  Communism 
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Chayanov’s aim was to produce a realistic analysis of agriculture and the food production system. 
Instead of the original orthodox Marxist interpretation of the developing phases of society – linear – 
Chayanov argues for the co-existence of different economic systems at the same time in history
10. 
This represents a discussion of contemporary as well as historic relevance, where the point of 
departure must relate to discussions about the possible dominance of one of the systems. In order to 
illustrate the relevance of dealing with the co-existence of different systems, Chayanov draws on an 
example from real life: 
 
… neglecting these distinguishing features of the family farm and extrapolating the 
economics of Smith and Ricardo onto it led the British to make a number of bad 
mistakes in their Indian economic policy (Chayanov 1925 (1966): 221). 
 
This quote precisely illustrates the crucial links between economic theory and policy. If the 
economics are incorrect, the choice of policy may also turn out to be wrong. The central issue is the 
definition of the rules of the game in the economic system. Because of the co-existence of systems 
and because each of the eight systems are individual in nature, Chayanov finds it problematic to 
cover all eight systems with a generalising universal theory leading to a general doctrine. The 
theoretical economics ought to establish a particular national economic theory for each economic 
regime. We find this as the key in Chayanov to understanding agricultural structural change. In 
order to illustrate the potential relevance, we may draw a contemporary line to e.g. the EU, where 
we can argue for the co-existence of at least four of the eight systems: Capitalism, Family Economy 
1, Family Economy 2, and Communism. A discussion about a possible Serf Economy is relevant 
according to tenancy. 
Chayanov’s “paradigm” is grounded in a dualistic analysis of the agrarian economy. 
Drawing inspiration from both neoclassical economics and Marxian economics, Chayanov divides 
the agrarian economy into two different systems: the industrial capitalist farmer and the family 
farmer. Chayanov attacks the hardcore of classical and neoclassical economics, homo economicus, 
in a Lakatos’ sense. He simply finds it inadequate in order to reflect real life. Chayanov uses two 
different meanings of rationality. The orthodox meaning related to the capitalist farms searching for 
and steered by the incentive and interest in profit maximisation, on the one side, and on the other 
side a kind of human, habitual rationality as defined by the non-reflective protection of the family 
and the non-reflective interest in being together with the family
11. Chayanov constitutes a theory, 
where the limitation of labour because of a certain, defined need for consumption marks the 
fundamental hypothesis in the theory.  
 
The theory of the Peasant Labour Farm 
Chayanov’s aim is to describe a single unit and the differences between single units. Chayanov’s 
method is to analyse the peasant labour farm – or, as he states, “the peasant farm production 
                                                 
10 The idea of the co-existence of different types of farms is not a unique Chayanovian perspective, see e.g. Hicks, J. 
(1969). A Theory of Economic History. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
11 The present relevance of this kind of human rationality in the economic theoretical discussion is e.g. illustrated in an 
article about the Norwegian fishery and the incentives of fishermen to work. Brox, O. (2002). "Hvor bliv det av 
grunnrenten i norsk fiske?" Stencil, May 2002. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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machine” – as the equivalent to a description of a modern steam engine “consisting of 39 percent 
Fe, 31 percent Cu, 16 percent H2O and 14 percent various organic substances” (Chayanov 1925 
(1966): 118).  
Chayanov defines three general sequences of organisational considerations (Chayanov 1925 
(1966): 127): 
 
I.  Choosing the profile of the farm based upon available information 
II.  Organising the individual sectors and making subsidiary estimates  
III.  Verifying the balances 
 
The second general sequence consists of: 
 
1.  Account of the family labour force and its consumer demands 
2.  Account of land held and possible land for use 
3.  Organisation of field-cropping 
4.  Organisation of draft (workhorses) 
5.  Organisation of feed-getting 
6.  Organisation of commercial livestock 
7.  Organisation of manure 
8.  Organisation of kitchen gardens, orchards and other sectors 
9.  Physical organisation of area 
10. Account of all work in agriculture 
11. Organisation of equipment 
12. Organisation of technical production, cottage industry, and crafts and trades away from 
home 
13. Organisation of buildings 
14. Organisation of capital and money circulation 
 
All of these elements constitute the foundation of the economy of the individual farm. Within any 
element, there are decisions for each farmer to take. The third general sequence and the final 
balance will be based upon: 
 
1.  The balance and organisation of labour 
2.  The estimation and calculation of income 
 
In practice, the process in the peasant family farm goes from sequence I to sequence II and to 
sequence III. Having produced a result, the farmers may return to sequence I in order to make 
adjustments and repeat all of the considerations until the final decision is made. “Only by means of 
gradual and repeated amendment of the calculations can one finally balance up all the farm sectors 
into an entire system” (Chayanov 1925 (1966): 127). At first glance, the above-mentioned 
sequences and elements look like “the methods for drawing up organizational plans in capitalist 
agriculture” (Chayanov 1925 (1966): 128); however, this is not the case. The criteria by which the 
considerations are affected differ. The reference is “The Chayanovian Rationality”. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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Instead of an entrepreneur seeking profit, the rule of the game in the peasant farm 
system is assumed to be the family and “… the motivation of the worker on a peculiar piece-rate 
system which allows him alone to determine the time and intensity of his work” (Chayanov 1925 
(1966): 42). From this single hypothesis, the whole theory of the peasant farm organisation is 
constructed using the capitalist farm as the alternative. While the concept of the peasant family farm 
is independent of any of the eight economic systems, the situation is contrary to the capitalist farm. 
Consequently, the ability to organise (the rules of the game) is broader for the peasant family farm. 
In the mind of Chayanov, this is a less fictive and simpler hypothesis. 
According to Chayanov, understanding changes in the agricultural economy must take 
into account the work of the two different systems each having their own rationality, including 
different principles or rules of the game regarding the three basic items: land, capital and labour. 
Chayanov’s task is to develop an understanding of “… the machinery for achieving economic 
equilibrium among these factors” (Chayanov 1925 (1966): 51). We have here a reference to the 
former section and the question of the decision of the peasant farms to calculate their “balance”. 
  Initially, the contemporary relevance of the Chayanovian concept can be connected to 
Denmark – and other countries as well – through the aspect of family-driven farms as the traditional 
organisation form. Furthermore – and this might be more crucial – nearly all Danish farmers are 
self-employed; family members, including wife and children, are often involved in the daily work. 
Here it is possible to introduce a postulate of treating the farmers as parallel to Chayanov’s peasant 
family farm
12. Finally, a recent empirical study concerning the structural change of Swedish 
agriculture 1992-2000 (Djurfeldt 2002) firmly supports the Chayanovian concept. We illuminate 
Chayanov’s model in the figure below. 
 
Figure 2: The Chayanovian model of the peasant family farm 
 
  
                                                 
12 Calculations for 1999 and 2003 support this postulate with a distribution between family members, managers and 
foreign labour force with respectively 78%, 1%, 21% (2003) and 82%, 1%, 17% (1999). Source: Danmarks Statistik. A 
comparison between family members versus managers could be argued as a more precise measure than Chayanov’s 
idea. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
Aalborg University, Denmark.  
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A Dynamic Theory of Agricultural Structural Change 
Chayanov explains the basic economic balance determining income and the peasant farm structure 
as the equilibrium between marginal utility of Russian rubles – income – and the degree of drudgery 
required to acquire the marginal ruble: The underlying assumption states that “the quantity of values 
that become available to the person running the farm agrees with the quantity of physical labor he 
has expended. But the expenditure of physical energy is by no means without limit for the human 
organism” (Chayanov 1925 (1966): 81). Furthermore, “the greater the quantity of work carried out 
by a man in a definite time period, the greater and greater drudgery for the man are the last 
(marginal) units of labor expanded”. At a certain point, equilibrium will be established. The precise 
point depends on the marginal utility of the family. Since the marginal utility falls with the growth 
of the total sum values that become available, there will occur a point at which rising labour income 
through drudgery equals the “subjective evaluation of the marginal utility of the sum obtained by 
this labor” (Chayanov 1925 (1966): 81). So any labour farm has a natural limit to its output 
“determined by the proportions between intensity of annual family labor and degree of satisfaction 
of its demands” (Chayanov 1925 (1966): 82). One of the results – and an important result at that – is 
that while in principle – theoretically – there is no maximum limit to the size of a capitalist farm, 
the size of the peasant farm does have a limit as defined by the equilibrium between the family 
consumer demand and its work force. 
When he analyses agricultural structural change and in fact becomes dynamic, both 
positions in the family must be better off: drudgery must decrease and satisfaction must increase. 
The investment of capital must also fulfil the two conditions: “It is clear that the application of 
capital which we have analysed will be acceptable to our farm only when the new equilibrium is 
established (1) with less drudgery of marginal labor expenditure, (2) with greater demand 
satisfaction” (Chayanov 1925 (1966): 209). We claim that Chayanov’s implicit arguments rest upon 
the following reasoning: when a new situation occurs in the course of making an investment, it is 
simply not possible to compare apples (drudgery) and oranges (consumption), weighing the two and 
subsequently arguing for the establishment of an advantageous situation. Consequently, both 
situations – less drudgery and more consumption – must be fulfilled. We now see that Chayanov is 
an elegant user of curves. He combines static and dynamic thought on the one side; on the other 
side, he combines absolute and relative thought. Chayanov thinks in four dimensions, which he 
illustrates in one figure. The figure below illustrates the limits for advantageous capital investment 
on the family farm. 
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Figure 3: The limits for the advantageous investment of capital 
 
Source: Chayanov 1925 (1966): 213 
 
The x-axis counts for two variables: level of investment in capital, K, and the level of gross income 
in the family. The y-axis measures the level of drudgery from work. The optimal situation is x2. In 
x2, the drudgery is at a minimum and the income is better off than in the initial x and x1, while in x3 
the drudgery exceeds the potential of x2. Thus far, it has been demonstrated that an increase in 
capital intensity due to e.g. new technology has upper limits for the family farm. Chayanov’s 
approach focuses on factors impacting capital formation, labour intensity and the individual peasant 
family budget. The determination of these figures depends on “a complex system of social relations 
and frequently determined to a great extent by quotations on the London stock exchange rather than 
by the local rainfall” (Chayanov 1925 (1966): 228). The situation in the family farm must take the 
limit of working hours into consideration. This means that the capitalist principles of bookkeeping 
must be supplemented by an upper limit of drudgery. Any investment or growth opportunity must 
be assessed with respect to the actual given need for consumption. The next question concerns how 
the on-farm equilibrium influences the capital formation and renewal.  
Inspired by the development of Russian agriculture before the revolution, Chayanov 
brings the discussion of “the idea of a differential agricultural program that, other than recording 
semiproletarianized and semicapitalist farms, would differentiate recommended improvements for 
different scales of labor farm at different phases of development” (Chayanov 1925 (1966): 254). On 
the basis of the recognition of differentiation and with special attention to the capitalist exploitation 
on the one side and the proletarianisation of the farmers on the other side, Chayanov brings politics 
into the arena: “We must hope that the labor farm, strengthened by cooperative bodies, will be able 
to defend its positions against large-scale, capitalist type farms as it did in former times” (Chayanov Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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1925 (1966): 256)
13. He stresses the existence of two counter-forces. The first force is driving farms 
into capitalism and strengthening the dynamic processes of agricultural proletarianisation. The 
second force “strengthened the position of the small farm” (Chayanov 1925 (1966): 257). On the 
other hand, he emphasises the farmer as being an ever more intensive partner in a global capitalist 
system aimed at reducing agriculture to a commodity. In both respects, Chayanov involves the 
position of politics and the aim of the creation of state capitalism based upon cooperatives, both 
horizontally and vertically. The policy concept of horizontal and vertical is the exact subject for the 
following aspects in Chayanov. 
 
 
When Chayanov changes his perspective from micro to macro, he introduces a new concept. He 
operates with the idea of the economy as the structure of a trading machine initially described as 
“The system of local rural bazaars”. The bazaar site is a concentration of all local trading, 
cooperative, business and spiritual life in the region. The bazaar as a whole is part of a greater 
system ending with the stock exchange in London or New York. The structure of the trading 
machine is discussed with reference to “the journey” of a commodity through five steps: 
 
1.  From producer to buyer or dealer number one 
2.  Sorting and transport to local trade centre 
3.  Sorting and distribution for onward transmission 
4.  Transferring to local consumer wholesale centres 
5.  Distribution with the help of trade distributive networks 
 
The position of financial capital as the turning point for the accumulation of agricultural capital is 
underlined as a fact, and the potential of financial capital as a determinant of the direction of 
economic structural change is implicitly announced. One of the consequences of the machine is its 
concern about a standard quality of the commodity and the following interference at the level of 
agricultural production. Further, and drawing on experience from America, Chayanov points toward 
the case of credits and the financing of the farmers’ circulating capital. This brings new ways for the 
capital to penetrate agriculture. “It is not without cause that, according to Professor N.P. Makarov 
only 35 percent of farmers incomes coming from America´s wholesale exchange goes to the farmer; 
the remaining 65 percent is taken by railway, elevator, irrigator, finance, and trading capital” 
(Chayanov 1925 (1966): 262). This leads forward to the following point from Chayanov: Vertical 
concentration might be more profitable than horizontal concentration! According to Chayanov, the 
rise and development of cooperative elements can only in certain phases take place and take over 
this vertical exploitation
14. 
Chayanov’s theoretical work reflects an ambition to develop a theoretical apparatus 
corresponding to the real life of Russian farmers in the beginning of the 20
th century. This context 
may appear useless when dealing with the evolution of the organic food market. Following 
                                                 
13 His “ought to be” attitude is interesting as compared with the present situation in Denmark, because Danish agriculture as a sector can be 
postulated to have fulfilled the aims of Chayanov’s recommendations for Russia in the form of state capitalism. 
14 It is in a situation where the local capital is relatively weak. This was e.g. the situation in Denmark in 1882 Ingemann, J. H. (1989). Det 
Økonomiske og Politiske Råderum i relation til den danske landbrugssektors udvikling 1880-1980 - Licentiate thesis. Roskilde, Roskilde University 
Center.. Generally, the contemporary situation may be stressed as a tendency towards a multinational vertical cooperation, where e.g. the 
Scandinavian dairy Arla spreads from Denmark and Sweden to other countries. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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Chayanov, we must change our interpretation of agriculture with reference to the different rules of 
the game within the different co-existent systems. The rules of the game in capitalist agriculture 
differ firmly from the peasant farm system. It becomes more complex when we must integrate some 
of the other systems, e.g. communism, serf economy and natural economy. When many systems 
infiltrate, it becomes difficult to ignore that Chayanov’s contribution makes the question of 
structural change complex. What exactly determines the process of change within and between the 
systems? Because of the definition of the peasant farm, Chayanov is able to keep his theory intact. 
If the farmer hires external labour, the farm per definition becomes a capitalist farm, and the 
capitalist farm is not part of his theory.   
 
1.  The family farm as a self-employed unit of agricultural production operates with a different 
rationality compared to a capitalist unit of agricultural production, where the number of 
consumers and the idea of “Family Satisfaction” represents the primary mechanism in any 
micro-decision process. 
 
The first part is a combined “demand-pull/demand-stop” theory of the peasant family farm. To 
some degree, it rests upon the demographic development of the peasant family farm, the migration 
process and the assumption of the reproductive capacity of the peasant family farm from generation 
to generation. The theory opens up for a complex set of discussions in which the definition and 
determination of rent, land-prices, investments and the accumulation of capital create the concrete 
structural change of the agrarian sector.  The second part allows us to establish a link to the 
existence of organic agriculture. The definitions of drudgery and family satisfaction are central, 
because work must be understood as a combined quantitative and qualitative item. The assumption 
is that the quantitative work on an average organic farm exceeds the work on an average 
conventional farm. With reference to Chayanov’s definition of drudgery, this ought to imply an 
impossible existence of organic agriculture. The fact that organic agriculture exists, even though it 
is a niche agricultural production, demands a deeper understanding of the terms “drudgery” and 
“Family Satisfaction”. One way of analysing this could be with reference to the Norwegian 
anthropological study of the motives behind the choice of the transition from conventional to 
organic agriculture (Østergaard 1998). This study illustrates that different and non-economic 
reasons, e.g. moral issues, are part of the decision-making. Another position interacts with the 
principal position of organic agriculture and its dynamic definition (DARCOF 2000: ; Ingemann 
2001c: ; Ichihara 2002: ; IFOAM 2002: ; Ingemann 2003). Knowing that definitions change over 
time and adding the dynamic rules and regulations – concerning e.g. animal protection and 
environmental questions which, other things being equal and from a rationalistic capitalist point of 
view represent an unnecessary cost – we may have a phenomenon infected with another kind of 
rationality than a pure capitalist rationality. The hypothetical idea is that this kind of rationality 
reflects rationality similar to the “Chayanovian rationality”. 
 
2.  Chayanov, politics, structural change and transformation 
 
The next element in Chayanov is the link between structural change, transformation and politics. 
The contribution here is double: the first element is an implicit consequence of co-existing systems. 
Chayanov finds that the policy of a nation must actively integrate a multiple understanding of Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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agriculture. This is his position on differential agriculture policies. In order to avoid farmers being 
converted into a proletariat, the political focus must support the peasant family farm structure. 
Chayanov’s recommendation is the idea of the vertical integration of agriculture. In a Chayanovian 
perspective, this increase in horizontal concentration is an erroneous policy, because the 
consequence is a transformation of family farms into a farming proletariat. However, if such a 
structural change and transformation becomes fact, the only reason why, from a Chayanovian 
perspective, has address to a one-sided political focus on one – and only one – of the co-existing 
farm systems. The focus is on the capitalist farm. 
 
3.  The idea of structural change in the agrarian sector becomes a question of the concrete and 
context-dependent interaction within and between different modes of agricultural 
production; the development of the market prices for the products; the general development 
of the stock-market; and the ability to obtain financing. 
 
It is a fact that different modes of agricultural production have existed and continue to exist. 
Moreover, organic agriculture cannot be defined as a sole system. The existence of “hardcore” and 
“softcore” organic farmers has been a well-established discussion. This implies that any simple 
conclusion versus the micro-foundation of decision making may be interpreted cautiously. 
Generally, the question of prices counts for the support for the existence of organic agriculture. 
When the family farm makes their calculations, the market prices play an important role. On the one 
side, we know that the prices for organic products have been higher than conventional products. 
This should be an indicator for why organic agriculture exists from Chayanov’s point of view under 
the assumption that the higher price comes to the benefit of the organic farmer and not the retail- 
and distribution system. On the other side, the family farms must take into account the question of 
the general lower yield of products as compared with conventional production. The general 
situation in the stock market may be interpreted as a mechanism which either favours, disfavours or 
acts neutrally in the process of the occurrence and establishment of organic agriculture. Little can be 
said without further empirical investigation. This is similar as regards the question of credits. 
Chayanov’s theory appears rather complex, combining the macro, meso and micro perspectives. 
This combination is similar to Ingemann (Ingemann 1998a: ; Jørgensen 2002); when we include 
Chayanov`s theory of the co-existence of different agricultural systems, it emphasises the 
contemporary relevance of the Chayanovian perspective. 
 
 
Willard W. Cochrane 
The general descriptive framework 
Willard W. Cochrane represents a direction in American agricultural economics in which historical 
insights play a major role in order to understand agricultural evolution. Cochrane identifies two 
watersheds in the history of American agriculture, and he is open to a third, ongoing watershed. 
Watershed and our concept of transformation are subjects for discussion. The first passed during the 
period 1763-85. The existence of “free” land sparked an entirely new situation. Labour was scarce, 
capital was expensive, and land was cheap (Cochrane 1993: 184). The function of production was a Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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question of making the right combination of these input factors. The farmers expanded their estates, 
and the method of production was extensive farming. The result was poor land use. As of around 
1900, the situation regarding free land changed. As of that point, all land was in a form of 
cultivation and a process with three elements evolves: 
 
1.  Substitution of labour with machines 
2.  Increased productivity due to new and improved plants and breeds 
3.  Increased use of capital in the form of e.g. fertilisers and pesticides 
 
“The agricultural development process from 1920 to 1970 was the product of science and 
technology (Cochrane 1993: 377-378). From 1950-80, the general development was a story of the 
rapid adoption of the technological opportunities on farms. The less efficient, less aggressive 
farmers went out of business while larger and more productive farms were established. The 1980s 
were different; exports stopped increasing, prices levelled off, declined and then ultimately 
rebounded. Interest rates increased. “In this context highly credit leveraged farmers, large (our 
accentuation) and small, went out of business in large numbers” (Cochrane 1993: 379). We 
suddenly have a situation where the definition of being ineffective must incorporate the farmers 
with large credits. Due to the continued substitution of labour with capital, the price of capital 
becomes an issue of vital importance to the concept of productivity and efficiency. Ceteris paribus, 
larger is not always better. Large-scale production appears to have a limit. Cochrane does not 
follow this track, focusing instead on aggregates. 
  Cochrane documents the development in productivity from 1948-1989 and focuses on 
the era of the 1980s. Here, for the first time, inputs in all factor categories decline. His hypothesis 
for this change differs from his general approach to the technological influence on agriculture. 
Instead of addressing the change to the adoption of technology, the reason for the discrepancy is 
better management and the controlled use of the productive resources. According to Cochrane, we 
have entered a new age – the age of a mature, industrialised agriculture. Cochrane is open to a 
watershed starting in the 1980s focusing on the world market and the mode of food production and 
distribution. Proceeding deeper into the watershed and combining the situation with the ability to 
finance, Cochrane states that the financial control of the enterprise may not always be in the hands 
of the farmer. Cochrane mentions that banks often exercise financial control over a farm, but they 
are not inclined to provide the innovative leadership that leads to a modern industrialised farm. 
Other enterprises do have this expertise, however. Feed companies and processing companies have 
entered the poultry-producing units. This is also occurring in vegetable and pork production and 
meat-processing enterprises. In addition to the financial control, the control over production itself 
increases, leaving the farmer as a kind of employee of the controlling the company. This is the 
central element in “The Mature Industrial age”.  This is Cochrane’s general, long-term description 
and explanation of agricultural structural change and transformation. 
 
The specific descriptive framework 
In his complex, descriptive explanation, Cochrane identifies 10 forces he regards as being important 
to explain the historic change in American agriculture. The 10 forces represent what can more or 
less be regarded as his guess about which forces must have been important. There is no Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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argumentation or reference to any selection process. We have systematised the forces in three 
categories: 
 
1.  The main force is technological development. 
2.  This force is supported by other forces defined as the input industries, research and 
education, the world trade, the environment issue
15 and the role of government. 
3.  The third force is a residual consisting of three additional forces. 
 
 
The causal connection between technological and structural change is a firm part of Cochrane’s 
analysis. Technological advance is his central concept. The basic assumption in the theory is the 
definition of farming as an atomistic industry. The output of the single unit is too small compared to 
the total output of the industry, meaning that the units become price takers. If the individual unit 
wishes to improve its economy, the means for doing so is the reduction of unit costs. By reducing 
unit costs, losses are reduced or profits possibly raised. The means for reducing unit costs is the 
adoption of new technology. New technology offers the solution to the individual farmers’ problem 
of reducing unit costs. Consequently, the incentive for adoption is latent. The main mechanisms in 
this technological adoption process is represented by the theory of treadmills and the cannibalism 
process. The substitution of labour with capital made farmers more dependent on off-farm sources. 
The increasing dependence on credit and financing from external partners placed the farmers in a 
new and more complex position: “… it means the farm operator, if he is to be successful, must be 
an expert not only in the complex modern technology of farming but also in credit and finance” 
(Cochrane 1993: 205).  
Cochrane states: “Development of the agricultural sector without the services that flow from the 
required infra-structural elements is impossible” (Cochrane 1993: 210). He illustrates the 
development of this structure with a focus upon: 
 
1.  Systems of transport, roads, bridges, canals, railroads, highways, water resources and rural 
electricity. 
2.  The input industries
16 including marketing industries. 
 
In the second part of the physical infrastructure, the direct reference for Cochrane is the long term 
change in agricultural inputs of capital from 17-58% of all inputs. “For this transformation to occur 
on farms, a development had to take place in the complementary input industries” (Cochrane 1993: 
228-229). Cochrane mentions that the industries – the petroleum, tractor and farm machinery 
industries, the fertiliser industry, the pesticide industry and the livestock feed industry – “had to 
develop the production plants and the distributive organization – the infrastructure – to permit and 
facilitate the capital transformation on farms” (Cochrane 1993: 229).  
  On the basis of the marketing industry, the concept “Marketing Bill for domestically 
produced farm foods” is introduced. “The marketing bill is the difference between the farm value 
                                                 
15 The inclusion of the environment as a special issue is new in the second edition compared with the first edition from 
1979.  
16 If we should follow the theoretical universe of neoclassical economics, there should be a profit motive. This motive is 
not mentioned by Cochrane, and we must ask whether this can cause any bias for Cochrane’s general theory? Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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and consumer expenditures for these foods both at food stores and away-form-home eating places. 
Thus, it covers processing, wholesaling, transportation, and retailing costs and profits” (Cochrane 
1993: 232nc). The marketing bill
17 increased nearly eight-fold over a 30-year period. With 
reference to the entire physical infrastructure, his conclusion is: “It is (their role, our remark ) to 
provide farm operators with favourable economic options” (Cochrane 1993: 233). The physical 
infrastructure provides opportunity for farmers to make economic progress. It is up to the farmers to 
make use of the opportunities.  
The first professors of agriculture at Yale date back to 1845. Since then, education and 
research relating to agriculture and food production have increased. There is a division of labour 
between public and private R&D. Public research is primarily about carrying out basic research and 
the training of scientific personnel, while private research concentrates on the development of 
technologies for sale to farmers. Consequently, this infrastructure is an integrated aspect of the 
structural change in the agricultural sector. The importance of research and development is hardly a 
new phenomenon. As Cochrane points out with special attention to part of the general infrastructure 
for knowledge support to farmers: “In this organizational arrangement the extension service is 
providing farmers with essential the same service in the 1990 as it did in 1917, but the new 
organizational arrangement recognizes the increased specialization in science and technology” 
(Cochrane 1993: 251). The general historic skills to create a system of knowledge support underpin 
the farmers’ organisational power and political influence as an historical factor and context-
independent.  
  American agriculture depends on the world market and the existence of the world 
market because of “overproduction”, e.g. 30 percent of its annual crop production is exported. 
While exports are generally important for agricultural structural change, the importation of 
agricultural products has no particular influence. Cochrane’s perspective generally appears to hold 
the existence of world market dependency as a fact. From then on, it becomes a question of politics.  
With reference to Clayton Koppers, Cochrane summarises the three notions or principles behind 
the American use of nature.  
 
·  Abundance of unclaimed nature 
·  Natural resources were inexhaustible 
·  Immediate use of resources was best 
 
Beyond these principles, there is and has been: 
 
·  A judicial system providing support 
·  A political philosophy of maximising freedom 
·  An economic system in which the market is the determinant 
 
Cochrane concludes the following about the American system: “… with some minor exceptions, 
they had completed this task by 1890” (Cochrane 1993: 283). How has it evolved during the last 
100 years, and what is the relationship between the environment and agricultural development? The 
short answer is: the politics in the United States have more or less remained the same over 200 
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years. Over a 100-year period, environmentalism first took shape as a movement in the period 
1960-80. “Carson’s ‘Silent Spring’ signalled the beginning of the movement” (Cochrane 1993: 294-
295). However, the various laws, commissions, programmes and agencies focusing on the 
environment were implemented and the ecological crisis continued to deepen. “By the end of the 
1970s, and in spite of the many corrective actions taken by the federal government … problems of 
environmental degradation and pollution in the United States appeared to be increasing” (Cochrane 
1993: 300). Cochrane addresses the reason: “A whole new set of problems that had their origin in 
the massive and careless disposal of industrial chemical and wastes were beginning to show up 
across the nation.” This quote may be the most direct link between agricultural structural change 
and environmental change in Cochrane’s analysis. Agriculture is indirectly seen as an industry 
partner. The Reagan and Bush period in the 1980s was a period in which the principle of taming 
nature nearly totally returned to the principles listed above. “The free market can solve 
environmental problems better than government regulation” (Cochrane 1993: 302). By the end of 
the 1980s, the so-called third generation of problems became reality: the greenhouse effect, global 
warming, thinning of the ozone layer, acid rain, tropical deforestation, extinction of species, and 
ocean and coastal pollution (Cochrane 1993). In his second-last essay, these problems are placed in 
a general concept in which the entire economy of the United States is analysed. From this general 
diagnosis, Cochrane claims that the environmental problems have become an obstacle and a threat 
against the entire American community; a solution related to sustainability must therefore be 
implemented. The proposed environmental program is one of the eight programmes constituting 
Cochrane’s policy proposal, and the elements include e.g. a stop on the sale of public land and a 
general concept in order to protect the biological diversity via management in “an ecologically 
responsible manner” (Cochrane 1997: 20). This is the closest Cochrane gets to organic agriculture 
as a phenomenon. 
  What is Cochrane’s explanation for this historical development? “It came about 
through the developmental activities of man” (Cochrane 1993: 303)
18. Instead of dealing with a 
further explanation, Cochrane turns attention to a solution. His answer with address to the 
agricultural sector is a question of right management and the means is “sustainable agriculture”.
19 In 
general, the solution is a question to be solved by national and international political leaders 
(Cochrane 1993: 306). In conclusion, Cochrane may be claimed to have developed a “natural law of 
the human exploitation of the earth.” If problems arise, the law must be regulated; it is a question of 
political leadership. 
Governments in the United States and western countries in general have been closely involved 
in agricultural structural change. State intervention in agricultural economics counts four principal 
categories: 
 
                                                 
18 The interpretation of this sentence may go in two directions: first, and cutting to the bone, this is an analogical answer 
to “It happened because it happened”. Second, it happened because of the nature of man. If the focus is on the latter 
interpretation, “Homo Economicus” has entered the stage without being mentioned directly. 
19 We are not going to elaborate on the definitions of “sustainable agriculture” presented by Cochrane or others. The 
only comment is: The definition of “Sustainability” depends on the concrete context (se e.g. Norgaard, R. B. (1994). 
Development Betrayed. The end of progress and a coevolutionary revisioning of the future. London and New York, 
Routledge, McNeill, D. (2000). The Concept of Sustainable Development. Global Sustainable Development in the 
Twenty-First Century. A. Holland, McNeill, D. Edingburgh, Edinburgh University Press.)  
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1.  Economic subsidies via price support 
2.  Economic subsidies via money, banking and credit 
3.  Regulation aimed at changing the structure of the market 
4.  Regulation aimed at changing the trade policy 
 
The history of agricultural development is also a history of politicians providing support in order to 
avoid farm crises and to protect their own political interests due to voters and lobby groups. 
American agricultural policy has never been laissez faire. To the contrary, this policy has always, 
more or less, been actively seeking to secure the economy of the farmers; however, it has not served 
all farmers equally. Cochrane’s conclusion is that the system has favoured the largest farmers. 
  In conclusion, the role of government is crucial in explaining the direction of 
structural change in the agricultural sector. When a major economic crisis occurs, the government 
has provided economic support. When the world market has failed, the government must purchase 
the residual products; otherwise, too many farmers would go bankrupt. On the one side, this is a 
threat against the consumers; on the other side, the farmers and their communities are voters. Policy 
and politics matter in Cochrane’s universe.  
According to Cochrane, three other forces may be taken into account. They are: 
 
1.  Prosperity and Depression 
2.  Belief and Value 
3.  Energy Availability 
 
These three elements operate at a different level of abstraction and represent both material and 
immaterial dimensions in Cochrane’s analytical framework. Without arguments, Cochrane 
concludes: 
 
Other observers of the process of agricultural development in the United States might 
well identify still additional forces, and they almost certainly would categorize those 
forces somewhat differently from the way it was done in this volume. But the 
discussion in this chapter will focus on the three additional forces noted above 
(Cochrane 1993: 335-336). 
 
His concept of agricultural development is multidimensional. “It is a mistake to view 
the process of agricultural development in the United States as the product of a single, or monistic, 
cause, or force.” All of the forces are important, and the absence of “any one of them would have 
operated to slow or cripple the process of agricultural development” (Cochrane 1993: 347)
20. The 
confusion about the ranking or non-ranking of the Cochrane-forces can be further illustrated. His 
statement is very clear in the beginning of his discussion about ranking; ranking is impossible. “It 
would be nice in a work such as this to rank the various forces of agricultural development in their 
order of importance. The author will not do this, however for one important reason: he does not 
know how to do it” (Cochrane 1993: 341).  
                                                 
20 Note that Cochrane’s argument is similar to co-evolutionary economics. We pursue this direction of economics in the 
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  The reason for the limitation can be discussed from his own perspective and on the 
basis of his own definition of structure. Cochrane writes the following about “structure”:  
 
This term refers to the form and characteristics of an industry or a sector of the 
economy. It is concerned with the size, number, and location of business firms in an 
industry, with the essential technological and resource characteristics of an industry 
and with the basic organizational and institutional characteristics of an industry 
(Cochrane 1993: 6). 
 
On the one hand, Cochrane’s idea of structure deals with at least three dimensions. First, he has a 
“physical dimension I” relating to observable facts defined as size, number and location. Second, 
there is a “physical dimension II” relating to the mode of production defined as the use of 
technology and resources. The definition of resources remains unspecified. The third and final 
dimension refers to the institutional landscape within the industry. The definition of – and 
differences between – organisation and institution remain unspecified. Furthermore, any possible 
connections and dependence between industries or sectors are not discussed. Consequently, the 
definition of structure is both quite broad and limited; it is open for interpretation and the definition 
generally lacks the precision normally characteristic for a definition. 
  We have rewritten Cochrane’s definition of structural development; or, in our 
terminology, structural change: 
 
1.  The first dimension regarding change in the concentration and location of production 
2.  The second dimension regarding change in the technical mode of production 
3.  The third dimension regarding change in the organisation of production 
 
With the establishment of this definition, the Cochrane description of the structural change in 
American agriculture must be based upon these three dimensions and a more firm framework may 
appear.  
The general theory of agricultural structural change 
Cochrane has constructed an index of average per capita food consumption for the period 1910-
1990. Based upon prices and quantity, the index captures changes in both. The index reveals three 
important things about the demand for food: first, the income effect is modest; second, demand for 
food has varied directly with population; and third, demand is highly unresponsive to price. 
Generally speaking, the demand for food is highly inelastic. There are two explanations: first, the 
size of the human stomach limits the capacity of human digestion; second, food has very few 
substitutes. What is true for the aggregates is not true for individual food products. The demand for 
individual products varies with shifts in e.g. personal income and advertising. Cochrane does not 
make it possible to generalise about the behaviour of food demand for individual products before 
single case studies of each product have been analysed.  
  Because of the high inelasticity for both supply and demand, even modest changes in 
demand cause considerable changes, e.g. a 5% increase in demand generates a 25% increase in farm 
product price levels. The conclusion is that: 
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The food producing sector of agriculture, which is most of the industry, is basically an 
unstable industry. In a free market situation any small change in demand relative to 
supply, or in supply relative to demand, must produce wide swings in the farm food 
product price level and as a consequence give rise to large fluctuations in the gross 
returns to the producers of food (Cochrane 1993: 411).  
 
This was the theory; in practice, the story has been different. This is why Cochrane concludes that a 
free market model cannot be used to explain the history of American agricultural development in 
the post-WWII era. Government intervention must be included in the model.  
Some products have highly unstable prices, whereas other products have greater price 
stability. However, the variations are not random because of the process of substitution between 
products, both from the point of view of the farmers and the consumers. “The force substitution, 
like the force of gravity, works continuously to pull individual food commodity prices towards the 
food commodity price level. But it never succeeds completely” (Cochrane 1993: 415). This creates 
a moving farm food product price level. Dual instability results. First, there is the general price 
instability. Second, there is the commodity price instability. The general unstable price level can 
make farmers rich; or the opposite. It therefore leads to government intervention. The unstable 
commodity prices lead to inefficiency and resource allocation problems. And as Cochrane 
comments, “(it) seems to tantalize economist and command their almost complete attention, to the 
neglect of the consequences of the former [the general price instability]” (Cochrane 1993: 416).  
We are in the position to demonstrate Cochrane’s 1958 theory (Cochrane 1958), 
which has never been empirically tested. However, “Much of the evidence since then has supported 
the theory” (Cochrane, 1996: 550). The point of departure is chart A. We have an aggressive farmer 
named “Mr. Early Bird”, who adopts a new and improved technology. As a result, his marginal cost 
reduces from MC1 to MC2. 
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Figure 4: The theory of the treadmill. Firm and industry solutions in a free market 
 
 
With a fixed price exceeding the price he is able to compete against, he will bring a larger quantity 
to the market (OB instead of OA) defined by the point at which his new marginal cost equals the 
average cost (R). As a result, he is able to produce more and earn a profit: the area P1RST. Other 
farmers will follow “Mr. Early Bird”, and they too will gain profit. In chart B, the process achieves 
a new equilibrium and expresses the situation where more farmers have adopted the new technology 
and total market supply has increased. In a free market economy, this increase will cause the price 
to fall to P2, and the economic gains to all of the adopters of the technology are eliminated. In the 
long run, the winners are those consumers who acquire the same amount but at a lower price. The 
losers are “the laggard farmers” who fail to adopt. At the new price P2, their cost structure remains 
ATUC1 and their losses equal the rectangle P1RSP2. 
  However, the fall in prices is the logic of a free market; reality operates differently. 
Cochrane has U.S. politics in mind when further expanding the theory of the treadmill.  
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Figure 5: The treadmill solution with government intervention and cannibalism 
 
Source: (Cochrane 1993: 430) 
 
In his example, quantity will grow – from A to B to C and finally D – but the price will not fall due 
to the fixed government price P1. To acquire greater profit, farmers want to expand production. 
Under constant return to scale, farmers expand to position 3. With given technology, the only means 
of expanding is the purchase of new land. The competition to acquire new land thus increases, 
which leads to increasing land prices. Already at this point, the number of farmers must have 
declined, because all land is already in use. Given a higher price of land, the cost structure changes 
until marginal cost and average cost are in equilibrium. This is the case at the fixed government 
price P1 at quantity D. Each of the involved firms has expanded output, and the farms have become 
larger. The land value has increased; so has the production unit cost. The process can now be 
repeated with the introduction and adoption of new technology. Cochrane concludes: “Thus we see 
that cannibalism is an integral, and indeed a necessary, part of farm technological advance with 
fixed prices” (Cochrane 1993: 431-432). 
  Consequently, the theory of the treadmill is adequate, both in the case of free 
competition as well as a government-steered economy with public subsidies for farmers. And as 
Cochrane underlines, the “product market” treadmill has been replaced by the “land market” 
treadmill. Or stated alternatively: cannibalism is possible because of public subsidies to farmers. 
The economic subsidies are used to press land prices upwards.  
 
In the main, the landowners who have benefited from government programs of price 
and income support have been the larger, aggressive, innovative farmers in each 
farming community, who have used the income assistance from government to 
acquire additional land (Cochrane 1993: 433). 
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The fundamental reason for the existence of the entire process is due to the scarce and limited 
production factor: land.  
  Before proceeding to the issue of land, we have a number of comments. First, 
Cochrane’s theoretical concept is directly borrowed from Schumpeter. His theory of economic 
development has merely been transplanted to the farm scene (Cochrane 1993: 452). Despite the 
missing empirical testing, our hypothesis or speculation is that the theory of the treadmill, 
developed on the basis of the prices works in the same way, whatever the government support is 
called. The same logic of argumentation is possible if we substitute the price P1 in the figure with a 
measure named “economic subsidy”. The process of change in politics from subsidies on product 
prices to subsidies on e.g. exports or subsidies for owing acres does not provide a reference to alter 
the theory. Why? Because it still provides incentives to direct the production process into a specific 
kind of order. In the case of export subsidies, the aggressive farmers will allocate resources to the 
area with assistance from new and improved technology, and the process will be the same as shown. 
If the question of subsidies refers to owning land, then the subsidy will be capitalised into the land 
prices. 
While Cochrane’s treadmill theory from 1958 has been well adopted into agricultural 
economics, one of the last of his articles, “The treadmill revisited” (Cochrane 1996), has been rather 
neglected in both the theoretical and practical national and international agricultural economics 
debate. This is a rather peculiar situation, as the article introduces further refinement of the 1958 
theory. If the theory refers to reality, then the economic consequences work towards one – and only 
one – limit: the limit is monopoly and a situation with one – and only one – landowner. Such an 
economic perspective may involve political implications and forward a potential challenge to the 
general institutional agricultural set-up.  
We now go a little step further and make Cochrane’s contributions more explicit than 
the theoretician himself. As demonstrated by Cochrane, it may be far more appropriate to talk about 
two kinds of interacting treadmills. While the first treadmill is well developed in the literature, the 
second is rather ignored. However, the second treadmill is more fundamental to agrarian change 
than the first, because it goes deeper and beyond the institutional set-up established with the 
recognition of the property rights. Cochrane’s contribution establishes the concept of property rights 
as a dynamic concept, which involves non-farming actors. First, Cochrane demonstrates that the 
financial sector and landowners represent the directly relevant institutions. These institutions are the 
long-term winners in the game of agrarian structural change under the assumption that the concrete 
and historic continuous rise of land prices continues. Secondly, the innovators and producers of new 
technology become winners, while, generally speaking, the losers are the public and the farmers, 
taken as a unit. Thirdly, the treadmills are in favour of the living generations at the expense of the 
coming generations. Cochrane’s contribution has introduced the price and land market treadmills. 
Where the price treadmill finds its winner among the farmers, the land market treadmill finds its 
winners outside of the productive agricultural sector. These results are important, but they also 
represent a theoretical and practical “breakthrough” in the discussion of the understanding of 
agrarian structural change.  
  We could claim that the treadmills represent a social trap
21. In that case, it becomes 
relevant to investigate how to escape from the trap. Is it possible to escape from the two treadmills? 
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Cochrane discusses this subject, and the general conclusion is negative in relation to escaping from 
the treadmills. The treadmills operate outside of or within a free market. The single farmer may be 
able to remain ahead of his competitors, but the treadmills will remain in function. There is only 
one case in which the treadmill may be modified or even disappear; this is the case of uniqueness, 
which can relate to management, technology or the product itself. Theoretically, the situation is 
linked to monopoly, and Cochrane uses the term “quasi monopolist” in relation to the producer. 
However, that which is possibly a natural law – the natural law of treadmill and cannibalism – is 
open to another, competing “natural law”: the law of price formation under a situation with 
monopoly or monopolistic elements. 
 
Themes from Cochrane to the general theory 
We have identified a number of themes which, for whatever reason
22, are either poorly represented 
or missing from Cochrane’s general theory from 1993. The themes are related to: 
 
1.  Free competition and the input industries 
2.  Politics as good or bad 
3.  Economic subsidies, taxes and their effect 
4.  Politicians as farmers and their economic interest 
5.  Politicians as farmers and their lack of democratic interest 
 
 
I have sometimes thought that the shortest possible economic history of U.S. 
agriculture during the twentieth century would be this: non-farmers learning how to 
make money from farming … In any event, Cochrane’s prediction that the profits 
from an industrialized agriculture would go to non-farm investors, not to farmers, was 
right on the mark. This in turn, led rise of economic superpowers in the food system 
(Levins 2000 (2003): 8). 
 
The rather narrowed focus on the input industries in Cochrane’s main work stands in contrast to the 
above quote. His perspective casts light on the absence of free competition and critique is directed 
at the simplified division of the world in terms of the producers and consumers of food. 
 
There are people who grow food, and there are people who eat food … John Deere, 
Monsanto, Pioneer, and Cargill fit into neither theory. Invisible both to theory and to 
those who developed policies based on those theories, nonfarm corporations thrived 
while agricultural economists of both schools wring their hands over low returns in 
agriculture (Levins 2000 (2003): 42). 
 
With reference to why the best known economist of the age could not tell about the corporate 
profits of the day, Cochrane replied: “It never occurred us to look … You might as well have asked 
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us the diameter of Jupiter” (Levins 2000 (2003): 42). Consequently, the evolution of monopolies 
and oligopolies in the western and global economy versus the general notion of free competition 
must represent a perspective for further discussion in order to bring theory and real life closer to 
each other.  
The coherence between politics, economy and structural change is outlined in a 
discussion between Cochrane (Cochrane 1985) and the deputy staff director of the U.S. Committee 
on the Budget (Hoagland 1985). Cochrane’s general conclusion is: “Looking back over fifty years 
of farm price and income policies and programs, it would seem that the more things has changed the 
more they stayed the same” (Cochrane 1985: 1004). The analysis concludes that the policy has 
favoured the large and wealthy farmers, while the arguments for the policy refer to the millions of 
threatened farmers who are struggling to remain in business. This paradox becomes clear as the 
process continues from decade to decade. This is Cochrane’s argument to eliminate the price and 
income support “as quick as possibly” (Cochrane 1985: 1007). Cochrane does not propose a laissez-
faire farm policy. To the contrary, he focuses on the issues defined as “the critical problems of the 
food and agricultural sector” (Cochrane 1985: 1007). These problems are listed as: 
 
1.  The crisis of credit 
2.  Survival of the thousands of moderate-sized farms 
3.  The impact of the unstable currency on export 
4.  Trade barriers 
5.  Price and income instability 
6.  Soil erosion 
7.  Pollution from farming 
8.  The import of foreign workers  
9.  Tax policy supporting expansion and resource concentration in farming 
10. Hunger and malnutrition in general 
 
It is possible to identify a range of different theoretical references as the source of these ten 
problems. Cochrane’s general theory is represented in four of the problems (numbers 1, 2, 5 and 9); 
Management theory is represented in four of them (1, 6, 7 and 8); The general economic politics 
mechanism is represented in five of the ten problems (3, 4, 8, 9 and 10). The nature of the system of 
technology for conventional farming is addressed by two of the ten (6, 7)
23. In his article, Cochrane 
concentrates on the mechanisms belonging to his general theory
24. Which conclusions does 
Cochrane himself draw? 
  
In sum, I am not arguing to get government out of agriculture as a general ideological 
proposition. I am arguing to get government out of agriculture where it is helping one 
group of farmers do in another group. I am arguing to keep government in agriculture 
where it operates to make the competitive game of farming more fair to all concerned, 
hence, a more acceptable game for all concerned (Cochrane 1985:1009). 
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Cochrane’s position is to use politics to bring fairness into the process of treadmill and cannibalism. 
Hoagland (1985) is unable to critique Cochrane’s analysis technically. Instead, he claims the need 
to deal with the reality behind the political process. The number of lobbyists has grown, the 
fragmentation process has increased, and the chance to arrive at consensus has decreased. A change 
in the analytical perspective is required. The need for focusing on different interests and a more 
differentiated concept of politics is one of Hoagland’s central contributions. On the other hand, 
these perspectives are actually an implicit aspect of Cochrane’s article. 
  On the background of the theories of the treadmills, it can be argued that because of 
the inherent law of the struggle to buy land, land becomes what we may refer to as “an internal 
product of the agricultural logic of production”. The product is produced without the input of 
labour, capital or raw materials. The value added to the product is a result of the development itself. 
The theoretical background of the discussion of this value-added process as a result of a social 
development can be traced back to the doctrine of Henry Georges. We follow this perspective 
briefly and relate it to the recent reform of the EU. The Commission argues that they have proposed 
and implemented a decoupling of the subsidy away from the production process. This must be 
incorrect according to the optic of Cochrane’s general theory; land has been and remains a product 
for trade. The subsidy structure has changed, but the results are the same as earlier. This conclusion 
is strictly in accordance with Cochrane’s assessment in his 1985 article.  
  We will now follow Hoagland’s critique against Cochrane and make a simple 
illustration; it deals with politics understood as polity and involve the concrete politicians who are 
responsible for the legislation; and within this, the agricultural policy. We wish to make the 
following observations on the interaction between the EU subsidy and the selected, institutional 
players involved: 
 
1.  There has been a general tendency towards maintaining the EU-subsidy system as is. The 
position towards transparency and democratic insight has been and remains a slow-moving 
historical process. As an illustration, it must be stressed that in the majority of the EU 
countries, insight into the files of how much subsidy each person and company get, as e.g. in 
the case of Denmark, has been and continues to be denied by the public authorities. 
2.  It is not unusual for farmers to be disproportionately represented among politicians. This has 
been a pattern throughout history, nationally as well as internationally. It is worth noting 
that nearly all of the involved Danish farmer politicians employ the conventional, 
agricultural technology system. 
3.  It is not unusual that the large farmers, including the old monarch system, as landowners 
have received public subsidies. This also has been a pattern throughout history, nationally as 
well as internationally. And again it must be noted that nearly all employ the conventional, 
agricultural technology system. 
4.  It is not unusual that members of the highest agricultural institution have received public 
subsidies. This too has been a pattern throughout history, nationally as well as 
internationally. The interesting data is that the subsidy e.g. to Danishs members from the EU 
in 2003, vastly exceeded the general average for the farmers. This underlines the 
institutional structure in the most influent agricultural organisation, where it can be 
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board of director with a “president” as chairman of the board
25. Once again, it is worth 
noting that all of the directors of the board employ the conventional, agricultural technology 
system. 
 
  
The question is: what should their motive be to work for cutting or reducing the subsidies? This 
question can be related to at least three kinds of motives: 
 
1.  A microeconomic motive 
2.  A mesoeconomic motive 
3.  A macroeconomic motive 
 
The first perspective deals with the nature of mankind; in Cochrane’s universe, this is a question of 
maximising the profit of the farm. Consequently, would it not be contrary to the theory if the 
involved politicians were to work towards eliminating their privileges and money? The second 
perspective refers to the interest of the farming organisation. Cochrane deals with this perspective in 
his discussions about the influence of lobbyism, where the aim of the farmers is to obtain as much 
money and protection as possible. We assess that Cochrane’s position is likely the first perspective. 
The means for acquiring this aim deal with the nature of politics and the level of power. The third 
perspective is the only complex issue. However, we can state that the macroeconomic motive is a 
question of policy, politics and polity.  
  All three perspectives directly influence “The Rules of The Game” and the role of the 
politicians, who are also involved in farming, must be judged to have status as a stabilising and 
preserving factor, meaning that “The Rules of the Game” do not change with the help from those 
politicians. Generally, the existence of a subsidy system constitutes a context that cannot be ignored 
as an existing mechanism in agrarian structural change and transformation. In this context, the 
element of policy and politics can be argued to be up against the existing polity structure. With this 
conclusion, the question of dealing with structures of power becomes an unavoidable aspect of any 
theoretical and empirical analysis of agricultural structural change and transformation. 
Cochrana and Organic Agriculture 
How is it possible to use Cochrane’s theories to understand the origins and establishment of organic 
agriculture? We investigate this question from two different approaches: 
 
1.  Organic agriculture as a “natural” result of the social evolution with focus on the 
introduction of new technology and research and development activities. 
2.  Organic agriculture as uniqueness – organic agriculture as quasi-monopoly. 
 
Ad.1: Within Cochrane’s apparatus, it appears difficult to explain the appearance of a new 
phenomenon without reference to the introduction of new or improved technology. Anything else in 
his system is part of an evolutionary process in which the forces at any time have influence on the 
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direction of the structural change. The roots of the organic technology system may be claimed to 
relate to the Rudolf Steiner concept from the 1920s. In Denmark, experience with the biodynamic 
concept was acquired in the 1930s (Jacobsen, 2005). Both concepts were nearly non-existent in the 
commercial market, and the scope of production at the macro level was nearly non-existent. In the 
1970s, organic agriculture was established by grassroots (Ingemann, 2006). This means that the 
distance in historical time between the introduction of the technology system and the diffusion of 
the technology system has been a long-term history. How is Cochrane’s apparatus able to argue that 
this new technology was the initial source of the origins and establishment of organic agriculture? 
Cochrane would focus on the second half of his technology concept and talk about the improvement 
of existing technology. Ingemann (2006) and Jacobsen (2005) both state the importance of the 
establishment of the first educational system specialised in organic farming in 1982. Moreover, 
Jacobsen (2005) selectively focuses on the long-term struggle since the end of the 1970s until 1985 
for the implementation of both education and R&D activity. Jacobsen (2005) discusses the 
introduction of publicly financed research as a struggle between enthusiastic individuals and the 
existing system. This gives us the sense that the establishment of organic research may be claimed 
to occur despite public institutions rather than because of public institutions. This may also form 
part of the explanation as to why organic agriculture was a slow starter as an alternative system. If 
this argument is accepted, the question of organic agriculture as a niche rather than an alternative to 
the conventional technological system may be due to a low level of R&D and institutional barriers 
and resistance. 
  Here we must refresh the general idea that the “early birds” adopt new and improved 
technology, make a profit and expand their business. The next step ought to be for the average 
farmers to follow and adopt the technology. From a Cochrane-inspired position, we should argue 
that the increasing numbers of organic farms and organic use of land provides the empirical 
evidence. In the 1990s, the expansion of organic agriculture became a reality. If we assume this 
position, however, we have created a new problem: why did all farmers not convert from 
conventional agriculture to organic agriculture? The first conclusion within this perspective must be 
that the explanatory power of Cochrane’s apparatus appears weak. 
  However, the Cochrane apparatus enjoys support once we introduce another 
perspective to support the above argumentation. The perspective refers to the interpretation of 
Cochrane’s notion of time versus the introduction of new and improved technology. What happens 
if we assume that the technological system of organic farming is so complicated that the notion of 
“new and improved technology” must be interpreted on the basis of a decades-long time frame 
rather than one or two years? This is speculation, but the presented idea may be relevant in order to 
maintain technology as a main mechanism instead of an inherent and supporting mechanism.  
  The next perspective also deals with technology. If we split up the Cochrane definition 
of technology in parts, the first part can refer to the technical machinery and technical infrastructure 
of the farm. The second part relates to the “seed in a broad sense” of the production and process 
from “seed to product”. In many ways – but not all – the technological systems are different for 
conventional/chemical agriculture and organic agriculture, respectively. The main difference is the 
idea of productivity. The conventional neoclassical ‘Cochranian’ system refers to scale, unit costs 
and price. The organic agricultural concept of productivity is broader and based upon the principles 
of organic farming, where e.g. ecological balance and improvement (or unchanged) soil quality is 
part of the concept. We have different productive systems; only parts of the systems are similar. The Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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literature tells us that the unit cost for production is generally higher in the organic system. This is 
the general idea to date. But what about their productivity? In Cochrane’s universe, their 
productivity must be the same. Elsewhere, capital from one of the systems would flow to other 
systems; only the most productive system would survive. The co-existence of the two systems is a 
fact. In such a situation, Cochrane must introduce supply and demand for food. Generally, Cochrane 
does not regard the supply and demand for food and the question of food prices as a particularly 
influential factor. In our case, we have two different products sharing something in common: both 
products are named “food”. How do the demand and supply curves react? In its totality, the demand 
curve is inelastic in terms of price, but we have demonstrated the existence of the substitution of 
different food products. In a situation with two apparently similar products, the consumer will 
demand the product with the lowest price. The consumer will choose the higher-priced product only 
when: 
 
1.  The consumer prefers the product, for whatever reason. 
2.  The consumer only has access to the expensive product, for whatever reason. 
 
It is a fact that organic food is generally more expensive than conventional food. We therefore 
assume that the expensive product always represents the organic product. If we take the latter 
explanation first, then our claim is that this situation will always be covered by the former issue, the 
function of preference. If the market you visit only contains organic products, it is because the 
consumer has chosen this market because of preferences. On the other hand, it is more likely that 
the consumer might have difficulties gaining access to the expensive organic products. Because of 
the difficulties gaining access to alternatives to conventional food products, we will reduce the 
above two situations to the situation of preferences. The consequences of argumentation are two 
different products, each with their own demand and supply curves. How they co-exist may vary 
from product to product for whatever reason. The conclusion of both the demand and supply curve 
must relate to consumer preferences. This means that as long as the concept of productivity rests on 
Cochrane’s definition, we will only be able to understand the existence of organic agriculture with 
reference to consumer preferences. In order to understand the weakness in such an explanation, we 
must imagine a shift in the concept of productivity to that of organic agriculture. The externalities 
from conventional agriculture and the externalities from organic agriculture must now be 
incorporated in the price. Assume that the conventional prices increased and become higher than 
organic food. This may shift all of the preferences towards organic food. However, is this because 
of preference or price? The point is that any institutional set-up affects the concept of productivity; 
however, it is not possible to capture this point in Cochrane’s apparatus. 
  The third perspective deals with the core of Cochrane’s theory: the treadmills. When 
we have two systems, does this mean that we must deal with an organic agricultural technical price 
treadmill and a ditto conventional? And further, does this also mean that we must deal with an 
organic agricultural land market treadmill and a ditto conventional? If an organic farmer wants to 
expand, he is competing with other farmers; both organic and conventional. As demonstrated above, 
we have two agricultural systems, both in equilibrium. Elsewhere, capital would move. For 
whatever reason, both systems are able to achieve a profitable level of production by expanding 
their amount of land. The competition for land will tend to equal the price for any land at a given 
equilibrium level. The general explanation is the need for more land and the scarcity of land. Land Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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is land. And land is a scarce resource, which has a monopoly price; and there cannot be two 
different monopoly prices. This is why organic and chemical land have the same price. 
Ad. 2: The second approach has reference to the uniqueness of organic agriculture due 
to management, the technology and/or the product. The idea of uniqueness introduced by Cochrane 
is the only means by which to escape the treadmills. Uniqueness makes the concept of monopoly 
relevant. The labelling of organic food with the so-called red “ø-label” in 1990 provided organic 
farmers with a monopoly on the supply side. From then on, the public authorities controlled the 
production, and all organic farmers had to be certified in order to obtain access to the “white” 
markets for organic food. With a monopoly, the farmers ought to be able to take a mark-up price 
and be better off than their conventional neighbours. It is an empirical fact that the typical organic 
products had – and have – a price above the conventional product. But it is important to state that 
the supply monopoly established by organic products may be interpreted as a technical monopoly as 
opposed to a real monopoly. As noted, there is a competitive situation in the market for food in 
which it is possible to make substitutes. This means that the uniqueness is an apparent uniqueness. 
The question about whether this apparent uniqueness is transferred to a real uniqueness becomes the 
subject of interest. This question is not part of Cochrane’s theory, which leaves us with the element 
of speculation. An initial conclusion relates to the opportunity to escape the treadmills by becoming 
organic farmers, which is then reduced to a question of the function of the market and consumer 
preferences. This would be Cochrane’s conclusion. 
 
Conclusion 
Cochrane is in many respects locked into his neoclassical economic universe. However, his general 
long-term descriptive explanation provides major insights concerning the scarcity of land as the 
reason for the growth in the size of the agricultural units. The ongoing technological innovation 
process renders it possible for farmers to increase their productivity as measured without taking into 
account the externalities from their production. Such accounting is a matter of politics.  
  When Cochrane evolves his specific descriptive explanation and integrates his ten 
forces, he encounters problems and ends up with a kind of “anything matters” explanation. 
However, technological innovations matter more than the rest. 
Turning our attention to Cochrane’s treadmills, the insight becomes clearer. The land 
market treadmill is an important contribution to understanding why land prices and rent tend to 
increase while agricultural structural change tends to continue a process with fewer and larger farms 
with an increased trend of absentee ownership. Cochrane’s theory is generally a theory of a 
transformation of ownership and the re-allocation of wealth from people without land to land-
owning persons or institutions. The economic subsidies to agriculture fuel this structural and 
transformational process. One of the factors contributing to this policy has been the influence by 
farmers and their organisations. Cochrane draws a new perspective in a final viewpoint regarding 
the lack of free competition in the market and the general neglect of the input industries in 
agriculture and their economic interest. Turning attention to organic agriculture, the contributions 
from Cochrane become scarce. Our attempt to focus attention on technological innovations and 
provide them with explanatory power ultimately ends as a rather speculative conclusion. When we 
further focus on the co-existence of two different technological systems, Cochrane’s apparatus 
assists us with the concept of preferences as the reason for the existence of organic agriculture. The Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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last element in Cochrane’s theory is his portrayal of organic agriculture as a quasi-monopoly. Such 
explanation ultimately rests upon the function of the market and consumer preferences. Cochrane 
provides much insight, but his general apparatus is weak in relation to structuring these insights to 
form a wholesome theory capable of contributing to an integrated explanation providing an overall 
understanding organic agriculture and the process of structural change and transformation of 
agriculture.  
The Cochrane Perspective and the Hvelplund Approach 
In his doctoral thesis (Hvelplund 2005), Hvelplund assembles a comprehensive toolbox for action 
research. His explicit object generally includes references to the co-existence of different 
technologies and the evolution of these technologies as a historical process. This situation is similar 
to ours, where organic agriculture co-exists with other forms of agriculture. The aim is to establish 
an adequate model enabling scientific society to explain history and predict the future landscape. 
The point of departure for his argumentation is the established, textbook, neoclassical economic 
theory, “the abstract institutional economy”.  
His concrete context: environmental planning. Within this context, he has conducted an analysis 
of the economic, theoretical principles of regulation during three decades: from 1974 to 2001. He 
identifies the underlying principles as a theoretical combination of traditional neoclassic economics 
and a portion of Austrian neoclassical theory. According to Hvelplund, the difference between the 
Austrian way of thinking and pure neoclassicism is based upon the assumption that the Austrian 
theory argues for the existence of strong powers within the market capable of destroying the 
existence of oligopolies and monopolies. Consequently, any regulation of the market in relation to 
market failures is more or less unnecessary. In the pure neoclassical position, regulation is 
necessary in order to secure free competition. At issue for Hvelplund is the establishment of the 
epistemological framework based on the abstract neoclassical economic universe. The abstract 
neoclassical model operates with four boxes: 
 
1.  Market 
2.  Goals – objectives for politics 
3.  Basic institutional assumptions – the institutional set-up 
4.  Public regulation 
 
Hvelplund argues for the need for the application of neoclassical economics in the real world. 
Within boxes two and three, there are different sub-boxes and, which is the point, Hvelplund claims 
that two of them are black boxes in the abstract neoclassical model: concrete context and the wish 
for direction. The notion of epistemology has been opened by incorporating the historical, concrete 
institutional and technological contexts into the analysis. It is this integration which potentially 
enables the political processes to operate in a far more complex and detailed discussion. The 
explicit focus on the wish for direction for societal change is established as an integrated aspect of 
the model and signifies a shift from a mechanic to a dynamic understanding of structural change in 
an economy. The differences between the abstract neoclassical economy and the concrete 
institutional economic models are: 
 Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
Aalborg University, Denmark.  
    Department of Economics, Politics and Public Administration 
  40 
1.  Whether we have a free market situation or whether the market is embedded in institutions 
and we do not have a free market. 
2.  Whether we have economic optimisation or not, where the latter situation refers to the result 
of historical institutions. 
3.  Firms are rational and optimising units or firms are rational and optimising, but they have 
different rationales, different stages of development and different patterns of reaction. 
4.  Context does not matter or context matters. 
5.  It is necessary or unnecessary to analyse the cost structure and organisational dynamics of 
the firm. 
6.  Whether policy rules via market tools or with both market tools and systematic changes to 
the institutions in which the market is embedded. 
 
The first part of each point reflects the neo-classical economic praxis, while the latter represents the 
institutional economic praxis. We may argue that, until now, the similarities between Cochrane and 
Hvelplund are complementary. It is the next step in his modelling which makes Hvelplund special. 
We start with reference to the analytical main structure. Our claim is that the figure could have been 
named explicitly: “The model of societal power”. We shall argue for this: 
Figure 6: The Hvelplund model of societal power 
 
Political Political process process and  and technological technological change change
Goals
a.Environmental and 
innovation efficiency.
b.Price- and cost efficiency.
c.Security of supply.
d.Democratic eff.
E. etc.
Alternative 
technological
scenarios/possibilities
Alternative institutional scenarios.(Tax
system,tariffs,educational system,etc,)
Parlamentary process .
Open process
 
Source: Hvelplund (March 2006). Poster from Ph.D. course. Aalborg University, Department of 
Development and Planning. 
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This model assumes that technology is defined as a combination between: 
1.  Technique 
2.  Organisation 
3.  Knowledge 
4.  Product 
5.  Profit 
 
An increase in the level of technological change depends upon the change in and between the five 
dimensions. Radical technological change is defined, and it is required that more than one of the 
dimensions must change. A radical technological innovation is defined as being when four to five 
dimensions must be changed. The central issue for change is the establishment of alternatives to the 
existing order in society. In Hvelplund’s universe, the integration of natural science must enter “the 
game”. Engineers have the skills to establish technical alternatives, while the social sciences 
possess the equipment to form institutional alternatives. When alternatives are produced, the game 
of power will start. This is defined as a democratic process in which different actors attempt to 
defend and fight for their particular interests. The result of the fight will produce winners and losers. 
The case – the problem – represents the starting point. In our situation, the case is both 
agriculture and organic agriculture. In any case, Hvelplund claims the need to be concrete at an 
adequate level. The specification of the concrete comes from goals plus a search for the precise 
distinction of real life that renders action possible. The final part is important and underlines his 
position as an action researcher. Goals and action-specific, adequate descriptions at both the macro 
and micro levels are required. We require the description of the interaction between four pillars: 
 
1.  Organisation 
2.  Goals/Objectives 
3.  Action 
4.  Epistemological context 
 
The final pillar implicitly introduces the existence of various adequate epistemological contexts. His 
empirical research has underpinned the need to operate with this “tool” as a kind of “analytical eye-
opener”. However, the insistence on searching for an adequate epistemology and the explicit search 
for a universal theory of social science requires a guide. This guide is defined by the specific and 
context-dependent choice of a macro and micro model. We start with the macro model. Hvelplund 
operates with a first and second order. The first order is the general and objective infrastructure in 
the relevant part of society in light of the problem in question. We could also refer to the first order 
as the given institutional set-up at a given time. The second order is defined with respect to the 
actors and their process of concrete actions and the choices behind the actions. At first glance, this 
may be interpreted as the micro model; in Hvelplund’s thoughts, however, these actions are the 
central aspect of his second-order macro model. 
  Here, we must emphasise an important issue; in order to choose the most adequate 
analytical macro and micro models, the question of the time dimension plays a crucial role. Any 
research process must pay attention to this aspect. His argument is illustrated in the following 
manner: with a very short time dimension, the analysis tends to be static and proposals for action 
are based upon the existing technology. A man plans a trip with his bicycle from his home to his Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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workplace. The analysis conducted by the cyclist is concentrated on questions such as: will it rain? 
Is the road smooth? What is the wind like? If the dimension of time is longer, a discussion of the 
choice of the means of transportation may be put into question (the choice between different and 
possible means of technology). With a longer perspective, the question of changing one’s 
transportation needs by changing job or location may increase. Hvelplund’s point is that it is exactly 
here that there is often a discrepancy between the time horizons from which the different actors 
operate in the game. Different concepts of time exist in the process of structural change. These 
differences must be described, and these descriptions form a central part of his action research. 
Descriptions are an active part or player in the social power process. 
  We are now ready to illustrate Hvelplund’s model with reference to our research area. 
It is not a comprehensive description or illustration; merely a number of examples in order to 
acquire an idea of the possible potential of Hvelplund’s apparatus. He makes explicit reference to 
agriculture and the first-order societal infrastructure. With reference to the theory that all costs are 
included in the price, direct comparison is made between organic and conventional agriculture. The 
latter receives what he refers to as “a massive structural subsidy”. He claims:  
 
The point, that the state and the municipalities collect similar taxes from the profits of 
organic farming as from the polluting hog-factories, the chemical based agriculture is 
a massive and seldom recognised structural subsidy to the polluting and resource 
consuming business structure, which also produce pollution, disease and losers. 
Elements which lead to increased public cost and strengthen the resource spending 
business structure at the expense of the less resource spending businesses. (Hvelplund, 
2005: 100, our translation)  
 
It is evident that Hvelplund has a point from a macro-economic point of view, which can be 
explained within the paradigm of neoclassical welfare economics and economic externalities. 
Knowing the point from theory and practice, the next discussion relates to why the consequences 
are missing in both a historical and contemporary context. Hvelplund claims that the question must 
be forwarded to the institutions constituting and deciding the direction of societal, institutional 
change of the first order. Within these institutions, the ongoing praxis is often experienced as a 
natural law. This leads Hvelplund to state that without changes of first order, no fundamental 
change will ever be implemented. Change to the institutional rules of the game is fundamental in 
order to bring about radical change. Remark the similarity between our initial definition of 
transformation and Hvelplund’s idea of radical change. 
  We will now conduct an experiment. We simply assume similarity between 
agriculture as a whole and electricity and thereafter transfer Hvelplund’s electricity analysis to 
agriculture. We obtain two different models. The focus of the first model is on consumption, while 
the focus of the second model refers to regulation. In both models, we have a first and second order, 
consumption and regulation, respectively. When the focus is on consumption, the results are: 
1.  We have an ongoing democratic process, defined as the interplay between parliament, the 
different interests behind conventional and organic food production, the unions, the grass 
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2.  We have an ongoing implementation of politics. The interplay at point one creates a first-
order social structural politics within the nation-state, the WTO, EU, the NGOs etc. 
Secondly, agricultural and food-related sector policy is created. This is the second order. 
3.  The results are also dual. The first order creates societal agricultural production efficiency, 
which leads to the first-order, structural food consumption. The production efficiency of the 
agricultural sector leads to the second-order, non-structural agricultural consumption. This 
second-order consumption is a function of the efficiency of the various systems of 
production. The second-order consumption is based upon both the efficiency of the 
technology and the efficiency of the various technological systems. 
4.  The total agricultural consumption is the sum of the first- and second-order consumption. 
 
This is central to understanding the difference between first- and second-order consumption. In 
order to illustrate, Hvelplund provides an example: the change in energy consumption in the 
transportation sector depends on how far a car is able to drive per litre gasoline and the total number 
of kilometres the car drives. Total energy consumption does not decrease if the car is able drive 
20% more per kilometre when the total number of kilometres correspondingly increases by 20%. In 
Hvelplund’s terminology, the latter refers to the first order, while technological improvements refer 
to the second-order consumption. One of the points made by Hvelplund is that the political efforts 
have been concentrated on the second-order consumption. Following his logic, the same should be 
the case in agriculture. 
  When the focus is on regulation, the results are: the first-order public regulation 
system is divided into seven elements. The interplay between these elements constitutes the rules of 
the game, which construct the societal institutions and the level and content of the production of 
material goods. The seven elements are: 
 
-  The competition on the market about the need for products 
-  Alternative supply systems of goods 
-  The need for goods 
-  The national socio-economic structure 
-  The national policy reaction 
-  Rules and legislation, market structure, market power etc. 
-  WTO, EU, NAFTA, multinational companies, NGOs, national governments etc. 
 
What about the second order? Hvelplund draws a distinction concerning the definition of the second 
order with reference to the following categories and the interaction between these categories and 
their sub-categories: 
 
1.  The agricultural food service supply system. The direct system from earth to table including: 
Raw materials (nature), primary production (the different systems of agricultural primary 
production), transmission (transport of primary production), manufacturing of food, 
transport, distribution (wholesale and retail sales) and the direct agricultural food 
consumption system. 
2.  The indirect agricultural food supply system. Determination of the indirect system is 
managed by the interplay of four different elements. The first els ent is the technological and Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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institutional scenarios. This refers to the existence and potential of different systems of 
agricultural production. For simplicity, this can be seen in relation to the existence and 
potential of the conventional and organic agricultural systems. The second element is the 
parliamentary process. The third element is the lobbyist with a direct economic interest. The 
fourth element is the lobbyist without direct economic interest. 
 
How does the first order influence the second order? The influence is dual. 
  Firstly, the international and national construction of the social and economic rules of 
the game determine which kind of agricultural services are “needed”, and consequently which kind 
of agriculture shall be produced. 
  Secondly, the explicit focus is directed towards the rules of the game which decide 
how the agricultural services “which are needed” shall be produced. The first order, structural 
agricultural consumption, characterised by the national level, the EU level and the global level, has 
established rules of the games operating with heavy agricultural subsidies. According to Hvelplund, 
some of the largest subsidies are the missing taxes on pollution. In such a perspective, pollution 
covers e.g. the contribution to the spoliation of biodiversity, the fishing ocean, the ocean as 
recreational facility, sea, lakes and rivers, the poisoning of drinking water with pesticides, the 
poisoning of food through medicine and polluted animal food with non-tested GMOs and 
pesticides, the poisoning of people through e.g. meats with too many and dangerous bacteria, the 
intensive use of fodder, nutrients, vegetables, meat etc. with long transportation (the argument here 
is related to the missing taxes on transportation plus the fact that transportation is a potential source 
of pollution). These are merely examples, but the interesting point is: nearly all of the examples do 
have a direct connection to the conventional and GMO technological agricultural system. In 
principle, organic agriculture is not a source of pollution due to the principles behind the 
certification. Another example could be the international agenda concerning organic food and its 
positive effects. We have two contra-dictionary positions. Within the first the arguments are 
directed towards the need for the conventional and industrial efficiency of food production with 
reference to e.g. a growing world population or the business economy of agriculture (Pinstrup-
Andersen 2000: ; Christensen 2001: ; Prakash C. S. 2004). The second position argues the contrary 
position, and their research questions the efficiency of modern technological agriculture and argues 
for a return to old traditions c.f. organic agriculture (Tillman 1998: ; Monbiot 2000: ; Youyong Zhu 
2000: ; Leu 2004). However, organic agriculture is still a small niche. The above examples indicate 
how the first order directs the evolution of the second order. 
  Generally, his conclusion is rather simple: in order to obtain a long-term perspective, 
there must be an offensive participation in the formulation of the first-order level of regulation. This 
interplay between the first and second-order politics is not well developed by the research 
community, the politicians or the bodies in the central administration. The epistemological context 
is organisationally homeless. 
Thus far, Hvelplund’s apparatus seems to work. The next step is the establishment of adequate 
epistemological micro contexts. Generally, Hvelplund’s concept is focused on the value-added 
process. The focus can be different. If we are to use a profit focus, we would have to compare the 
development of value added to the product “agriculture” over time. Now we get into trouble. 
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different products over time, and different technologies co-exist within a competitive system. Is it 
possible to establish an analysis that describes: 
 
1.  The value-added process of conventional agrarian products from ground to table? 
2.  The value-added process of organic agrarian products from ground to table? 
3.  Positions 1 and 2 have to be documented during historic time? 
 
Because of the organisation of the business, this may de difficult. However, the solution within the 
Hvelplund apparatus is to demonstrate the ability to take action at the micro level. He would focus 
on one litre of milk or one kilogram of pork and make the case study. This would be supplemented 
by e.g. different calculations about business investments in order to identify boundaries for organic 
farmers compared to conventional farmers. Hvelplund’s idea would be a continuous process of trial 
and error in order to establish an adequate microeconomic model capable of contributing to an 
understanding where his reference is the chosen and adequate macro variables of the first and 
second order. 
Conclusion: The benefits from Hvelplund 
Because of our deductive point of departure, we are not able to conclude in an ordinary manner. 
Hvelplund’s modelling work is characterised by being concrete; however, we find that Hvelplund’s 
approach seems promising. A main element in this assessment is the idea of the importance of the 
establishment of a clear alternative. If we take Denmark as an example, plans have been introduced 
from time to time about how organic agriculture provides an alternative to conventional agriculture 
(e.g.(Illum 1987), (Specialarbejderforbundet 1995), (Bichel-Committee 1999)). However, the result 
is still that organic agriculture is a niche. This illustrates that Hvelplund may have a point. Organic 
agriculture is an alternative, but it is epistemologically homeless.  
  The second point is that the integration of the political dimension in Hvelplund 
operates with interplay between a first and second order. By making this distinction, Hvelplund 
contributes to modelling the concept of policy, politics and polity in his models. This is rather 
sophisticated as compared with Cochrane. The political infrastructure matters. However, the polity 
matters fundamentally, because this first-order system must change in the rules of the game in case 
a fundamental change shall come. However, political efforts have concentrated on the second order 
and how agriculture shall produce; sector politics such as environmental restrictions on nutrient 
discharges, rules for animal protection, rules for animal transport, rules for medicine use etc. Some 
rules of this first-order game must change in order to create a transformation. Transformation 
becomes a question of a process of human choice. 
  The third point in Hvelplund’s work is that his focus casts attention on the paradox 
about structural subsidies to conventional agriculture. These subsidies are a cost for the public, and 
the subsidies constitute a kind of structural advantage to conventional agriculture as compared with 
organic agriculture. This is a further argument for focus on the first order to understand agricultural 
structural change. 
  The fourth point relates to the fact that, at a practical level, there are different time 
horizons between the involved actors. This must not only affect the practical dimension; the 
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also be affected. Precisely how becomes a modelling puzzle based upon the concrete case and a 
process of trial and error. 
  We find that Hvelplund makes a number of further contributions to Cochrane’s work. 
When our Cochrane conclusion ended up with “anything matters and technology matters mostly”, 
the conclusion relating to Hvelplund must be that some things matter more than other things. 
Matters depend on the problem, the goals and the possibilities for action. When this is decided, one 
specific description and one specific analysis become more adequate than others.  
 
Section two – Classical Economics 
The Physiocrats and Reflections considering Organic 
Agriculture 
The question of the rise and establishment of organic agriculture and an organic market for food 
may be answered at a high level of abstraction. In order to structure the answer, we separate in two 
elements: the first element concerns the introduction of a new good, and the second element 
concerns the expansion of the established production of the new good. In this context, the new good 
is defined as organic agricultural products. The physiocrats have no reflections according to 
differentiation between products. The only reference, which may be quite speculative, is the indirect 
link between the existing surplus of products, which first becomes realised when exports or higher 
prices are introduced to the model. If the possibility to increase the net product is implemented, we 
could argue that the whole or part increase in the net product come from a new kind of agricultural 
product: organic products. The price of organic products is generally higher than conventional 
products. So it was when organic products were introduced, and so it is today. This focus on higher 
prices means that a physiocratic explanation as a first contribution would address this element in an 
explanation. The export explanation has potential both when explaining the introduction as well as 
the establishment of organic agriculture. Another explanation reflects wishes for the direction of 
demand. Consequently, the micro foundation in the economics of physiocracy is introduced. 
Another explanation makes any change in the system of reproduction a question of politics, where 
politics is defined as a “wish for direction” or their own term, “desire”. The potential contribution to 
an explanation by the physiocrats may be summed up. The following mechanisms may influence 
the process of structural change in agriculture:  
 
-  higher prices for products 
-  higher prices for organic products 
-  general export opportunities  
-  export opportunities for organic products 
-  consumer choice 
-  wish for political direction 
 
Dealing with the concept of transformation, the physiocrats contribute with the idea of a change in 
relative prices between manufacturing goods and agricultural goods. If the relative prices shift and 
the agricultural goods become relatively cheaper, we are in a situation where the state as a Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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cumulative process tends to be ruined. This is a cumulative transformation because of a breakdown 
of the relative price system. The cumulative process is based upon erroneous policy. The 
explanations illustrate highly complex explanations. As must be noticed, the explanations work at 
different levels of abstraction. First, we have the focus on the productive sector as a general sector 
of production. Second, there is a specific focus on organic goods. Third, the consumers determine 
the composition and direction of societal consumption. Finally, the wish for political direction 
related to the need to secure reproduction in society in general is represented. 
The physiocrats’ discussion makes it possible to conclude that an economic model 
capable of including the dynamic structural process of change and transformation must include the 
following elements as a point of reference: 
 
Table 1: The physiocratic model of reference 
 
Dimensions  Analytical levels of abstraction  Keywords 
Accumulation  Economy  Macro, Meso and Micro 
Allocation 
Politics  Macro and Meso  No restrictions on the productive sector 
Nature  Meta  Taken for granted and “the gifts of nature” 
 
The model requires brief explanation; the physiocrats obviously operate with a dialectic between 
economy and politics, where the latter is important for securing the maximisation of the production 
of economic wealth. The introduction of three sectors in the economy and their interaction is also an 
introduction of the meso and macro analytical levels. The element of consumer decisions introduces 
the micro analytical level. The important role of politics is to secure both allocation, the monetary 
circulation of wealth and accumulation. According to the latter, this requires an absence of 
restrictions on the productive sector. The means concerning allocation refer to the various classes or 
sectors in the economy and are analogous to the idea of consumption. Landowner consumption 
must be allocated 100%, and it is the role of the state to secure this action. Furthermore, the state 
must implement a tax system based upon taxing the rent and solely the rent. The state must also 
ensure that landowners spend all of the net product in an appropriate manner. Consequently, the 
analytical meso and macro levels are also represented in the physiocratic idea of politics. Natural 
resources, understood as the use of “the gifts from nature” in the agricultural sector, play an implicit 
part in the theory, and the meta level of abstraction may relate to something beyond the control of 
man. Accumulation refers to the only productive sector, agriculture, and the potential of the sector 
to expand. 
 
Adam Smith and organic agriculture 
The first part of “The Smithian Explanation” of agricultural change and transformation refers to a 
number of agriculture-specific elements as well as some general economic elements. The specific 
elements are: 
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2.  The increase in real prices for rude products 
3.  Landowners become better off in society because of increases in rent and real rude prices 
and decreases in real manufacturing prices 
4.  The ongoing use of technology renders it possible to produce and sell at lower prices to 
maintain the profit 
5.  The ongoing process of cultivation depopulates the countryside 
 
These are the primary indicators in Smith’s discussion of agriculture. In order to construct his 
general explanation, the general indicators must be integrated. The increased division of labour is 
the first grand element worth noting. Within agriculture, there are a number of natural limitations on 
the sub-processes. This is why the industrialisation of agriculture has a time lag compared with 
manufacturing. Agriculture is different from industry, because it may vary in production due to the 
natural conditions of the season and the limited demand for food. The second grand element is the 
actual, institutional level of competition in business. If the situation is far from free competition, the 
profits are far above the natural level of profit. This leads to inefficient capital accumulation. 
Generally, the interest of the labourers and the landlords are convergent with the society in 
question, while the position of the capitalist is opposite. This means that a high rent and a high 
wage is good for the rate of the accumulation of capital and consequently for the increase of social 
wealth. The situation with profits is the opposite; the process of change becomes a constant “fight” 
in order to get the actual institutional profits down to the natural level of profits. At this level, the 
society will have what we call archetypical market prices on the products. Profits under the natural 
level always reflect a short-term phenomenon. Profits above the natural level are in the interest of 
the capitalist and may last for a longer time horizon. Because of this constant “fight” for the level of 
profits, equilibrium is a rare position. The change in the level of profits is normally a top-down 
process. In order to avoid such a process, there is an inherent need for social institutions. When 
these institutions succeed, the society is in a situation with free competition. According to Smith’s 
perspective, the institutional element of free versus non-free competition obviously plays a major 
role in attempts at understanding any process of social structural change. As we have argued 
(Rasmussen 2007) and with Denmark as case, the level of competition appears to be decreasing 
rather than increasing in the third agricultural transformation.  
The second aspect of “The Smithian Explanation” of agricultural change and 
transformation refers to politics. Political decisions are crucial for the capital accumulation process 
and consequently for the increase of the wealth of a nation. Smith’s ideal world is a world of free 
competition. This world holds the optimal potential in order to create wealth. Any tendency towards 
a monopoly of any factor of production – land, capital and labour – must be met by political 
decisions. Consequently, the existence of an institutional framework must be an inherent element in 
Smith’s ideal world.  
The question of the establishment and maintenance of public institutions must be 
touched here. On the one hand, Smith deals with the kind of public expenses required in order to 
facilitate commerce; this is the idea of the necessary infrastructure of a country. On the other hand, 
Smith deals with how to finance these expenses. In this perspective, Smith operates with two main 
groups of institutions. 
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* The institutions for financing public expenses 
 
The important issues for our perspective are: 
 
-  The entire political process of making laws, including both policy, politics and polity. 
-  The content of policy, where the Smithian concept of internationalisation, public sector 
financing and the role of public subsidies to business shall be emphasised. 
 
In Smith’s ideal world, the rules of the game in the law process must exclude the capitalist class. 
Smith expresses himself very precisely: 
 
Any attempt to make new laws must be examined very carefully. Especially if the 
proposals come from the group of people who earns their money during from 
accumulation of capital in order to make profit. The proposal of any new law or 
regulation of commerce which comes form this order, ought always to be listened to 
with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till having been long and 
carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious 
attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same 
with that of the public (Smith 1776 (1981): 267). 
 
This is a warning about the influence of industry on the political level of society
26. With reference 
to the works of Ingemann and the Danish agricultural change, it is well documented that Danish 
farmers have interfered in the political process. In an attempt at following Smith’s 
recommendations, the Danes have actually done the complete opposite by fusing business and 
politics together. 
Two observations in Smith call for specific comments regarding public sector 
financing. First, taxation as an instrument can create a certain channel for structural change. Second, 
tax on rent on land is the optimal instrument for maximising the creation of wealth in a society. 
Taxation is commonly used as a structural instrument and has been a specific instrument in any 
agricultural policy. Taxes on pesticides is an instrument favouring organic agriculture. Taxes on 
transportation represent another tax favouring the less input-dependent industries such as, in 
principle, organic agriculture as compared with chemical or conventional agriculture. The principle 
of using taxation as an instrument for managing the behaviour of an industry is often referred to as 
regulation. Taxes on rent are better than taxes on wages or profits because of the capital 
accumulation process. Consequently, taxation can be used to provide direction for industry, and 
taxes can be structured to maximise e.g. the organic market for food. 
The hard core in his theory of agricultural structural change is the claim of a general 
tendency for rent to increase until a certain point of time where there is balance. This is the general 
situation where the accumulation of capital in agriculture is industrialised. Part of this process is an 
increase in the real prices of agricultural products. Technological improvements counteract this 
process. Within Smith, the introduction of new technology influences the rules of the game. First, 
the farmer is able to sell cheaper and keep his profit. Second, the pressure on the small-scale 
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farmers increases. When it becomes profitable to improve more and more land, their unproductive 
production will decrease and the tendency towards depopulating the countryside increases. When 
demand and supply for all agricultural products are equal, we have free competition and the optimal 
situation for the accumulation of capital in order to produce wealth. In order to understand Smith, 
we must think in a space-dimension and with a very long time perspective. Moreover, we must 
think in different sequences for different agricultural products. Consequently, in a Smithian optic, 
parts of agriculture are in a general situation with a balance between demand and supply and have a 
status as “industrialised”, while other parts of agriculture have not yet reached this general position. 
The constant tendency towards monopolisation represents a main challenge. Treaties, 
bounties and restrictions on exports are other important elements, where the role of correct political 
decisions becomes crucial. Within agriculture, the tendency to favour large estates must be avoided, 
because they are less productive than smaller farms where intensity is higher.  
The establishment of organic agriculture becomes a combined explanation of 
introducing of new technology and profitability. Part of a Smithian explanation could also be with 
reference to the social institutions and their efforts in relation to e.g. laws, restrictions and taxes. 
 
Malthus and agrarian structural change and transformation 
The Malthusian model states that man and nature are part of the conflict about how to survive. 
Malthus regards the limits of nature to feed man as a fundamental natural law. This is why he 
concentrates on how human beings can counteract the law. This is the institutional economic 
element in Malthus. First, the ability of farmers and capitalists to cooperate and press wages creates 
problems for labourers and their power to provide for a family. Second, the farms must be divided 
into smaller units in order to exploit nature as intensively as possibly. Third, all of the workers must 
work within the agricultural sector and the sector must receive subsidies. The factories are not 
necessary, because they only produce luxury goods. Moreover, it is unhealthy for the workers to be 
there. Fourth, human beings must be under pressure to invent new and improved technologies 
capable of contributing to increased food production. 
  His growth theory provides an integrated perspective on how structural change in a 
nation evolves, and his perspective is not optimistic with reference to the survival of the global 
population. However, within the limitations of nature, it is possible to interfere and change the 
direction of this structural process. This has to do with the rules of the game and bears direct 
reference to our definition of a transformation. It is a question of the correct combination of politics. 
In a modern, contemporary context, the Malthusian question and theory are similar to the question 
posed by all ecological economists and their dismissal of the idea of unlimited growth. 
Contemporary scientists within ecological economics refer to the limits on the available resources 
in general – and not the specific question of food. Dr. Aage (Aage 2006) argues in terms of a kind 
of neo-Malthusian doomsday. Jespersen (Jespersen 1998) represents a more moderate point of view, 
arguing that the fundamental problem area remains the same. If we expand the Malthusian model to 
cover all of the scarce natural resources and the limits of nature to absorb pollution, the theory 
becomes contemporary. Furthermore, Jespersen points out that the ever-increasing use of energy in 
farming together with the decreasing farming area resulting from erosion strengthens the relevance 
of Malthusian theory. The relevance of the Malthusian model is stated with further strength, e.g. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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“Yet periodically in specific places, Malthus’ model has been confirmed, and history may yet 
confirm it globally” (Costanza 1997: 26). 
Ricardo - Contributor to the Conceptual Framework? 
Ricardo’s model operates with four “domestic” sectors and the export market sector. The sectors 
are: 
 
1.  Agriculture is the dominant sector and the sector that constitutes the model as the 
fundamental sector. The agricultural sector must be divided into two sub-sectors, which in 
some cases run athwart one another: the first sub-sector is the landowners sector constituted 
by the class of landlords. They rent out land and earn their money from the rents paid by the 
farmers. The landowners receive rent according to the principle of differentiated rent. The 
second sub-sector is the farmers sector, as constituted by farmers and their labourers. The 
farmers sector earns their money from corn production. The income from the sale is 
distributed in the form of wages to the labourers, profits to themselves, and rent to the 
landowners. 
2.  Manufacturing is the industrial sector, including services and crafts. This sector is 
constituted by the capitalists. 
3.  The financial sector is the pecuniary sector. This sector comprises of banks and “the monied 
class” (Ricardo 1821 (1971): 112). 
4.  The government sector is the political system. This sector is made up of politicians and 
administrators and is financed by taxes. The military is included in this sector. 
5.  The export market sector is the final sector. This sector is essential to obtaining growth in 
the economy. 
 
Ricardo’s general theory explicitly focuses on the long-term evolution of structures in the economy. 
The allocation (or, as Ricardo prefers, the distribution) of resources, defined as rent, wages and 
profit, is the crucial factor in the capital accumulation process. Allocation is the mechanism which 
constitutes accumulation. Translated into a contemporary perspective, Ricardo was the first 
economist to emphasise and carry out an economic analysis of the limits of resources. Agriculture 
represents itself as a contradictory system with reference to ownership of land. The sector consists 
of farmers and landowners. The farmers are treated as normal capitalists, while the landlords are 
primarily regarded as an unproductive class. Ricardo’s focus is on the macroeconomic integration 
of the farms. How the unit of production referred to as agriculture participates in the process of the 
allocation of wages, rent and profit, on the one side, and, on the other side, the accumulation of 
these resources. The technological improvements, different means of cultivation and management 
matter for structural change. However, it is the interaction with the other sectors – manufacturing, 
finance, government and exports – of the economy and the principles behind this interaction that are 
the causes of structural change in the agricultural sector. In Ricardo, the rules of the game are 
analogous with these principles. The first conclusion must be that the capital accumulation process 
is interfered with by different economic laws relating to the interplay between rent, profit and 
wages, on the one side, and on the other side by unpredictable events such as the introduction of 
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A cornerstone in Ricardo’s theoretical work is his emphasis on the difference between 
industrial and agricultural goods. While the industrial good is constituted by wages and profits, the 
agricultural good also contains rent. The allocation process – and consequently also the 
accumulation process – thus represents an interaction based upon a production of fundamentally 
different material products. Furthermore, there is a quantitative limit to the production of 
agricultural goods, as land is a scarce and finite resource. Third, industrial goods tend to become 
cheaper in price in the long run, whereas agricultural goods have a tendency to become more 
expensive. 
Ricardo assumes free competition assumption. Consequently, the monopoly in an 
economy is not a result of the economic laws of accumulation and must be transferred to the 
influence of other mechanisms. In the theoretical context of Ricardo, the reference can only be 
politics and/or unique, monopolised technology. A main policy topic in Principles is the question of 
taxes and the opposite, bounties. How does the system of taxes and bounties affect the capital 
accumulation process? A number of fundamental principles can be outlined. As a liberal, Ricardo 
argues for less state, less regulation and no boundaries on business. Instead, he advocates for more 
market.  
In sum; structural change is a process within and between sectors. The search for the 
maximisation of the rent and profit is claimed to be the most important principle with universal 
character. The principles of policy are just as important due to their potential power to change the 
rules of the game, defined as the economic principles of Ricardo. This makes the principles of 
politics universal with reference to the existence of politics. The role of nature is in the hands of the 
owners and users. The principles of the owners, i.e. the landlords, regarding the use of nature are 
determined by rent and consequently the search for maximising rents. This too must be treated as a 
universal, non-context-dependent variable. Consequently, Ricardo has left us a model with a high 
degree of complexity built upon a high degree of universal principles. This makes his model 
relevant in any contemporary context of capitalism and its allocation and accumulation processes. 
While profit-seeking is based upon a law of economics, rent-seeking is based upon the law of social 
life or politics. The reference to social life has both a micro- and macro-element. The micro-element 
is due to the contract between landlords and farmers and the possibility of the land owners to obtain 
zero rent. The macro-element is e.g. with reference to the corn law. 
  Consequently, this brings the capitalistic system into a situation where everything can 
happen and where any outcome of the accumulation process may result. The sources are the 
processes of the allocation of rent, wages and profit. On the one hand, high rents and wages can halt 
the capital accumulation process. On the other hand, high profits can lead to a destruction of the 
system itself. The free market represents the best security for obtaining the optimal result, defined 
as the total production of society. Politics can act in favour or disfavour of this process. The 
interaction between politics, the law of economics and new technology leads any society to change 
over time. This is our idea of “The Ricardian Universal Law of Capital Accumulation”. 
  This interpretation of Ricardo brings further attention to the variables in the model: 
which variables are independent and which are dependent? As we have demonstrated, no variables 
are independent, and this theoretical claim turns his model into a question of how to determine the 
real engine of capital accumulation. Our interpretation of Ricardo’s principles must be that it is the 
actual, historic interaction that creates the actual result: the accumulation of capital defined as the Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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level of wages, the level of rents and the level of profits. One further consequence must be to shift 
the focus of the model away from economics and laws of economics to political economy.  
The central universal laws of economics are: 
 
-  The process of profits must be equal in all sectors of the economy and within all companies 
in the economy. The process of capital substitution is part of this mechanism; 
-  The existence of differentiated rent on land; and 
-  The existence of a dynamic subsistence wage. 
 
The array of modifying mechanisms is so numerous that any interpretation of any context may 
suffer significantly without such a dual focus. The most important modifying mechanisms are: 
 
-  Technological development, development in the division of work and skills  
-  Subsidies for exports 
-  Bounties on imports 
-  Subsidies in general 
-  Taxation 
-  Disturbance of the free competition and the market in general 
-  Political influence in the parliament 
-  Exogenous shocks 
 
It might be obvious that these mechanisms function on different levels of abstraction with reference 
to the process of allocation and accumulation in the economy, thus demonstrating that Ricardo 
operates on both the macro-, meso- and micro-levels.  
  With this conclusion, the accumulation model ultimately focuses on the evolution of 
the distribution between rent, profit and wages over time: the allocation process within and between 
the economic sectors and within and between the group of actors or classes. This struggle over 
allocation between all of the participants in the constitution of society will, in the Ricardian world, 
be represented by all of the classes that constitute society: landlords, farmers, labourers in 
agriculture and manufacturing, capitalists and the supporting financial sector and the government. 
Wages are more than mere wages; we must also discuss who finances the wages (landlords, 
capitalist or the labourers). As regards profit, distinction must be made between the profits to the 
capitalists and farmers versus the interests of the wealthy administrated by the financial sector. This 
is why we will conclude and claim that Ricardo was a founder of a complicated model of an 
institutional, modern capitalistic system based upon universal principles. 
  Transformation may occur in Ricardo’s model; not as a result of economic laws, but 
only with reference to politics. The question is whether and how politics destroy the workings of the 
market. Excessive interaction in the market may change the rules of the game due to the ongoing 
struggle over distribution. This struggle can change the rules of the game fundamentally. The 
introduction of high agricultural subsidies represents such a change in the pure, economic rules of 
the game. This is a radical change as compared with the situation in free competition. Consequently, 
our claim is that the hardcore in Ricardo’s theory is challenged by the introduction of public 
subsidies to agriculture. This represents a tax on capital and wages. Another attack on the central 
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in the real world as compared with the monopoly-absent Ricardian world. In both cases, Ricardo’s 
theory opens up for the inclusion of the existence of agricultural transformation.  
Von Thünen and the theory of agriculture 
What was von Thünen’s universe? Imagine an area surrounded by a desert. There is no 
communication except within the area itself. The city is located in the centre of the area. Around the 
city, the area is cultivated in order to provide the habitants of the city with raw materials. We 
essentially have a two-sector economy. The first sector is the rural sector consisting of agriculture, 
forestry and mining. The second sector is the urban sector consisting of manufacturing and services. 
The city residents supply the inhabitants of the surrounding rural area with manufacturing goods 
and services.   Von Thünen’s initial theoretical assumption may be summed up as below: 
 
1.  The citizens are both workers and capitalists. Consequently, the time a citizen spends in the 
accumulation process results in both a wage and a profit. 
2.  In von Thünen’s world, all workers flow freely. This process is part of the establishment of 
his equilibrium, natural wage and profit rate. 
3.  Land is not able to flow freely. 
4.  Capital flows freely, except in parts of the capital placed in land. 
 
The arrangement of the agricultural production is determined by a combination of: 
 
·  distance to market based upon transportation costs 
·  land fertility 
·  the differences in nature of the raw materials 
 
In his theoretical argumentation, the differences in land fertility and the differences in nature of raw 
materials are initially abstracted away. The area is “… all of equal fertility … Various kinds of 
agricultural products are grown in concentric circles around the city, the exact location at which 
each product is raised being determined by the cost of transporting it to the city” (Leigh 1946: 482). 
On the basis of these limited variables, von Thünen develops the following: 
 
·  A theory of land rent, interest and entrepreneurial profit 
·  A theory of distribution of capital and labour – the theory of natural wages and interest 
 
All theories are based upon considerations regarding marginality. Von Thünen stresses the principle 
of marginality, both as regards labour and capital: 
Von Thünen’s contribution makes the question of rent more comprehensive than 
dealing alone with his contemporary colleagues. With von Thünen’s contribution, rent is a result of 
the interaction among many variables, and the differentiation of fertility was only one among 
several sources for obtaining differential rents. Obviously, belonging to practical farming activities 
has inspired von Thünen, and the claim of being a business economist is enlightened. Next, the idea 
of capital bound to land and its inability to move as desired may be of importance to structural Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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change in the agricultural sector. Third, profit as the remaining capital of the revenue after paying 
for other “services” may also offer an important insight into the accumulation process. 
Von Thünen’s contribution adds further complexity to the fundamental pillars of how 
to understand agricultural structural development. He adds a spatial perspective which contributes 
to an understanding of the rural area as a differentiated unit with respect to the distance to the 
market, multiple soil qualities and differentiated food production. This position is the foundation of 
his theory of land rent. One further aspect of the theory of rent is based upon the fact that land, 
understood as capital, is unable to move. One of the consequences is that improvements in land may 
eat capital up without any ability to obtain revenue for the capital invested in that process. On the 
other hand, his micro-foundation of the economy is based upon marginality with respect to capital 
and labour. Consequently, von Thünen’s apparatus is quite sophisticated; when we line up all of his 
variables, it becomes clear that it is possible to make von Thünen’s system dynamic. 
  When the system moves, von Thünen’s model creates structures and change in 
structures. The main aspect is the tendency for agriculture to specialise its production. This is an 
inherent element in the process of structural change. It is this very tendency that creates room for 
the introduction of new products, e.g. organic food. The development of new products thus refers to 
needs or demand from the market, on the one side, and the possibility to make a profit, on the other 
side. This is because increased specialisation forces agricultural units to produce less variation, 
which in turn creates increased demand from the market for a return to further variation. As regards 
the introduction and establishment of organic agriculture, on the one hand we have a pure theory of 
the market relating to demand and profitability. Behind this story, the underlying reason is found 
within the increased specialisation as a result of the structural change process. 
  According to von Thünen, structural change is a continuous process based upon 
economic principles or laws. They present the rules of the game. How does the concept of 
transformation operate within von Thünen’s apparatus? The interference and sources of radical 
change can be claimed to come from without, e.g. new production techniques and means of 
transportation, a sudden openness to other isolated states, or by cultivating new lands. This means 
that the question of transformation is a question to be answered with reference to something outside 
of economics.  
Politics does not represent an issue for von Thünen. However, at one level of 
abstraction, we could claim that these external economic elements are somewhat related to politics. 
While the first two elements rest on an increase in human knowledge, the latter two are based upon 
human decisions. This makes the question of transformation and the radical change of the rules of 
the game a question with reference to two sources independent of one another. First, we have the 
element of technological innovation. Second, we have human decisions, or the somewhat 
synonymous concept of politics. On the other hand, external influence may only influence the 
continuous process of structural change. Here we receive indication that the difference between 
structural change and transformation depends upon how we actually define “the rules of the game”. 
The introduction of new techniques changes the production methods or even the content of 
production. Does this bring about a transformation with a radical change of the rules of the game? 
New markets may be claimed to affect only the size of production and not the fundamental rules for 
production of this size. Finally, new land brought into use rests upon the existing principles of what 
is already going on. The element of transformation within von Thünen’s universe appears somewhat 
distant; however, the structural change concept is definitely part of his theory. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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  In addition to these findings, von Thünen offers more specific contributions to 
understanding structural change. The concept of four sources of rent, the specific concept of 
transport or transaction costs, the inherent element of specialisation, the question of capital-eating 
estates, expectations about profits and the origin of new products are all elements contributing to 
understanding structural change and the transformation of agriculture. 
 
Section three 
Institutional and Evolutionary Economics - The Veblenian 
Economics 
The Model  
Veblen’s theoretical work constitutes a general macroeconomic theory of structural change of 
capitalism (Veblen 1899: ; Veblen 1901: ; Veblen 1904: ; Veblen 1909: ; Veblen 1914 (1964): ; 
Veblen 1919: ; Veblen 1921: ; Veblen 1923a: ; Veblen 1923b).  
 
Figure 7: The model 1 
 
The interaction between actors and institutions based upon some fundamental mechanisms leads to 
a number of specific structures. These structures reflect a complex system of mismatch. The most 
fundamental mismatch is that the net product of society is lower than its social potential. Veblen 
defines social potential in terms of the concept
27: “The State of the Industrial Art”. The State of the 
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instead of e.g. the term “idea”. The term “concept” may refer to something more firm than “idea”. However, it is rather 
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Industrial Art is institutional; consequently, it is a dynamic concept. The general reason for the 
mismatch is another mismatch; Veblen claims that there is a mismatch between the dominating 
habits and the need for new habits. We are talking directly about a conflict between the existing 
“rules of the game” and the need for new such rules. The dominating habits constitute an institution 
and consequently a dynamic concept. We name this institution “Make Believe”. 
  In order to understand the two discrepancies and their relation to the dynamic process 
of agricultural structural change, we have identified the following level of abstraction in Veblen: 
 
-  The concept of the “Modern System”   
-  Structural change as a result of seven different mismatches  
-  Structural change in seven different kinds of institutions 
-  The three universal working mechanisms  
 
 
Veblen develops the concept “Modern System” in order to understand the real functions in the 
capitalist system. There are two modern systems in Veblen’s universe. The first modern system 
replaces “The era of handicraft” and is introduced as a function of the industrial revolution. The 
historic time and space is identified as the latter quarter of the 18
th century in Britain. The evolution 
of capitalism is a cumulative process. It becomes increasingly complex, and the first modern system 
is gradually replaced with Modern System II, fully implemented around the last quarter of the 19
th 
century
28. From then on, absentee ownership and the separation of ownership and management in 
distinct categories together with a widening of the financial sector fundamentally changed the rules 
of the game in capitalism.  
 
1.  First phase – the era of handicrafts and trade – HT 
2.  Second phase – the first era of modern capitalism – M1 
3.  Third phase – the second era of capitalism – M2 
 
The links between industry, management, credit and ownership in M1 and M2 can be illustrated 
graphically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
difficult to distinguish between the two terms, as a concept can be argued to be an idea and an idea can be argued to be 
a concept. 
 
28 The introduction of and shift from Modern System I to Modern System II varies from country to country in the 
western capitalistic world. The important point is not the exact historic time but the introduction and implementation of 
the systems all over and with a minor time-lag from country to country.   Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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Figure 8: The model II 
 
 
 
Veblen’s point is that the function of the modern system has changed, but the institution of make-
believe remains unchanged. This means that the society rests on an old-fashioned institutional 
foundation. The complex modern system
29 can be illustrated graphically: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 We could have refrained from illustrating the link between “credit” and absentee ownership, because Veblen focuses 
on industry. He is not concentrated on the ownership or absentee ownership and financing. 
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Figure 9: The model 3 
 
In order to understand the content and fundamental difference between HT, M1 and M2, we must 
introduce the actors and shifts in their respective roles and their interests in the process of structural 
change. 
The point of departure in his analysis is his separation of industry and business. In 
industry, the production of goods and services is the ultimate goal. The only goal in business is 
money, i.e. the financial end. Consequently, the Veblenian dichotomy consists of two kinds of 
work: industrial work and pecuniary work. Industrial work is served by labour, while pecuniary 
work is served by businessmen. This dichotomy was a result of the technological evolution that was 
the source of further specialisation. The result was the creation of two parallel systems living side 
by side: the business community and the industrial community.
30 In addition to these groups, the 
landowners play a special role. Landowners may consist of a combination of labour and 
                                                 
30 There is a striking parallel to Chayanov’s theory of the co-existence of different agricultural systems. 
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businessmen. On the other hand, the landowners can be pure businessmen or pure industrial 
workers.   The businessmen are divided in different groups, where the industrial managers or 
businessmen are compared with real estate people acting as middle men between the increased 
number of financiers and absentee owners. This represents the dynamics involved in the shift from 
phase M1 and M2. Absentee ownership becomes the dominating form for economic organisation, 
and the role of the financial businessmen is to accelerate the credits. The absentee ownership 
illustrates the distance between ownership and the daily management, which is led by the business 
managers. The absentee ownership is conservative and wishes to maintain the status quo. The role 
of the manager is steered by the responsibility to make as much money as possible for the owners. 
Part of this money is directed towards the financial sector due to the increased credits from this 
sector to industry. 
  The dynamics of the modern system draw a specific small group of businessmen into 
the role as “captains of industry”. These captains are at the centre of the process of accumulation. 
Their decisions determine the direction of the structural change of society. When the credit 
economy expands, Veblen deals with the term “Captain of Solvency”. From now on, the power of 
society is in the hands of the actors who control the credits
31.  
  The workers are divided in two groups: those with technological knowledge, on the 
one side, while on the other side are the rest of the workers who are productive in running and 
developing the industry. Those with technological knowledge are further divided in two archetypes: 
“The Old Technicians”, who do not seek to change the steering system, and “The Young 
Technicians”, who see a potential for changing the steering system due to the enormous lack of 
employment of the technology and the enormous waste produced by the system. Already at this 
point, we notice that Veblen searches for sources of transformation. 
  The general public administration, newspapers etc. are perceived as a means of getting 
the system to work and keeping change off of the agenda. 
  The workers are regarded as the uninformed who pay the price due to higher prices, 
taxes etc. The special position of the landlord as a potential worker – or the common man – must be 
repeated. 
Structural change is characterised as an adaptive, evolutionary and conservative process. Veblen 
assumes that the life of mankind – like other species – is a process of selective adoption. Societal 
change is a matter of the change of institutions as “a process of natural selection of fittest habits of 
thought” (Veblen 1899: 101). The development process is based on the past habits in these 
institutions and all of the actions of mankind are teleological. 
The fact that the habits of the past are part of “the rules of the game” in the present 
produces an inherent and potential unbalance or mismatch between the needs of the present and 
what the present is actually supported by. The concept of mismatch is a key term. Veblen expresses 
this in the following manner: “In the nature of the case, this process of selective adaptation can 
never catch up with the progressively changing situation in which the community finds itself at any 
given time” (Veblen 1899: 102). The evolution proceeds, stage after stage, with the institutional 
element as a conservative factor. Change occurs because of external pressure.  
                                                 
31 When using the term “captain”, the reference is their role as the dominating actor in the game. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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Veblen’s general theory – an overview 
As formerly indicated and in order to understand Veblen, we argue that he operates with: 
 
1.  Three universal capitalist mechanisms  
2.  Five institutions and two sub-institutions 
3.  Two general and six specific mismatches in structures as a result of capitalist evolution 
 
The mechanisms are: 
 
1.  Interstitial adjustment 
2.  The market and the price system 
3.  All politics are business – politics I  
 
The institutions are: 
 
1.  The institution “Make-Believe” and its sub-institutions “Vested Rights of Ownership” and 
“Money and Profits” 
2.  The institution “State of Industrial Art” 
3.  The institution “Competitive System” 
4.  The institution “Credit, Business Capital, Capitalisation, Tangible and Intangible Assets” 
5.  The institution “Politics II” 
 
The mismatches are: 
 
1.  Mismatch between potential and actual social net products 
2.  Mismatch between dominating habits and the social need for new habits 
 
1.1 Mismatch between owners and non-owners 
1.2 Mismatch between large owners and small owners 
1.3 Mismatch between businessmen and the corporation and its absentee owners 
1.4 Mismatch between businessmen and industrial intellectuals 
1.5 Mismatch between community, businessmen and corporations 
1.6 Mismatch between the vested interest of the common man and the vested interest of absentee 
owners, businessmen and industry. 
 
The cavalry, the mechanisms, the institutions and the mismatches constitute the grand theory. 
Veblen’s theory is comprehensive in more than one sense. We are able to combine any mismatch 
with more than one institution. This indicates that Veblen thinks across any boundaries.  
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The mechanism “market and the price system” and Institution 3 
“Competitive system” 
The market and the price system are main pillars in Veblenian theory. The market is the mechanism 
for buying and selling goods and services; the mechanism is universal and inherent and constitutes 
the institution “the competitive system”. Competition is an institution. The system is generally a 
competitive system. Businessmen strive to gain control. From this it follows that the process of 
change refers to the competition between businessmen and the aim of gaining control to keep 
profits as high as possible. The element of the creation of coalitions and acquiring monopoly are the 
main elements constituting the competitive system as a dynamic institution. 
  The main characteristic of the machine process is the need for standardisation. In 
order to develop the process economically, there is an inherent need for the production of standards 
of size, weight, grade, kinds, styles, gauge etc. The standardisation process includes both goods and 
services. All of industry is part of this ongoing mechanical process. This means that the 
coordination process becomes crucial at all levels of the development process. The different kinds 
of industries become entangled with one another. Everyone becomes dependent on one another and 
their own sub-industries. Consequently, the emergence of group solidarity increases between 
administration and the management of the industries.  
We must note the result of Veblen’s analysis at this point. He states that any 
disturbance to the system must be avoided because of its potential danger to damage the industrial 
system and its development. However, this is one of the contradictory elements in society. There is 
an inherent mismatch between all of the actors in the system. Besides, there is a dynamic and 
ongoing fight in order to win every of the coming battles. This is a consequence of the mechanism 
“The Interstitial Adjustment of the Industrial System.” The means for securing the system is via 
business transactions; here the businessmen enter the process. It is their disposal of the pecuniary 
transactions and obligations which decide the direction of the structural change of the community.  
  The inherent tendency for disturbance means that the modern industrial community 
has an inherent potential to become involved in a crisis. The performance of the market becomes 
crucial, because the outcome of the market process determines whether or not the business realises a 
profit. Modern industry is characterised as being very productive. Generally, the system has an 
inherent risk of overproduction defined as “Overproduction means production in excess of what the 
market will carry off at a sufficiently profitable price” (Veblen 1921: 8). Consequently, any 
production or output must be regulated in order to avoid overproduction. Veblen focuses relates “… 
to what the traffic will bear – that is to say, what will yield the largest net return in terms of price to 
the business men who manage the country’s industrial system.” ((Veblen 1921: 8) “A reasonable 
profit always means, in effect, the largest obtainable profit” (Veblen 1921: 11). The price of 
products becomes the heart of the economic organisation of the system, and the businessmen are 
responsible for obtaining a profitable price. It thus follows that the accumulation of capital can 
never proceed at full capacity for very long. “The requirements of profitable business will not 
tolerate it” (Veblen 1921: 8). The mechanisms of “the market and the price system” and “interstitial 
adjustment” secure the system. Veblen points out that it is not the potential possibilities of the 
production units or the potential possibilities of the work force which count.  Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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  Veblen introduces the potential existence of a mark-up price theory as a latent element 
in the system
32. With reference to businessmen who always want to get as much money as possible 
out of their activities, the profit mechanism is confirmed as a locomotive. There are two methods by 
which management can operate in order to maintain profit levels. “(a) to maintain profitable prices 
by limiting the output, and (b) to maintain profits by lowering the production cost of an increased 
output” (Veblen 1921: 27). Here, the machine process includes two important factors
33. First, there 
is “a rapid rate of increasing efficiency”, and second,  
 
the close interdependence of the several lines of industrial activity in a comprehensive 
system, which is growing more comprehensive and closeknit as improvement and 
specialization of industrial processes go on. The last-named factor counts for more in 
proportion as the interdependences grows closer and more comprehensive (Veblen, 
1904: 135).  
 
One of the consequences of the latter factor is a demand for ever larger coalitions to maintain a 
profitable business and capitalisation. This process will not stop until a coalition becomes “one 
close business coalition virtually the whole field of industry…” (Veblen 1904: 135). “The Interests, 
properly speaking, are made up of those blocks of absentee ownership which are sufficiently 
massive to come into the counsels of the One Big Union of the Interests (Veblen 1923a: 399). This 
is a kind of monopoly
34. 
                                                 
32 We do not agree with Mouhammed, A. H. (2000). "Veblen´s Economic Theory: A Radical Analysis." Review of 
Radical Political Economics 32(2): 197-221.) when he writes that the Veblenian system is constituted with the theory of 
mark-up pricing as one of the four fundamental pillars in Veblen’s economics. Muhammed postulates that Veblen 
argues that the prices are inflexible and downward. Our interpretation of Veblen is less rigid. This is why we operate 
with the idea of the mechanism being latent and potential. The businessmen are interested in money and reasonable 
profitability. Because of the inherent tendency in the modern system to adjust, Veblen’s understanding of the economy 
includes the existence of crises and booms. In this process, the product prices fluctuate, including downward prices. Part 
of keeping the general profit acceptable could be related to e.g. technological improvements and the increased 
effectiveness of production. The dynamic of the system is described well in Veblen 1904 and the chapter entitled 
“Welfare”, in which the theory of conjunctures in the modern system is developed. However, Veblen’s universe is 
much more dynamic and relative than as described by Muhammed (2000). This is why Veblen’s works must be 
understood at different levels of abstraction. The point is that the understanding first occurs when the different levels of 
abstraction are put together at the same time while employing a dialectic methodological approach. 
33 The impact of the technological machine on human culture is a theme in itself. Veblen debates the consequences 
rather closely, and one of his main findings may be reflected in the following quote: “The machine throws out 
anthropomorphic habits of thought. It compels the adaptation of the workman to his work, rather than the adaptation of 
the work to the workman … and the resultant discipline is a discipline in the handling of impersonal facts for 
mechanical effect” (Veblen, 1904: 170-171). This is why the spiritual aspects of life, including religion, do not become 
manifest in the population. “The machine discipline … touches wider and wider circles of the population, and touches 
them in an increasingly intimate and coercive manner” (Veblen, 1904: 197). 
34 During the period from the mid-1950s until now, the development of the Danish meat and dairy manufacturing 
industry has evolved in exactly this manner. From being a local industry, the contemporary situation is the evolution of 
multinational concerns. Danish Crown is the largest meat concern in the EU, and ARLA is one of the largest in the EU 
(Ingemann, J. H. (2006). Andelsorganisering i det landbrugsindustrielle kompleks - en historisk oversigt. Working 
Paper. Department of Economics, Politics and Public Administration, Aalborg University. Aalborg: 44. Ingemann 
points out that this new situation makes the traditional organisation model inadequate and calls for new organisational 
forms. Moreover, Ingemann questions the concentration strategy and reflects on the need for a strategy of 
differentiation instead of a strategy of standardisation. In a Veblenian context, the development of the agricultural 
manufacturing sector is a natural consequence of the M2 system. The primary agricultural units of production have 
become absentee owners of the industry, and there is an inherent risk of conflict between the business manager interest Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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Institution 1 “Make-Believe” 
Shortly, we may interpret the Make-Believe institution as an institution dealing with the mismatch 
between the predominant understanding of what is good, necessary and correct, and Veblen’s 
theoretical construction of what is good, necessary and correct. Make-Believe refers directly to the 
rules of the game and the need to change the rules of the game. Consequently, the Make-Believe 
institutions refer directly to the concept of “Transformation”. A rather central element in the make-
believe system relates to focusing on tangible assets instead of the influence of the intangible assets.  
The intangible assets, the immaterial business stock, are prime movers for the content and direction 
of both agricultural structural change and structural change, generally. Habits are a dynamic 
concept and constitute the Make-Believe institution.  
 
So when any given usage or any line of conduct is seen and approved from the 
modern point of view, it comes to the same as saying that these things are seen and 
accepted in the light of those principles which modern men habitually consider to be 
final and sufficient. They are principles of right, equity, property, duty, perhaps 
knowledge, belief, and taste (Veblen 1919: 3). 
 
This statement implicitly holds that habits change “from one age to another and from one people to 
another, in response to the varying conditions of life” (1919: 3). It is this very change in the 
principles which constitutes habits in a broad sense as a main institutional and evolutionary element 
for understanding the structural change of a society. 
Institution 2 “The State of Industrial Art” 
The state of industrial art can be characterised as the “potential for the production of goods and 
services” in society. The state of industrial art is the institution that science and technology are able 
to produce more goods and services than are actually implemented in society. It is a matter of the 
rate of exploitation of the technology and knowledge.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
and the interest of the owners. In the concrete case with e.g. Arla and Danish Crown, however, some of the owners are 
more absent than others and, as indicated by Ingemann, there is a tendency that the influential owners are the large 
owners. A further modification to Veblen’s optic is the traditional tendency of a close-knit relationship between the 
daily management, the board of directors and the multiple working groups inside the meso-organisational level of 
Danish agriculture. However, these tendencies may be a remnant of the past and, in Veblen’s context, the system will 
develop further in complexity, and the general influence of the large corporations will represent an inherent pressure to 
strengthen the position of “the captains of industry”. And despite the present volume of Danish Crown and Arla, it is 
not plausible to count these two concerns as represents “the captains”. Consequently, the two concerns become part of 
new coalitions or sub-concerns to larger concerns. Such a development may be a step towards a clear role as absentee 
owners on the one hand. The concept of “contract-farming” may be claimed to be as old as the corporative movement 
itself. A general further development of contract-farming is developed with reference to the obligation on the input-side 
to use specific technology. The concept of contract farming in this broader sense is a well known phenomenon in the 
structural development of the USA in e.g. poultry production. On the other hand, such a structural change may be a 
signal for a new evolution as pointed out by Ingemann. The crucial question will be a question of both contracts and 
financing. The latter discussion involves the value of land, the rate of the debt compared to the value of the property, 
and the earning capacity of the production unit. The former discussion about contracts may block any attempts to break 
loose from the existing network; consequently, the absentee owners find themselves in a trap. But this trap will be 
different than as described by Ingemann. Ingemann’s trap refers to the development of the supply and demand in the 
market, while the contract-finance trap may be characterised as an internal institutional trap. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
Aalborg University, Denmark.  
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  The new elements in the modern system are primarily with respect to ownership, 
financing and organisation. The owner managed the plant in M1, whereas the absentee owner 
becomes the norm in M2. The owner is substituted with staff, and the owner “has taken the shape of 
an absentee ownership of anonymous corporate capital, and in the ordinary management of this 
corporate capital the greater proportion of the owners have no voice” (Veblen 1919: 37). One of the 
new elements in the shift of the modern system from M1 to M2 is that the corporate capital 
becomes impersonal. The business functions constituted by the businessmen as the practical 
coordinators are effectuated in a network system. Veblen refers to this network system as a system 
of “Make-Believers” (Veblen 1919: 39). Their job is to make the productive industry yield a margin 
of net product over cost, which is “an overhead charge payable to anonymous outsiders who own 
the corporation securities” (Veblen 1919: 40). The size of the overhead is “a matter of the state of 
the industrial arts, the technological knowledge, which the community has the use of” (Veblen 
1919: 45). The industrial art defines the potential, maximum limits of the production. The actual 
production is decided as the interaction between the efficiency of the work, on the one side, and the 
decisions made by the businessmen about what is profitable in the given market, on the other side. 
Within this arrangement, a net product will be made which exceeds the production costs. 
Veblen’s point is the definition of the capacity limit as an evolving mechanism which he describes 
as “the community’s joint stock of technological knowledge” (Veblen 1919: 46) and the substantial 
core of civilisation. The use of the community’s technological knowledge, the state of the industrial 
art, becomes only a matter of fact with reference to “their own sole profit” (Veblen 1919: 48). “The 
outcome is, in effect, that these owners have equitably become the sole legitimate beneficiaries of 
the possible margin of product above cost” (Veblen 1919: 49). While the principles of unrestricted 
ownership have created a situation of differential mismatch between what is possible and what is 
actually implemented, the same principles are “believed to have been highly expedient as well as 
eminently” (Veblen 1919: 50).  
  Veblen’s insights lead to the following conclusions: 
 
1.  The dynamic modern system (M2) tends to favour an ever smaller group of property 
owners, both with regard to economic wealth and with regard to power and within the 
crucial influence about the direction of the process of societal structural development. We 
have a growing mismatch between large and small owners – mismatch 1.2. 
2.  This process of structural change is inefficient from the perspective of economics and 
wealth, because the capacity of the industry is not used fully – mismatch 1. 
3.  The credit or financial capital controls the direction of structural change. We have not 
characterised this as a mismatch; however, there is a clear link to mismatch 1.  
4.  The actual structural development is generally referred to as a good, fruitful and societally 
efficient process. This “bluff” transforms what is “bad and inefficient” to “good and 
efficient” – mismatch 2. 
 
 “Sabotage” in itself expresses the general mismatch between potential and actual social net 
production. It reflects a dual concept. On the one hand, we have a system which never exploits its 
capacity fully – plants or workmen – to produce goods for the community. This is the concept of 
“capitalistic sabotage” (Veblen 1904: 5). On the other hand, Veblen introduces the concept of 
“syndicalist sabotage” describing “the tactics of passive resistance.” The role of the government is Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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clearly illustrated in the Veblenian optic. Government and law are universal mechanisms for 
producing security for the businessmen with respect to the accumulation of capital. 
  “Waste” is one of Veblen’s general concepts with reference to the businessmen and 
their activities. Veblen points out that the pecuniary motive for all activity must be differentiated 
into gains, on the one hand, and gaining control over large business forces on the other hand. In 
connection with this position, coalitions are brought into the businessmen’s game. The process of 
the creation of coalitions between competing actors may increase the possibility to increase the 
ownership
35. On the other hand, the process of creating a coalition between competitors is perceived 
as a delay of the production possibility. “These negotiations are in the nature of derangements of 
industry.” Veblen’s point is to demonstrate the inability of the modern system to be effective in a 
productive sense. Because of the steering system with the businessmen at the centre, the production 
of goods and services becomes a lesser possibility. The negotiation theme addresses these 
consequences, and Veblen argues that the businessmen work both in favour and disfavour of the 
coalition. First, the negotiations are the method by which the businessmen attempt to put 
themselves in a better position compared with the potential coalition partner. Second, the 
negotiations are an element in a process to harm the potential partner in order to be better off in the 
negotiations.  
  The institution of “Vested Rights of Ownership” is an institution of vital importance. 
Generally, this right must be secured. At the top of the rights, “the rights of ownership is 
paramount” (Veblen 1919: 19). Veblen’s point is that the development of society, industry and 
science has changed, while the law and customs have remained the same. Industry has evolved and 
becomes business. Science has evolved and is able to create more than business wants. Everyone 
enjoys the same rights, and society works to secure these rights, but the structural development of 
society evolves and some become better off than others
36. However, the position of ownership has 
become common sense, axiomatic. “This modern European, common sense theory says that 
ownership is a ‘Natural Right’” (Veblen 1904: 40). The concepts “free income” and “getting 
something for nothing” are different expressions of the same institution. The vested rights enable 
owners of e.g. shares to get something for doing nothing. This is what Veblen is referring to as free 
income. 
  The agricultural relevance of property rights both relates to e.g. land and the 
technological system. During the course of history, the latter element has been locked into a general 
system of patents on machinery and plants. Recent attempts by the American biotechnological 
concern Monsanto at gaining patents on all of the hog genes in e.g. Europe demonstrate an 
influence from the principles of ownership and the structural change of agriculture.  
                                                 
35 Generally, the way to understand Veblen must be with reference to gains. The size of ownership must be interpreted 
within this framework. Consequently, an increase of ownership as part of a business decision must be related to 
expectations of increased gains compared with a situation without increasing the size of the ownership. 
36 It can be argued that the moral aspect of Veblen becomes clear at this point. On the other side, Veblen’s ambition 
with his work is to reach an understanding of the evolution of society. The different interests of the different groups in 
society are part of this perspective. Veblen’s analysis merely states that some are better off because of structural change 
in society. This may not be a moral statement but rather a kind of “matter of fact” based upon his general theoretical 
assumptions and analysis. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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Institution 4 “Credit, Business Capital, Capitalisation, Tangible and 
Intangible Assets”  
Veblen’s point of departure is the question of the speed and magnitude of the turnover versus 
business gains. These two factors determine business gains. The “credit” institution is a potential 
aid in this process. If the businessman is able to reduce the turnover to less than the ordinary time 
for the line in the industry, the profit will exceed the normal profit.  The turnover process – from 
investment to capitalisation to profit – can be reduced by the “adoption of more efficient, time-
saving industrial processes” and/or through “competitive pushing the sales” (Veblen 1904: 53). The 
magnitude of the turnover can be increased with assistance from credits. When the recourse to 
credit becomes general practice, the consequence is “that the competitive earning capacity of 
business enterprises comes currently to rest on the basis, not of the initial capital alone, but of 
capital plus such borrowed funds as this capital will support” (Veblen 1904: 54).  
  The first consequence of the competitive phase is that the capital required to obtain a 
reasonable profit increases from the initial level. The second consequence is that businessmen who 
cannot or do not use credit are unable to obtain a reasonable profit, because the others are able to 
sell cheaply compared with themselves. In order to meet the low prices, their profits must decrease 
and profits become unreasonable.  
  The general outcome of the process of capital accumulation reflects a process where 
the discrepancy between the business capital and the industrial equipment increases. At a certain 
point, the discrepancy between the two types of capital – business capital as defined as the 
aggregate nominal capital (capital plus loans) and industrial capital as defined as the actual rate of 
earning-capacity – reaches a level where the security for credit is threatened. At this certain point, 
the process of liquidation begins. And it is within this process a transport of property
37 from the 
former and initial owners of industry to the institutions of credit begins. These are the general 
principles of Veblen’s credit theory. We have an economic system where the actors inside the 
institutions of credit decide the direction of structural change based upon their judgements about 
what is in the interest of the absentee owners.  
In the Veblenian universe, the change from a “money economy” to a credit and 
corporation economy constitutes an incentive for economists to shift their focus and, within this 
change, reassess the general rules of the game. The focus must be on “the earnings-capacity of the 
corporation as a going concern” (Veblen 1904: 63). In this connection, the concept of “tangible” 
and “intangible” assets is introduced. The source of the intangible assets is immaterial. The best 
know is “goodwill”. Among other intangible assets, Veblen focuses on the possession of trade 
secrets, trademarks, patent rights, a franchise and any monopoly. This means that an immaterial 
possession becomes a legitimate and valuable asset; each of them has a market value. Veblen’s 
perspective is to claim that the existence of these intangible assets represents “an agency of 
conservation rather than of creation” (Veblen 1919: 59). If the intangible assets did not exist, the 
total productivity is claimed to be higher
38.  
                                                 
37 Generally, the process of change in ownership typically involves three parts – the present owner, the promoter or 
management – and the credit house which financed the operation (Veblen, 1904: 68). 
38 The contemporary debate about e.g. intellectual property rights or patents illustrates two contradictory positions in 
both the theoretical and practical debates. The first position could be that of Veblen, and the contrary position would 
point out that it is necessary to protect the plant with patents in order to be able to find investment in R&D. If the patent 
rights would not exist, the investment would not be brought into action. A first assessment of the logic in both of the Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
Aalborg University, Denmark.  
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  Veblen explicitly states that in the case of farming, the use of goodwill and corporate, 
large-scale organisation as a means to obtaining a financial contribution in the business process has 
been scant. However, the inclusion of the manufacturing agricultural sector in an inquiry may 
change this position. A study e.g. of the agricultural co-operative manufacturing sector illustrates a 
change from many and locally based units of production to few and larger units with a trend 
towards monopoly and transnational organisation. Furthermore, the general tendencies in the 
process of the industrialisation of agriculture over the last fifty years have altered the organisation 
drastically, both with address to the use of credits and the process of capitalisation.  
We will now elaborate on the concept of the process of capitalisation – the 
accumulation of business and industrial capital and partly the allocation of capital, understood as 
ownership of capital – which Veblen develops. The point of departure is a theory of the existence of 
two kinds of stocks – common stock and preferred stock. Common stock covers the immaterial, 
intangible assets
39, while tangible assets are covered by preferred stocks (or other debentures)
4041. 
In building up capital, the corporate managers make use of both stocks. On the one hand, the 
preferred stocks can be expanded if someone is willing to purchase new shares. The owners transfer 
control of their property to someone “far away” and outside their (daily) control. We know that the 
managers must acquire an expansion of capital and the common stock represents the corporation’s 
goodwill. Consequently, the entire capital of the corporation is now bound up in intangible assets. 
These intangible assets are the security for all capital in the corporation.  
Politics II as Mechanism 3 and Institution 5 
All politics is business politics. This is the point of departure for Veblen and constitutes his 
conclusion concerning the nature of law and politics. This is why we interpret “Politics” as a 
universal mechanism in the grand theory. The argumentation follows automatically from his general 
description of the economic system. Industry is managed for business. The welfare of the 
community is based on success in business. All habits rest on business and the ideas of gain and 
loss. While we state that “Politics” is a mechanism in Veblen, on a more concrete level of 
abstraction, we may claim that “Politics” is also an institution. In the real world, there is change in 
policy. This makes politics matter for the concrete direction of structural change. The result of the 
new order is the creation of two main classes: those owning wealth invested in large corporations 
and consequently “control the conditions of life for the rest, and those who do not own wealth in 
sufficiently large holdings, and whose conditions of life are therefore controlled by these others” 
                                                                                                                                                                  
positions may be interpreted as “claims”. The first position introduces a new order or organisation of the industry, while 
the second position makes refinements within the existing order of industry. 
39 These include the intangible assets such as trademarks, patents, processes, franchises etc. 
40 Veblen states that the preferred stock as debenture represents the most characteristic modern development. “It is, de 
jure, counted as a constituent of the concerns capital and the principal is not repayable; in this (legal) respect it is not an 
evidence of debt or a credit instrument. But it has little voice in the direction of the concern’s business policy. In 
practice the management rests chiefly on the holdings of common stock” (Veblen, 1904: 78). 
41 Veblen underlines – in a comprehensive note – that his division between preferred and common stock only exists in 
theory. Once a stock has passed the “stage of organisation and gone into the hands of the purchasers, each share 
represents nothing but an undivided interest in the aggregate capitalization of the concern, so that the particular item of 
wealth represented by a given share or given form of security can no longer be identified” Veblen, T. B. (1904). The 
Theory of Business Enterprise, Document established 1-218. Security refers to e.g. loans from the financial sector, 
which represents e.g. part of the value of the common stock. In this respect, securities are assets that can be brought to 
the market and changed from e.g. one financial actor as a bond. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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(Veblen 1919: 129). It has become a question of having enough wealth to make it count! The new 
order had led to a new organisational system of power.  
 
Veblen and Agriculture 
Veblen claims that it is the nature of farmers to always want to have more land than they are able to 
cultivate. From this statement follows two processes: land has a tendency to be extensively
42 used 
and farms must rely on hired help. This renders the farmer an absentee landowner. The issue of 
extensive land use has economic implications. Cost potentially becomes incremental. More land 
leads to a need for more equipment. More land and more equipment lead to expanded credits. A 
consequence of the structural change with large and extensive agricultural production relates to the 
capacity to provide credit. Veblen points out that “the actual proportion of unused and half-used 
land … greatly exceeds what any inexperienced observer will be able to credit” (Veblen 1923: 5). 
In conclusion, Veblen makes the role of the farmer as absentee landowner more complicated as 
compared to the normal industrial absentee owners. In order to place any group in the group of 
absentee owners, there ought to be opportunity to control the market. The farmer is unable to fulfil 
such a criterion. Their situation is more likely the opposite. The farmer is caught in the system 
unable to control it.  
Veblen proceeds to the situation in which farmers are in a position as owners of 
speculative real estate. On the one side, land has a prospective or speculative value. On the other 
hand, the farmers must use his labour in order to provide for himself and his family. In this game, 
the value of land represents a potential for the farmers and Veblen compares land values with 
intangible assets. The farmers are transformed into many actors in one. First, he is an absentee 
landowner with limited power. Second, he is a businessman who wants to expand his intangible 
assets in order to expand his business, Third, he is an industry with an agricultural production. 
Fourth, he is a common man with both the position as a technological intellectual and a worker. 
Consequently, the farmer as landowner occupies all of the roles in Veblen’s grand theory except 
one: he is not a financier. If we recall the theory, we remember that the captains make the decisions 
determining the direction of industrial structural change. Because the captains rest upon their ability 
to obtain credit, the institution of credit has the greatest influence, meaning that the farmers are 
steered by credit institutions. However, both the farmer and the credit institution have a 
fundamental interest in land values being as high as possible. This reflects a shared interest in rising 
land values, where the financial institutions become investors in farming.  
The farmer is caught between those who want to buy low and sell high. The farmer 
must take what he can get “on pain of ‘getting left’” (Veblen 1919: 134). This is a theory of the 
farmers as price-takers
43. This part of the theory is based upon the country-town retailer versus the 
                                                 
42 Remark that this conclusive statement by Veblen is directly the opposite of Cochrane’s position. Consequently, the 
definition of extensive versus intensive farming becomes a key concept in a Veblen-Cochrane comparative discussion 
of the theory of agrarian structural development. 
43 The inclusion of e.g. the corporate manufacturing sector challenges this position. On the other hand, the modern trend 
for large-scale retail companies is directly in line with Veblen’s argument. A further analysis of the result of the 
struggle between producers in manufacturing and the distributors may provide further insight concerning these two 
counteracting tendencies. In the Veblenian universe, different positions can be argued, but the monopolistic coalition 
idea may be claimed to be the final outcome of the struggle. Because of the position of the financial sector as the Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
Aalborg University, Denmark.  
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town. The country-town retailer would like to act like other businessmen – buy low and sell high – 
but his situation is that he can manage to sell high, but the only place where he can buy low is from 
the farmers. This is the only place he is able to decide how much the traffic will bear. Veblen 
introduces a “new” institution by name. When arguing with reference to the country-town retail 
middlemen, he introduces the concept of “the massive vested interests who move in the background 
of the market” (Veblen 1919: 135). These actors do not “lend themselves to that purpose” (Veblen 
1919: 135). Exactly these background actors who buy low and sell high regulate the life of the 
farmers, because the farmers have come to depend on the market
44. 
  As noted the farms are generally over-capitalised. The definition of over-capitalisation 
is that the current market price is greater than “the capitalised value of the income to be derived 
from their current use of the farm” (Veblen 1919: 139). When holding the land in speculation of 
rising land values, the situation becomes familiar to the concept of intangible assets of the vested 
interest and “persuades the prairie farmer that he is of a class apart from the common man who has 
nothing to lose” (Veblen 1919: 139). Veblen argues further that even if the farmer is in a position in 
which the land is going to be sold, he is influenced by the speculative business in farmland, where 
one only engages in business that is “convenient for own ends. And so the farmer-speculator of the 
prairie continues to stand fast by the principles of equity which entitle these vested interests to play 
fast and loose with him and all his work” (Veblen 1919: 140). Moreover, Veblen points out that the 
speculative element has a limit.  
 
As land-owners they aim and confidently hope to get something for nothing in the 
unearned increase of land-values. But all the while they overlook the fact the future 
increase of land-values, on which they pin their hopes, is already discounted in the 
present price of the land (Veblen 1919: 139).  
 
The comparison between the farmer and the new order ends with the reasoning that there is an 
inverse relationship between farmers and businessmen. The farmer has a “negative intangible asset” 
due to the problem of gaining a modest return for the use of land, and the earning-capacity does not 
“outrun the capitalised value of the underlying physical property” (ibid: 141)
45. His situation is the 
opposite of that of businessmen. 
  The independent farmer is assumed to be “a slow-dying tradition” (Veblen 1919: 
134). The life of the farmers will only last as long as “the run of the market for what they need and 
for what they have to sell does not take such a turn that the title will pass by process of liquidation 
into other hands, as may always happen” (Veblen 1919: 136). Veblen states that the process of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
determinant, this sector must obviously be at the centre of any further analysis in which the theme is the structural 
change of industry and society. 
44 The establishment of an alternative producer-consumer network in organic agriculture may be claimed to be because 
of this mechanism. However, this economic management hypothesis with reference to the development of the market 
may contribute to the more sociological perspective in the  explanation of these alternative organic food network in 
Denmark implemented by Kjeldsen, C. (2004). Modernitet, tid, rum og økologisk fødevarenetværk. Department of 
Economics, Politics and Public Administration. Aalborg, Aalborg University. Ingemann (2006) explicitly touches on 
the discussion of the future positions of differentiation and the new organisation of the market for food, including 
organic food. 
45 It must be noted that Veblen’s insight complements that of e.g. Cochrane. The only difference is that Veblen’s insight 
was laid forty years before Cochrane (1958). From an academic point of view, it is interesting that Cochrane does not 
cite Veblen. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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structural change will end in a transfer of ownership from the farmers to the institution which has 
given him credit in order to finance the increased cost of farming, the institution of finance. 
  Because of his point of departure in the two roles of the farmer as both producer and 
consumer, Veblen is able to establish this theoretical result. In both a historical and a contemporary 
context, the result contributes to recommending a further focus on the input elements to the farmer. 
The input system decides how the life of the farmer turns out – not the output side. The inherent 
assumption here is with reference to the assumed ability of the farmer to be technically able to 
produce whatever the market demands. A further element in an input focus is with address to the 
aforementioned contract farming. Such system has as an inherent risk that the farmers will be 
locked into a monopolistic input arrangement with specific address to the ruling technological 
system.  
Much has already been indicated with reference to the myth of the independent farmer 
and the similarity between the farmer and the common man. On the one side, the farmer has always 
been working hard with a limited pecuniary result. On the other hand, they still perceive themselves 
as “individually self-sufficient masterless men.” Veblen’s aim is to argue that this independent role 
does not correspond to reality. The belief of the farmer and the actual situation do not correspond.  
When we make the connection between organic agriculture, agriculture structural 
change and the Veblen grand economic theory, we get wo positions. The first refers to the 
assumption that the rules of the game continue and we have “business as usual”. This is the idea of 
explaining organic agriculture as a natural part of agricultural change. The second points refer to the 
origin and establishment of organic agriculture as a transformation. The business as usual 
explanation argues that because the system is steered by the businessmen and the financial sector, 
the rise and establishment of organic agriculture must be due to its pecuniary potential. When we 
confront such profitability explanation with the fact that organic agriculture is still a niche, the 
Veblenian apparatus would assist us with the explanation that it is not in the interest of the absentee 
owner and the financial capital to support organic agriculture, because the velocity of capital is 
simply higher within the industrial, conventional agriculture. The simple example is the 
conventional chicken factory versus organic chickens. When we turn attention to technological 
advance Veblen states; it relates to a “continually accelerated rate of advance … more … 
standardised … it seems this line still farther in the calculable future, rather than the reverse” 
(Veblen 1919: 72). Within this argument and within the profitability explanation, organic 
agriculture is only able to mimic conventional agriculture within a niche. 
We turn to the idea of organic agriculture as a transformation. In a Veblenian context, 
this explanation would be with reference to the necessity of external pressure if changes are to 
come. The strength of the pressure is reflected both in the appearance and the establishment of 
organic goods. Organic agriculture is up against the dominant food production system. The reason 
why organic agriculture does not take over must be found within the structures in the dominant 
system and the conservative, institutional power within the system. The general strength of the 
conventional system lies in its ability keep the rules unchanged by excluding or counteracting laws 
which support the strength of the organic system, e.g. perspectives concerning anti-pollution, 
animal welfare and health, and change the rules of the game in the general agricultural steering 
system.  
The discussion of the nature of mankind leads Veblen to engage in a discussion of the 
inherent resistance to the economic process. Here, we could argue for the existence of a motive for Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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the establishment and expansion of another kind of agriculture in relation to both producers and 
consumers. Organic agriculture is due to resistance against the industrial process of conventional 
agriculture. We get change in the motives or preferences of the actors. Veblen’s arguments about 
the producer part are fully consistent with those of Ingemann (Ingemann 2006) with reference to the 
Danish pioneers of organic agriculture. It is also supported by the Norwegian anthropologic study 
of the motives for changing from conventional agriculture to organic farming (Østergaard 1998). 
Furthermore, the origin of organic agriculture as a social movement is emphasised as one of two 
reasons for the introduction and establishment of organic agriculture in a recent Danish Ph.D. thesis 
(Jacobsen 2005).  
Summing up, the Veblenian explanation of organic agriculture could be a “business as 
usual” explanation; second, it could be an explanation with reference to the industrial intellectuals; 
and third, it could be an explanation of the general resistance against the economic process and a 
wish for a return to “nature”. 
 
Conclusion  
According to Veblen, the process of structural change will lead to: 
 
1.  The number of farms will continue to grow in size, and the total number of farms will 
decrease. The increased volume of the actors in distribution, e.g. the retail chains and egg-
transport companies
46, have put them in a position where they become an influential factor 
in the process of structural change. Their interests are in lowering the price they pay for 
goods. Furthermore, they place pressure on the primary production in order to increase the 
amounts. If the farmers want to deliver to the existing networks, they must invest in greater 
units of production. 
2.  The number of farmers will continue to fall. 
3.  The regime of competitive business creates a credit treadmill. 
4.  The transfer of ownership of farms to financial institutions will continue to increase. 
5.  The mismatch between farm owners and non-farm-owners will continue. 
6.  The mismatch between large and small landowners will continue to work in favour of the 
large owners. 
7.  The farmers will become increasingly like the common man, and the independent farmer 
will be a rare phenomenon. 
8.  The money-drain from country to towns will continue. 
9.  The farmers continue to be price-takers. 
10. The mismatch between workmanship and salesmanship in the individual farmer continues in 
favour of salesmanship.  
11. The mismatch between the farmers as managers and the absentee owners of credit 
institutions continues. The managers have an interest in a mismatch between actual and 
expected earning capacity. 
 
                                                 
46 One case in Denmark in 2006 was the egg-transport refusal by Hedegård (egg packing plant) to an organic farmer. 
Because he only had 3000 hens, the company cancelled the transport contract. A further case study may cast further 
light on the more specific details in this story. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
Aalborg University, Denmark.  
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The process of structural change is highly modified with the massive entrance of the financial sector 
and the multiple methods of credit making where the farmer has no power to influence the direction 
of social structural change, including agriculture structural change. The power evolves into the 
institution “The Council of the One Big Union of the Interests” and “The Captains of Solidity”. 
  The economic process is an evolution of various institutions and we will focus on the 
institution of politics. There has certainly been an ongoing evolution of both policy and politics; but 
no fundamental new order or any new fundamental rules of the game have been implemented. 
Many adjustments have been made, but the other institutions appear to be stable. Similarly, the 
element of polity has shifted from a more local and national framework to an increasingly 
transnational and international framework. However, this is included in and how Veblen perceived 
this institution. The conclusion must be that the institution of politics is a stable institution. The 
general conclusion is that, from a Veblenian point of view, we have experienced structural change 
without transformation. The discussion of agricultural structural change becomes a discussion of 
effects or consequences. Any of the trends demonstrated in the above are a logical effect due to the 
interplay between the mechanism, the actors and the institutions. 
   
Section four 
Ecological Economics - Introduction 
The “Ecological Economics” paradigm is relatively. While the roots of the paradigm are hardly 
new, it was not until the end of the 1980s that a group of economists and ecologists formalised the 
paradigm.  
 
Ecological economics is not a single new paradigm based in shared assumptions and 
theory. It represents a commitment among economists, ecologists, and others, both as 
academics and as practitioners, to learn from each other, to explore new patterns of 
thinking together, and to facilitate the derivation and implementation of new economic 
and environmental policies (Costanza 1997: 49). 
 
The political dimension of the paradigm may be claimed to be the putty between all of the scientists 
who have contributed to the development and implementation of the theoretical and empiric 
elements within the paradigm 
 
Georgescu-Roegen and Bio-Economics 
The economic process 
Georgescu-Roegen (GR) focuses on the economic process. His ambition is to describe this process 
without neglecting any essential factor.The concepts of flow and fund are used to discuss the 
function of production. GR has illustrated his manner of thinking concerning the interplay between 
the environment and the economic process.  Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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Figure 10: Illustration of Georgescu-Roegen’s System 
 
 
Source: Georgescu-Roegen (1977: 269) 
 
The economic process consists of six aggregate sub-processes: 
 
a)  cE – producing controlled energy e.g. electricity 
b)  cM – producing controlled matter e.g. steel 
c)  K – producing capital equipment 
d)  C – producing consumer goods 
e)  R – the recycling industry  
f)  Hh – the households  
 
The model has two kinds of input to the process: 
 
a)  eE – environmental energy 
b)  eM – environmental matter 
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The model has three output flows: 
 
a)  dE – dissipated energy 
b)  dM – dissipated matter 
c)  W – waste e.g. nuclear garbage 
 
The final results of the economic process are: 
 
a)  cE – producing controlled energy e.g. electricity 
b)  cM – producing controlled matter e.g. steel 
c)  K – producing capital equipment 
d)  C – producing consumer goods 
e)  rGJ – gorbojunk, which is neither dissipated mater nor waste, but available matter  
 
The model provides different insights: 
 
1.  Dissipated matter is not recyclable. 
2.  The economic system survives only because of a continuous inflow of matter and 
energy. 
3.  Because energy and matter cannot be reduced to a common denominator, the 
concept of efficiency becomes unclear. “We cannot decide on purely physical 
grounds which of two processes performing the same task is more efficient, if one 
uses more energy, the other more matter. This decision remains economic. One 
should all the less think of reducing economic value to a physical coordinate” 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1977: 269). 
 
GR’s concept is that the economic process is unidirectional (non-circular) with a continuous 
transformation of low entropy into high entropy – the concept of irrevocable waste or dissipated 
matter. This is the basic rule of the game for any economic process. GR has a general critique of the 
market mechanism and what he refers to as “The Myth of the Price Mechanism” (Georgescu-
Roegen, 1979: 17). GR rejects the market mechanism as a solution, because it only counts the 
demand and supply of current generations. “Prices can never be ecologically right, simply because 
future generations are not present to bid on the scarce resources side by side with the current 
generations” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1976: 125). 
Any production consists of a basic recipe. This is a partial process. Any partial process 
is an elementary process. All elementary processes share in common that the funds involved in 
them “must remain idle during a great part of the production time” (Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 236). 
This is a normal situation. GR makes a simple illustration with reference to the production of a 
cabinet maker who does not use the saw and the plane simultaneously. We may now introduce the 
role of demand to the argumentation. When the flow of the demand for products is low, the 
processes are organised in series. “Under such conditions, specialisation was uneconomical” 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 237). When the demand for products increases, the processes can be 
arranged in parallel (e.g. start the production of more than one table at the same time and repeat the 
process when the table is finished). The point here is that this “offers little or no economic gain”. By Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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multiplying the number of processes by n, the identified idleness must also be multiplied by n. The 
production must therefore be arranged in lines. This is the factory system, where the idleness of 
funds is minimised. Any service from the funds goes from one elementary process to the next 
without rest. The basis for the system to work is the existence of a process-fund within the factory 
system. Without a process-fund, the factory system is incomplete. The process-fund is a kind of 
mechanism which starts to work when the factory opens and production merely continues as it did 
the previous day. The foundation of the process-fund is based upon the arrangement of the 
elementary processes. This indicates GR’s organisational focus and his focus on the capacity of the 
system to minimise idleness of flows and funds. With respect to the arrangement of the elementary 
processes, gains are realised. “In some cases, therefore, technological progress may work against 
the factory system if the demand does not increase in step with it” (Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 249). 
This reflects the importance of demand in the specialisation process. GR specifically refers to Adam 
Smith and his statement that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. 
   
Agriculture, the economic process and policy 
GR states that 
 
no parallelism exists between the law of the scale of production in agriculture and 
industry. One may grow wheat in a pot or raise chickens in a tiny backyard, but no 
hobbyist can build an automobile with only the tools of his workshop. Why then 
should the optimum scale for agriculture be that of a giant open-air-factory? 
(Georegecu-Roegen, 1960: 5). 
 
GR discusses the inherent conflict between the two sources of low entropy: the earth’s deposits, 
which are limited, and the radiation of the sun. The former is closely linked to industry, while the 
latter is closely linked to agriculture. In industry, it is possible to add further man hours in order to 
increase production. In agriculture, there is a limit for production due to e.g. the limit of land, the 
season etc. Agriculture differs from industry, because the elementary processes cannot be arranged 
in lines without interruption. There will be an inherent element of idleness present. Some partial 
processes can be produced in lines (the process of e.g. ploughing and sowing). Because of nature, 
however, much is going to be produced in parallel. Consequently, the concept of the efficiency of 
agriculture differs from the factory system. GR’s point is that the nature dictates in agriculture, 
while man dictates in industry. Any point has reference to the ability to start and stop elementary 
processes. GR makes two examples of where there are exceptions to these rules. First, he focuses on 
Bali and points out their ability to work in lines. Second, he uses the example of the shift in the 
USA from chicken farms to chicken factories. In both cases, a factory system with production in 
lines has been implemented. The essential element in the industrialisation of agriculture may be 
claimed to be exactly this point. The foundation of the conventional agricultural system is the 
question of gaining control over nature. Organic agriculture, in principle, represents the 
contradictory position due to the rule of working with and in cooperation with nature. 
  The result of the analysis carried out by GR is that because of the inherent element of 
idleness in agriculture, the economic activity is characterised as overcapitalisation. Agriculture is 
simply less efficient than industry because of the inherent disturbance by nature. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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  The understanding of agriculture as something other than industry generally leads GR 
to point out a missing link between understanding agriculture and making agricultural policy. “The 
agrarian economy has to this day remained a reality without a theory” (Georgescu-Roegen 1960: 
1)
47. Both standard economics and Marxist theory have their theoretical foundations in specific 
institutional traits. In standard economics, individuals behave hedonistically. The entrepreneur 
attempts to maximise profits, and any commodity is exchanged on a market at uniform prices and 
no exchange otherwise. In Marxist theory, there is e.g. class monopoly for the means of production; 
there are profit-seeking entrepreneurs; and demographics do not enter into the theoretical universe. 
GR’s statement is that the use of standard economics (in the west) and Marxist theory (in the east) 
in the policy with reference to the area of non-capitalistic agriculture lead to inadequate solutions. 
We have a reality in which policy rests upon an inadequate theory. In other words, there is a need to 
understand agriculture in order to develop adequate policy. 
GR states, “...the economic process as a whole is not a mechanical phenomenon” 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 139). GR leaves us a concept according to which change is the result of:  
 
1.  The decisions of man; 
2.  The conditions given by the flow-fund model and nature as a closed system with 
scarce resources. 
 
  When the decisions and actions of man are claimed to be crucial, the next question 
must be how man organises himself. This gives rise to an inherent social conflict in the process of 
the organisation of society. “Who shall go down the mine shaft and who shall eat caviar and drink 
champagne? This is the big question” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1976: 109-110). The positions in the 
social conflict influence the process of economic change in a society. GR point out five positions 
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971: 310ff): 
 
1.  Any society has an elite which circulates and creates a political agenda. 
2.  These elites are centred in the town community. 
3.  This creates an inherent conflict between town and country; between industry and 
agriculture. 
4.  The elites have an interest in promoting industry and getting “cheap bread” from agriculture. 
5.  The conflict is a conflict over distribution; it will never be solved. 
 
The focus on the activity of man and the mind of man leads GR to conclude that there 
is a great difference between physical science and the science of man; “that, contrary to what Pareto 
and numberless others preached, there is not only one method by which to know the truth” 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 363). The aim of economics is “to study man in the hope of being able to 
promote his happiness in life” (Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 94). In his theoretical work, GR has 
constructed a programme of bioeconomics. This programme reflects his wish for social direction. It 
should be noted that “bioeconomics is both a methodology for doing economics and a set of 
                                                 
47 As we are going to see, GR’s thoughts have much in common with some of the thoughts of Chayanov, but these 
thoughts were not unfolded to the same extent. However, GR was not familiar with Chayanov’s works at that time. 
Later in his career, GR became familiar with Chayanov and became highly influenced by his theoretical work. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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overarching recommendations for the proper conduct of human affairs” (Beard and Lozada, 1999: 
121). 
 
Summary 
GR’s theoretical apparatus is based on a focus on the input side of the economic process. We live in 
a finite system with an ongoing transformation of the environmental resources from low to high 
entropy. Because natural resources are scarce, industry meets a boundary in the future. A basic rule 
of the game in the economic process is the production of dissipated matter, dissipated energy and 
waste. Demand is the absolute engine of the entire system. Behind demand, there is a human 
decision. This means that a selection process between potential decisions creates structures. The 
thoughts of man rest on a dialectical concept with an element of randomness. This differentiates the 
theory of man from the conventional rational man. Because politics are based upon this assumption, 
politics in general become wrong. This explicitly includes agriculture. A basic rule of the game in 
the economic process is that demand influences whether the production shall be produced in series, 
parallels or lines. The production in lines minimises the idleness of the funds. Production in lines is 
more difficult in agriculture than in industry. Natural resources are an inherent factor creating 
problems for agricultural line production with respect to e.g. the season and the limitation of land. It 
is simply not possible to avoid the rules of the game dictated by nature. Consequently, agriculture 
places limitations on structural change as compared with industry. Moreover, the inherent element 
of idleness leads agriculture to become overcapitalised. 
  It is not generally possibly to state that the efficiency of the economic process is 
highest when the factory system produces in lines. The economic process involves four different 
perspectives: the valuation of nature is impossible; all funds and flows; all of the three arrangements 
of production; and the process-fund inside the factory must be involved in order to evaluate the 
most economical arrangement. The system is complex. 
  The inherent social conflict is a basic biological rule of the game without solutions. As 
explicitly noted one place in GR’s principal work, it is the elite and the captains of industry and 
banking who search for and choose direction. It is not a question of technology; rather, it is a matter 
of which institutional conditions the society operates with and the concrete agenda of the elite of the 
town community. This renders the structural change of agriculture an economic process steered by 
conservative institutions in which the social elites of the day determine the direction of society. 
Their interest in agriculture is to be able to obtain agricultural products as cheaply as possible. The 
elites establish the political agenda, and it is fundamentally a fight for distribution. 
  The phenomenon of organic agriculture must be interpreted within a framework in 
which organic agriculture is able to mimic conventional agriculture and also produce in lines. 
  GR’s bioeconomics programme illustrates his wish for direction and emphasises his 
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Co-evolutionary ecological economics and agricultural 
structural change  
The co-evolutionary cosmology of Norgaard’s economic model 
The model deals both with the analysis of why evolution has come about and what mankind can do 
in order to impact the direction of society. The general perspective generates the ambition for the 
model to contribute to a grand theory of economic long-term global development, and it is a 
political economic comment for how to create an alternative for all species on earth based upon the 
notion of sustainability
48. His principles are (Norgaard, 1994: 65): 
 
1.  Holism: parts must be understood within their wholes and wholes are different from the sum 
of their parts. 
2.  Mechanism: systems can be both mechanical and deterministic but they are not predictable. 
Systems are chaotic or discontinuous. Systems can also be evolutionary. 
3.  Contextualism: phenomena are contingent upon a large number of factors particular to time 
and place. Similar phenomena can occur to different times because of different factors. 
4.  Subjectivism: understanding systems cannot be separated from the observer, the observer’s 
activities, values and how we have known and hence acted upon systems in the past. 
5.  Pluralism: alternate patterns of thinking must be involved in order to understand complex 
systems. Different patterns are inherently incongruent. 
 
The fundamental principles behind the concept of a co-evolutionary process are illustrated in Figure 
11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Norgaard uses a chapter to discuss the idea of sustainability. His general conclusion is that “it is impossible to define 
sustainable development in an operational manner in the detail and with the level of control presumed in the logic of 
modernity” Norgaard, R. B. (1994). Development Betrayed. The end of progress and a coevolutionary revisioning of 
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Figure 11: The Norgaard Co-Evolutionary model 
 
 
Source: (Norgaard 1994: 27) 
  The important issue within the co-evolutionary perspective is the general multiple 
connections between variables. None of the variables can be isolated and claimed to be 
independent. Any variable is dependent. In the model, Norgaard includes the positive and negative 
feedback processes in the respective processes. Consequently, the theory is a theory of complex 
systems. This complexity is demonstrated rather clearly in Norgaard’s argument for the increased 
and inherent need for coordination between specialists. Coordination demands time, and time means 
costs. The formula n(n-1)/2 demonstrates the number of processes. We have n as the number of 
actors with a skill required for a process. This means that with five actors involved, there are 10 
processes. With e.g. eight actors involved, the number of co-ordination processes is 28, and so on. 
When we transfer the principle to the theoretical model it demonstrates the degree of complexity 
and the general challenge to understanding a process of structural change in a system. In the model, 
prediction is impossible, because any change to one variable may change the other variable. Co-
evolutionary processes are not like the dynamic of a mechanical machine, where knowledge of the 
different parts of the machine and knowledge of the specific relations between the parts makes one 
know how the system works. In the co-evolutionary system, both parts and relations change in 
unforeseeable ways. Change becomes a process of “experimentation, partly conscious, and selection 
by whether things work or not” (Norgaard 1994: 37). Norgaard’s concept is that selection is a 
process of trial and error, and the motive for selection is determined by the result of this process. 
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Aalborg University, Denmark.  
    Department of Economics, Politics and Public Administration 
  81 
and always has been a process of experimentation and a process of trial and error. We may refer to 
this as the hard core in the Lakatos sense of the theory of co-evolution. The motive for selection is 
an implicit part of the theory, and we claim that this constitutes an inherent, implicit, “co-
evolutionary rationality”. 
  Co-evolutionary theory is characterised by the interplay between an environmental 
system and a social system characterised by a kind of ping-pong, each part continuously reacting to 
the steps of others. “Over time, neither is more important than the other … Yet over the longer run 
we approach the equally disturbingly situation of nothing determining anything, that all will change 
in unpredictable ways” (Norgaard 1994: 46). The theory is based upon the idea that “social 
innovations … arise randomly.” Norgaard expands his viewpoint against any determinism and in 
support for his own co-evolutionary theory. 
 
Those who must think deterministically even to begin to understand the 
coevelutionary process might first simply think of several deterministic processes with 
mutual feedbacks, both positive and negative, between the components, and then 
expand this simple model to include statistical or random properties, the introduction 
of new components, a hierarchical nature, and regional contextuality. (Norgaard 1994: 
81) 
 
Generally, Norgaard’s idea is to establish a theoretical model based upon a co-evolutionary 
cosmology. There are six elements in the construction, all related to his principles. 
  The first refers to the fact that people are within the system or cosmos. People affect 
the evolution of the cosmos, which we attempt to understand; the observer and the observed are 
interrelated. The second element refers to the link between how to know and how to act. “How we 
understand agricultural systems, affects our agricultural decisions and thereby affects both the 
agroecosystem and agriculture which we were originally trying to understand in order to decide” 
(Norgaard, 1994: 94). The third element deals with the principle of conceptual pluralism. 
Conceptual pluralism is based upon the idea that we must fight with “multiple ways of 
understanding and disparate insights. It is naïve to presume that making synthesis is possible” 
(Norgaard, 1994: 93). The fourth element is the claim that people arrive at a collective 
understanding, and the process of acquiring knowledge is fundamentally a social process. The last 
two elements are inseparable. 
 
In a coevolving cosmos, parts can only be understood in the context of the particular 
systems in which they are embedded, and history unfolds event by event according to 
the chance convergence of particular conditions at particular times. Systems just are. 
History just is. The parts of a coevolving cosmos can only be understood in the 
context of whole systems because parts co-evolve in the context of wholes. (Norgaard, 
1994: 100) 
 
We sum up and define the concept of co-evolutionary change using an example from Norgaard:  
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In short, pests, pesticides, politics, policy, the pesticides industry, and integrated pest 
management evolved in response to changes in each other and in the relationships 
between them, or more simply, they co-evolved. (Norgaard 1994: 27) 
 
This is the essence of the co-evolutionary theoretical model.  
Agricultural structural change as a co-evolutionary process 
As has been taking place since it began “between five and ten thousand years ago” (Norgaard 1994: 
40), agricultural change takes place through experimentation. Experiments have formed the cultural 
knowledge of agricultural management within generations and from one generation to the next.  
The process is characterised by the increased specialisation of individuals and increased 
institutional complexity in receiving feedback from the specialised individuals within the social 
system and between the social system and the ecosystem. The general explanation of the shift from 
small-scale to large-scale agriculture is made within this framework. The following agricultural 
institutions are pointed out: 
 
1.  A highly complex system of farms has been developed 
2.  Agrochemical and seed industries 
3.  A highly developed marketing system 
4.  Government institutions (responsible for generating and disseminating knowledge, 
developing new inputs, regulating markets, absorbing risk, subsidising capital, limiting the 
distributional effects of adjustments, controlling environmental and health impacts) 
 
The fitness of these agricultural institutions is constantly tested by the responses of the 
ecosystem to the style of farming occurring under their umbrella. (Norgaard 1994: 42) 
 
How does Norgaard describe the work of the process more precisely? Norgaard starts with the 
mechanical innovations which precede and select chemical technologies. This selection reinforces 
the fitness of agricultural mechanical technology. Such a technological system makes large-scale 
production more economical, and the monocultural farms appear. When the farmer depends on one 
or two products, the risk of failure increases. This pushes the farmer to use agrochemicals, and the 
industry becomes an important powerful economic and political actor. The response from the agro-
ecosystem leads to two types of new institutions. The first type of institution should regulate and 
control for environmental damage. The second type of institution is meant to initiate research in 
order to reduce the dependence of farmers on chemicals. At the same time, biodiversity decreases 
and new diseases and pests arrive. The seed industry becomes responsible for maintaining, 
developing and supplying new varieties. 
  The result of the process of structural change is that during the process, the economic 
organisation of agriculture went from the independent farmer selling on a free market towards “a 
complex of corporate/state agricultural capitalism” (Norgaard 1994: 43). The element of eliminating 
the risk of farming seems to be inherent in this process. Norgaard describes this as a process in 
which farms expanded and the ownership of farmland became concentrated. This enabled the 
farmers to plan additional crops. Farmers also received crop insurance, investment subsidies and 
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companies in order to reduce personal risk and obtain capital. Large non-agricultural corporations 
entered the sector. Because a co-evolutionary process contains “positive feedback”, the reduction of 
risk rendered the mono-cultural production more attractive and the process of structural change was 
enforced to continue existing practices
49. Furthermore, the larger farms made it difficult for the 
farmers to manage the different areas with respect to the unique biodiversity of each area. As a 
result, the ecosystem was damaged. 
  The agricultural ecosystem has features that reflect co-evolution with the social 
system. This perspective is in conflict with e.g. neoclassical and Marxist economics. 
 
Both neoclassic and Marxist economic theory explain growth in terms of 
accumulation of physical capital and improvements in human ingenuity which 
enhance our ability to use rationally the earth’s resources and to increase the rates of 
material production. Progress – equated with the advance of Western science, the 
process of modernisation, and material economic growth – drives development in both 
neoclassical and Marxist theories. (Norgaard 1994: 45) 
 
The question of new technology versus values is the point of departure for Norgaard to involve the 
questions of the moral direction of progress and the question: “Is progress whatever science and 
technology makes possible and societies can adapt to?” (Norgaard, 1971: 57). This point touches 
upon the arena of politics and policy, and the normative element of the co-evolutionary paradigm is 
understated as a necessary and inherent element of the theory. 
  There is one major point that we must highlight in order to acquire the correct 
perspective and understanding of structural change from a co-evolutionary perspective. According 
to Norgaard, a gap always exists between the rate of technical progress and the rate of social 
progress. “New technologies arise faster than we can develop the organizational capability to 
control their social and environmental side effects” (56). The claim about a time-lag is illustrated 
with reference to devising new types of pollutants faster than the institutions for controlling the 
pollution. Norgaard points out that the real problem here is not the uneven rates but the fact that 
new technologies determine both the kind of social organisation that evolves and the “kinds that 
must be designed to control and offset the effects from the technologies. Societies, rather than 
picking up and molding technologies according to their values, are being shaped by technology” 
(Norgaard, 1994: 56).
50 Notice that this position is diametrically opposed to that of Georgescu-
Roegen, who states that mankind develops machines; not the other way around. 
 
                                                 
49 The observation here links to the “public subsidy treadmill” described in the chapter about Cochrane. 
50 As we remember, any and every kind of determinism has been rejected by Norgaard. However, it is rather difficult 
not to argue that Norgaard seems to contradict his own co-evolutionary paradigm on this point. If we should argue in 
favour of Norgaard’s position and claim that he is not in opposition to his own paradigm, then the determinism must be 
argued to be placed at a high level of abstraction. In the concrete, contextual situation in which selection is made, 
different technologies can possibly become winners. At this very moment, e.g. organic agriculture as well as chemical 
GMO agriculture are both possible. The result of the selection process determines the direction of structural change. 
The selection process is part of the “spaghetti” process. Consequently, the determinism does not mean with reference to 
direction. We are talking about an abstract and general determinism in line with the need for human beings to eat in 
order to live. If we are going to interpret Norgaard in this manner, his comments regarding determinism are within his 
paradigm, and he does not contradict own paradigm. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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Unfortunately, however, most policies of economic development still rest on the old 
fallacy bred by the mechanistic philosophy, the fallacy that it is the machines that 
develop man, not man that develops machines. (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971: 361) 
 
In order to develop his theory, Norgaard illustrates some of his points with the assistance of 
agriculture and food production. We are going to take two examples in order to demonstrate how 
the theory works when confronted with empirical observations. 
The Pesticide treadmill 
The pesticide story from the United States is one of the examples which “during the twentieth 
century provides an excellent example of the co-evolutionary process” (Norgaard 1994: 23ff). The 
story is about the interplay between three main variables: 
 
1.  Pests 
2.  Pesticide 
3.  Polity and politics 
 
Prior to the Second World War, inorganic compounds such as arsenic, sulphur and lead were used 
to control insects and pests. In the beginning of the 20
th century, two laws were passed. This 
regulation was seen as a matter of ‘truth in advertising’, of seeing that farmers were obtaining 
useful chemicals and consumers were receiving healthy food. After the Second World War, the 
number of products was expanded primarily in order to facilitate the chemical industry and protect 
farmers from ineffective products. DDT was discovered in 1939. DDT is an organic pesticide. The 
discovery of further organochlorine insecticides changed agriculture dramatically. Because of this 
effectiveness, the inorganic pesticides were driven from the market by the early 1950s. The insects 
which survived these effective pesticides developed resistance due to the fact that the insects have 
many generations within a single agricultural season. Moreover, problems relating to secondary 
pests and resurgence emerged. Because of the reduction of the primary pest, an agro-ecological 
niche develops for other species that can play a role similar to that of the initial pest. The response 
from agricultural researchers and the chemical industry was the recommendation of more frequent 
and heavier spraying. “More pests demand more pesticides.” The farmers entered what we refer to 
as a “pesticide treadmill”; pest management costs increased as compared with the former situation. 
  While some farmers followed the minority of the researchers and minimised spraying, 
most farmers continued. Because of the reduced effectiveness, the chemical industry introduced 
new insecticides. As a result, there were fewer insects and birds; this was at the time that Carson 
wrote “Silent Spring”. In 1972, an act was introduced to protect the environment and DDT was later 
banned, which was followed by other chemicals in the course of the 1970s. The response from the 
chemical industry was slowed down because of higher restrictions on introducing new products to 
the market. A new type of pesticide was invented based upon synthetic pyrethroids. These 
chemicals were both more expensive and the timing of their use had to be more precise. While 
farmers in the beginning of the 1970s could afford to buy the products, they got into trouble in the 
late 70s and beginning of the 1980s because of decreasing prices. In the 1980s, a shift in the policy 
supporting traditional chemical agriculture was founded under the LISA program (Low Input 
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integrated pest management from the beginning of the 1950s. The result of the entire process was 
that crop losses to insects were approximately the same as prior to the introduction of pesticides. 
However, it is not possible to stop the use of pesticides. “...we cannot simply stop using them 
because our agroecosystems and agroeconomy have been transformed by their use such that they 
must be used” (Norgaard 1994: 26). According to Norgaard, “the story” could not have been 
foreseen. In such a case, pesticides would never have been introduced. Why the change occurred 
can be explained with reference to the theory of co-evolution. As quoted earlier; “In short, pests, 
pesticides, politics, policy, the pesticides industry, and integrated pest management evolved in 
response to changes in each other and in the relationships between them, or more simply, they 
coevolved” (Norgaard 1994: 27). 
Organic Agriculture and R&D Activities 
The lack of knowledge also exists within another perspective. Confronted with this issue, Norgaard 
states: 
 
But the increase in knowledge and in the number of scientifically trained people has 
not improved predictive capacity. As our understanding of chaotic systems and 
coevolving system grows, however, the plea for more of the same falls on increasingly 
deaf ears.(Norgaard, 1994: 144 ) 
 
Norgaard thus turns toward a recommendation for increased plurality within research and 
development. If we momentarily focus on organic agriculture in Denmark as an example, the lack 
of knowledge is also an issue here. For example, the programmes for publicly financed Danish 
organic agricultural research are dominated by the premises of Western science à la the Norgaard 
claim: atomism, mechanism, universalism, objectivism and monism (DARCOF 2002: ; FØJO 
2007). (see e.g. Particular projects within the natural sciences dominate. A few social science 
projects related to marketing and why people purchase organic food offer the exception. The 
technical focus may be claimed to be a disadvantage when the aim, as declared in the official 
documents of the research organisation, is to expand the mode of production based upon the 
IFOAM principles (DARCOF 2000). From our point of view, the need for comprehensive research 
may be beneficial, with a further focus on contributions from the humanities and social sciences. 
The lack of insights and the distortion of the R&D activities may be one reason why organic 
agriculture remains a niche on the global level. 
 
The Idea of the Market versus Organic Agriculture 
The idea of the invisible hand is a topic with considerable influence on the concrete structural 
processes. The market is known and widely accepted as the coordinating mechanism. This is part of 
the general political discourse. Already more than 70 years ago, Frank H. Knight noticed that 
increasing specialisation called for co-ordination, which led to increasing costs. Knight did not use 
the concept “transaction costs”; however, the content is the same. These co-ordination mechanisms 
are visible in the form of people working within social organisations. The case for Norgaard is his 
insistence on a change of focus from market to a real and visible co-ordinator. He challenges the 
idea of the invisible hand as a genuine factor. He points out that much work has been used to Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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demonstrate and document the transition from a market economy characterised by small farms and 
farming communities to a society where co-ordination has become increasingly more important. 
This is why he attacks the reappearance of the metaphor of “the invisible hand” in the end of the 
20
th century. This focus shifts the focus away from structure and power. 
For whatever reason and from a very brief snapshot, the change in the Danish political 
regime in 2001 started to use the metaphor in relation to organic agriculture. Until then, organic 
agriculture grew steadily. The political shift introduced the idea that organic agriculture ought to 
operate on the premises of the market (Finance 2002-2005). The point of the government was that 
organic agriculture is to operate under market conditions, just as all other farmers do. However, any 
talk about a market in the classical Adam Smith sense may be claimed to be absurd in relation to 
European and American agriculture. Instead of an explicit political discussion of values and a wish 
for direction, the “free market” metaphor is used. With a reference to the concept of politics, the 
reason why may be in order to obtain the political goals. From a co-evolutionary Norgaard point of 
view, the re-appearance of “the invisible hand” terminology in the western political economic 
discourse, instead of strengthening the focus on structure and power, may represent a 
supplementary research point. The last comment is connected to the general claim of co-
evolutionary theory for further empirical insights as to how markets guide producers, speculators 
and the designers of new institutions. When co-evolutionary economics lack this information, the 
case must be similar for the rest of economics. 
  
Conclusion 
The concept of a co-evolutionary approach in which the five key variables of organisation, 
technology, values, environment and knowledge change because of the change in each other and the 
relations to one another constitute a challenge to conventional economic theory. The idea of 
selection as a continuous process of trial and error represents a new and dynamic concept of 
rationality; a co-evolutionary rationality. From a co-evolutionary perspective, the structural change 
of agriculture has involved the continuous transformation of the environment, which has resulted in 
an ecological crisis. From a co-evolutionary perspective, the question of long-term change in 
agriculture must be with reference to the quality of life perspective. Increased material wealth has 
been the general motive behind the 200-year process of exploiting the natural resources using the 
available technological means. Like the rest of society, agriculture is shaped by technology. The 
increased specialisation and concentration of farms co-evolves with the increased involvement of 
input-industries, the marketing-industry, financial industry and governmental institutions. The 
evolution towards a more complex system has a single explanation best expressed on the basis of 
the pesticide treadmill. Because of a decision of selection regarding the use of chemicals, the 
evolution of farming evolves towards the increasing use of technology. The increase of knowledge 
reorganises earlier mistakes, and new knowledge is applied in order to repair the agricultural system 
of production and make it more economical. New technology makes it possible and profitable to 
increase the large-scale production, the advantages being the growth of monoculture supported by 
the policy of governmental institutions, including economic subsidies. Changes related to farming 
organisations introduce new organisational forms. Non-farming investors become owners. The 
environment loses biodiversity. The explanation of agricultural structural change relates 
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technological change, increased knowledge, interaction from public institutions and specific 
supporting values among the involved actors. 
   
Social Traps and agricultural structural change and 
transformation 
 
Introduction 
Costanza introduced the idea of an integration of the concept of social traps into ecological 
economics (Costanza 1987: ; Costanza 1997: ; Costanza 2002). However, closer scrutiny reveals 
that the invention of the term social traps was based on the article “The Tragedy of the Commons” 
(Hardin 1968). Based upon the reflections in this article and an article about the ecology of micro-
motives (Schelling 1971), the idea became explicit (Platt 1973). The first systematic attempt to 
combine psychology and economics into a theory of social traps was the work of Cross & Guyer 
(Cross 1980). We will exclusively focus on examples dealt with by the theoreticians. Second, the 
element of politics is touched upon, and we demonstrate the concept of the way out of traps: 
escapes.  
What is a social trap? The theoretical background refers to learning theory and theory of human 
behaviour. Substantially, the theory of social traps is a critical questioning of the concept that 
humans act rationally. The analogy between economics and decision theory, on the one side, and 
learning theory on the other side is in sharp contrast. The former theoretical concept assumes that 
mankind has a map from which he knows or can easily guess where choices of action will lead. 
This is not the situation within learning theory and consequently with the theory of social traps. 
Learning theory assumes that direction is chosen from second to second, that the decision is based 
upon incomplete knowledge, and that we first know the destination upon arrival. The rationality of 
the theory may be unfolded in this manner: we thought we acted rationally but we got trapped in a 
situation we did not want to be in. “Occasionally, however, these road signs lead to unfortunate 
destinations. These are our social traps.” (Cross 1980: 12-13). The taxonomy consists of two parts: 
 
1.  Identification of social traps 
2.  How to escape from social traps 
 
Part one consist of five main social traps and one combined social trap. All of the traps contain 
counter-traps. Part two consists of seven primary strategic possibilities: the concept of “escapes or 
ways out”. The latter is part of the solution and belongs to our element of politics. 
 
Social Trap 1 - The time-delay traps 
Based on experiences and studies of different types of learning situations, it has been documented 
that a time-lag between behaviour and the associated reinforcer reduces the ability of the reinforcer 
to affect behaviour. Cross et al. point out a number of examples from economic theory. In decision-
making theory – e.g. investment theory – the matter of time and time-delay is part of the theory. On Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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the other hand, Cross et al. discuss the paradox – from the perspective of learning theory – that 
economists continue to work with rational economic models. Their position is that the discussion 
ought to be focused on the deliberative decision-making process in order to improve economics
51.  
Environmental economics, including cost-benefit analyses and the discussion of discount rates, 
represents another area of general importance. The idea of time-delay traps does not generally exist 
as an issue within the theoretical universe. Any trap is the result of a deliberative choice; any trap is 
so to speak a voluntary choice based upon present preferences. 
 
Social Trap 2 - Ignorance traps 
The ignorance trap is illustrated with a reference to King Midas: anything he touches turns to gold; 
even his food. The opportunity to obtain a highly attractive reinforcer or reward means that even 
ordinary, known consequences of an action are ignored. Ignorance traps represent “a failure to 
accept or utilize generally available knowledge, when making a choice between alternative 
decisions” (Cross 1980: 22). Generally, the discussion of the existence of ignorance traps has been a 
subject for much debate. Cross et al. illustrate this by taking the question of balanced budgets up to 
debate. In economic theory, the attitude differs depending on the paradigm in question
52. The 
crucial element here is that ritual behaviour evolves and the theory that develops from this basis 
“may develop into a theology given widespread applications in all sorts of other, unrelated 
circumstances” (Cross 1980: 72). 
 
Social Trap 3 - Sliding-reinforcer traps 
A sliding-reinforcer trap resembles a time-delay trap. The basis of the definition of the trap is the 
creation of habits. The establishment of habits requires several reinforcers. Learning is a time-
spending process. When habits are established, they can continue without both positive and 
negative reinforcement. The establishment of the trap is based upon a success. The success turns 
around and leads to negative consequences. These consequences could have been avoided if the 
behaviour had been stopped earlier. The behaviour turns into a habit that does not change 
immediately despite the consequences changing from reward to punishment. 
 
Social Trap 4 - Externality traps 
The externality traps are about situations in which the behaviour of individuals has effects on the 
outside area of the interest of the individual. Cross et al. refer to welfare economics and 
environmental economics as the core in this trap
53. Externality traps are hardly something new in 
                                                 
51 We must remember that the book was written in 1980. Since then, economics has evolved with modelling on e.g. the 
assumptions of bounded rationality. Furthermore, work with game theory and artificial economics has also challenged 
the concept of the rational economic man. 
52 The question of whether an ignorance trap exists or not and the connection to various theoretical paradigms call for 
attention. The theory of science demands firm definitions. If the definitions of central ideas become ambiguous, the 
question becomes whether it is the heuristic framework instead of a theory we are dealing with. However, the question 
may still be open. 
53 See e.g. Trong, M. D., Jensen, Jette Thorbjørn (1991). Prisfastsættelse af miljøet, Aalborg University Press, 
Jespersen, J. (1998). Miljøøkonomi. Copenhagen, DJØF Publishing. for further insights into this area. Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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the social sciences, but they are known as externalities in relation to consumption and production. 
Consumption externalities are grounded in differences in preferences and can be directly observed 
as a confrontation in public space (clothes, choice of house colour, loud music at night in common 
houses etc.). Production externality is most commonly known from pollution. Behaviour at the 
micro-level creates a social macro-trap. Cross et al. argue for treating the pollution trap as a 
consumption trap and focusing on differences in preferences. The priority of one group may be to 
clean nature, while another group may give priority to the product. The first group has an interest in 
getting a new structure of incentives, while the latter group is interested in the status quo.  
Social Trap 5: Collective traps 
The co-existence of more than one externality trap creates a collective trap. The behaviour of the 
collective body damages the interests of the collective. In collective traps, the individual is not the 
cause of the trap. Everybody is the cause, and everybody becomes responsible for the creation of 
the trap. The existence of many actors means that the responsibility of the individual decreases. 
When the individual responsibility decreases, the risk of becoming trapped increases. 
   
Social Trap 6: Hybrid trap 
The classification “Hybrid Trap” reflects a mixture of the five different traps. Cross et al. point out 
that all types are typically represented in this category of traps. Their concrete example is the 
problems surrounding the international armament, confrontation and conflict. If we take the 
increased complexity of the modern societies on a local, nation and international level into 
consideration, the claim could be that social traps as a phenomenon have more precisely become a 
question of hybrid traps rather than some of the “pure traps” (numbers one to five).  
 
Social traps versus policy, politics and polity 
This section deals with potential escapes from the traps. Cross et al. refer to these considerations as 
strategic means. Our attempt at linking the strategic perspective fits a perspective of policy, politics 
and polity. The general concept of Cross et al. is to develop a systematic framework and discuss: 
 
1.  How is it possible to counter traps – what are the ways out? 
2.  How is it possible to escape from traps? 
3.  How is it possible to make the time in a trap endurable? 
 
Generally, the apparatus is developed on the basis of two levels of action: 
 
A.  Actions implemented by individuals or groups of individuals 
B.  Actions implemented at the macro or society level 
 
Our analysis indicate that it is possible to identify seven types of archetypical actions. When we 
focus on the first two types of traps – Time-delay traps and Ignorance traps – all seven are included. 
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1.  Converting the trap to a trade-off. This refers to the situation in which the consequences of 
the traps become clear. The future is incorporated into the decision-making process; this is 
what we will designate the Idea of Information. 
2.  Supplementing and modifying the existing reinforcers. This indicates an initiative where e.g. 
punishment for behaviour ex-ante is reduced or increased in order to motivate action in a 
direction where a future trap is avoided or transformed into a non-trap. This is what we will 
designate the Idea of Regulation. 
3.  Eliminating the bait. This refers to an intentional interruption of behaviour when the 
behaviour has been initiated. This is what we will designate the Idea of Manipulation. 
4.  Adding punishment to the bait. This is a situation in which a new system of punishment is 
implemented while the normal system continues to exist. This is what we will designate the 
Idea of Extra-Punishment. 
5.  Trap insurance. This indicates the launching of a reward system in order to reduce the 
negative consequences of the trap when the trap has caught someone. This is what we will 
designate the Idea of Insurance. 
6.  Reinforcing competing behaviours. When you are caught in the trap, there are always 
alternatives to the usual behaviour. The structure of incentives to these alternative 
behaviours must be rewarded. This is what we will designate the Idea of Competition. 
7.  Superordinate authority. This means delegating the power of decision making “to someone 
who is not the subject to the entrapping reinforcer” (Cross, 1980: 61). This is what we will 
designate the Idea of Authority. 
 
The development of seven strategic archetypes is possibly a step towards an operational model to 
prepare policy, implement politics and change the polity. The method would be to incorporate all 
seven strategies in order to identify the empirical indicators. Part of this exercise is a discussion of 
the missing empirical data and why this data is missing. Within this method, we would both be able 
to acquire a better understanding of the past and we would obtain an instrument for proposing 
changes to policy, politics and polity. We might possibly be able to acquire an instrument 
combining the past and the future. In a sense, the link to e.g. Ostrom (Ostrom 1999) and her 
discussion of general political management tools within complex adaptive systems seems likely. 
Social Traps and Organic Agriculture 
We will end up with an illustration with reference to organic agriculture and social traps. The point 
of departure is the postulate that we are presently in a hybrid social trap, which refers to e.g. the 
environmental problems stemming from agricultural production and the decrease in the biodiversity 
in the environment. This is a hybrid trap, as all of the different traps are involved: 
 
-  Time-delay trap, because we simply did not know the consequences from the 
beginning; 
-  Ignorance trap, because current knowledge indicates that organic agriculture 
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-  Sliding-reinforcer trap, because the process of structural change is viewed as a 
success in terms of its ability to produce a far greater number of products with a 
higher productivity; 
-  Externality trap, because the individual farmer affects the external area of interest of 
the individual; and lastly 
-  Collective trap, because many farmers participate in the process. 
 
Organic agriculture is one way out of the trap. We now confront the solution with the means: the 
archetypical actions. First, there is no lack of information. If we involve the conclusion from the 
Hvelplund, however, the information does not present organic agriculture as a real alternative. 
Second, regulation represents a possibility; the issue becomes a question of the implementation of 
new agricultural policy. Third, manipulation represents a possibility; the issue becomes a question 
of the implementation of a new agricultural policy. Fourth, extra punishment represents a 
possibility; the issue becomes a question of the implementation of a new agricultural policy. Fifth, 
insurance represents a possibility; the issue becomes a question of the implementation of a new 
agricultural policy. Six, competition represents an alternative; the issue becomes a question of the 
implementation of a new agricultural policy. Using Denmark as an example, e.g. the increased 
subsidies to organic farmers in the 1990s represents a move in such a direction, while the decreased 
subsidies to organic farmers in the 2000s represent an action manifesting the trapped situation. 
Seven, authority represents a possibility; the issue becomes a question of the implementation of a 
new agricultural policy. The conclusion from this illustration leads to the position that the reason 
why organic agriculture remains a niche is a combined question of a weak alternative and 
contemporary opposing politics. 
 
Section five – A Search for Empiric Indicators for evolution of 
the Global Organic Food Market: Towards the Conceptual 
model 
Introduction 
Before the COP-project is able to solve the problem related to how politics may assist to increase 
the demand for organic food and how public policy may contribute to a transformation of 
agriculture and food production towards organic agriculture and organic food it is necessary to 
find empiric indicators. This is the first stage towards the construction of the adequate theoretical 
model from the perspective of economics for the COP-project.  
The research report has presented an analysis of different theoreticians in order to 
understand the phenomenon “Organic Agriculture”. In this section we make a compilation with the 
aim to identify how the COP-project can be assisted in their study with specific reference to empiric 
indicators.  
Compilation, Conclusion and the first Search for Empiric Indicators  
The first statement is that nearly all of the economic theoreticians contribute to the theoretical 
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structural change and we find a significant coherence. From a more tentative position, we have 
outlined six arguments (institutional profits, pressure on small-scale farmers, increases in rent, 
industrialisation differs among products, economic redistribution in favour of profits and rent, land 
is superior security) for a tentative expansion of the skeleton to a Veblen-Cochrane-Smith skeleton. 
The only theoreticians who do not fit well into the Veblen-Cochrane theoretical skeleton are the 
main-stream approach as a whole. Their focus is on material structural change, while the majority 
of the other theoreticians also focus on changes in immaterial structures. Changes in immaterial 
structures are precisely part of our approach to agricultural transformation. 
Dealing with general theories, it is uncontroversial from an economic theoretical perspective to 
consider the appearance and establishment of organic agriculture as a result of the dynamic change 
of social structures. However, when we delve deeper into the respective frameworks of our different 
theoreticians and devote attention towards understanding the economic process for explaining why 
organic agriculture appeared and became established, our theoreticians contribute with different 
explanations. 
The first explanation is a demand explanation, which we find in all of our economic 
theoreticians. However, we can identify a specific approach in Georgescu-Roegen, where he draws 
a link to Smith and his idea of the determinism of the market on the division of labour. This 
consideration is coupled to Georgescu-Roegen`s general idea of the machine process and the 
problems of producing in lines in agriculture. Because of the greater limitation in organic 
agriculture compared to conventional agriculture for line-production, this may be a reason for 
organic agriculture as a niche. We must remember that, in the universe of Georgescu-Roegen, the 
demand and supply dimensions are steered by demand as a general rule based upon the idea that 
deliberative decisions of mankind select organic agriculture. Again, the definition of deliberative 
decisions is distinct from classical economics, as it refers to the social elites in towns who are in 
power concerning the steering of the direction of structural change, including the establishment of 
organic agriculture. 
The second explanation is Cochrane’s quasi-monopoly explanation and could also be part of the 
demand explanation. Using Denmark as example, we could also call this “The Labelling 
Explanation”, where the ø-trademark signals a monopoly. By this explanation, we can only guess 
why the demand is established. A plausible guess could be with reference to e.g. environmental 
crisis, animal welfare or the resistance against toxic food. If we assume that part of the explanation 
results from political initiatives, the quasi-monopoly explanation becomes a mixed demand-
regulation explanation. 
The third explanation we refer to as a profitability explanation. We can find support for the 
profitability explanation in the writings of all of our theoreticians. The explanation suffers from the 
fact that organic agriculture remains a niche. If organic agriculture is profitable, why is it still a 
niche? The answer to this question could be that it is due to the limited preferences of consumers. 
Such an answer receives the support of Thünen, who would focus on the specialisation process, 
which creates demand for new products. If the new product is introduced, the expectations of 
profitability are realised. The physiocrats would focus on higher prices as the reason for organic 
agriculture. We confront the profitability explanation to a problem for the organic farmers 
compared with the conventional farmers. Besides being a price taker, they require a higher price 
than conventional farmers. All other things being equal, their risk as price takers becomes higher 
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conventional farmers. Such financial-risk arguments work against the profitability explanation, and 
support for this argument can be identified in e.g. Veblen, Norgaard and Ingemann. If we repeat the 
niche-question, the physiocrats would repeat the consumer preference argument and we are back to 
a kind of equilibrium explanation. If this argument is to be challenged, we can get assistance from 
Veblen and Hvelplund, who would argue that the scope of organic agriculture is due to the general 
strength of the organic system as compared with the general strength of the conventional system. 
The fourth explanation focuses on regulation. Again, all of the theoreticians are represented. 
The regulation explanation is both able to explain why organic agriculture occurs and why it is 
established with the actual scope. When focus is on a political regulation explanation, all 
theoreticians find it influential, with the exception of Kærgård. He tones it down as an influential 
factor. When the focus is on a broader social regulation explanation, the element of allocation 
enters and we have the allocation fight from classical political economics. In Veblen, any decision 
about social direction, and consequently organic agriculture, is decided by the economic interest 
among absentee ownership, credit capital and businessmen, where the power of the credit capital is 
determinant. 
The fifth explanation is an institutional economic explanation. There is a close link to the 
regulation explanation, because the explanation has both the political regulation and social 
regulation as inherent elements. However, we find the institutional economic explanation to be 
broader. The institutional economic explanation is an explicit aspect of e.g. Ingemann, where the 
focus is on the general system of agricultural coordination on the supply side between the micro, 
meso and macro levels of the economy. The interaction here seeks to dictate the change of 
agricultural structures in a complicated process based upon social conflict and the creation of 
notions of values among social actors. From Veblen, we have the conflict between organic 
agriculture and the interest of the credit capital in accelerating the velocity of capital, where organic 
agriculture in general represents a slower velocity as compared with conventional agriculture. 
Chayanov’s contribution and his theory of the family farm as an institution is also an established 
part of an institutional explanation. 
The sixth explanation refers to the introduction and establishment of a new value system. We 
could argue that a value system is an institution and incorporate this explanation within the 
institutional explanation. However, in order to have specific attention on Chayanov, we prefer to 
make an analytical distinction. We have two somewhat different contributions. The first is based 
upon an assumption that organic agriculture involves more drudgery than conventional agriculture. 
This idea comes from Chayanov. In such a case, we deal with non-economic reasons among 
farmers for being organic farmers. We are talking about a farmer value explanation. This is a micro 
decision on the supply-side of the economy assuming that Chayanovian rationality involves non-
economic parameters. We find some support for this explanation in the Norwegian anthropological 
study (Østergaard, 1998). The second is identified within Veblen and reflects a resistance against 
the experienced and actual change of society and a wish for a return to the simple life or a return to 
“nature”. While the idea of a new value system is clear and the reference to organic agriculture as a 
return to “nature” is also clear, we may question whether organic agriculture represents a return to a 
simple life. 
The seventh explanation is the technology explanation and refers to the introduction of 
new technology. This is an element in e.g. Cochrane and Smith, where organic agriculture is a 
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operates with the existence of an institutional set-up with e.g. research and education and 
legislation. The technology explanation finds theoretical support in the main-stream approach. In 
Thünen, organic agriculture is accounted for by the ability for further specialisation with the 
introduction of new techniques. The technology explanation is challenged by the fact that organic 
agriculture remains a niche. Why is the new technology only used in a limited part of agriculture? 
One plausible reason could be a limitation in e.g. education and research on how to exploit the new 
technology. If knowledge of the organic agricultural technology system is limited to a small group 
of farmers, a small group of advisors and a small portion of the research and educational system, 
then we may have a plausible explanation for organic agriculture remaining a niche. According to 
such an interpretation, however, the technology explanation tends to become part of the institutional 
economic explanation.  
The eighth explanation is a combined Norgaard/Veblen explanation, where the logic is that 
organic agriculture in reality never should have evolved due to the logic of the rules of the game. 
While Veblen would call it a “pressure from the outside” explanation,  Norgaard would call it a 
“despite-of explanation” – instead of a “because-of explanation”. The Veblenian interpretation gets 
support from Brandt Jacobsen (2005). Her focus and the reason for organic agriculture refers to 
organic agriculture as a social movement. From Veblen and the Hvelplund, the scope of the present 
establishment is due to the general strength of the organic system as compared with the general 
strength of the conventional system. 
The ninth and final explanation is based upon an assumption that organic agriculture 
is the “way out of a hybrid trap explanation”. This contribution comes from Social Traps. The 
process of the establishment of organic agriculture is the result of organic agriculture as a clear 
alternative and the implementation of a new agricultural policy. The reason why organic agriculture 
remains a niche is a combined question of a weak alternative and contemporary political zigzag 
course. Again, the establishment and scope of organic agriculture reflects the strength of it as a clear 
alternative, which has the support of Veblen and Hvelplund. 
Off-hand, the nine explanations indicate that understanding the evolution of organic 
agriculture is ambiguous from a solely economic theoretical perspective. The array of explanations 
and the fact that many theoreticians are found within different explanations is an argument for 
understanding organic agriculture as complex and multi-unit economic theoretical phenomenon. 
Moreover, the explanations are intertwined. When we proceed further with the different 
explanations, we find that the profitability explanation, the regulation explanation and the “way out 
of a hybrid trap” explanation suffer from organic agriculture remaining a niche. These three kinds 
of explanations call for further insight in order to explain the niche position. Such further 
explanations would shift the focus to another explanation; e.g., if organic agriculture is to be 
explained in relation to profitability, the answer for the niche position could refer to the limitation in 
demand, and we would have a demand explanation instead of a profitability explanation. The same 
argument can be used in relation to the regulation and the trap explanation. If regulation is 
responsible for the niche position, there must be a reason for precisely the kind of regulation 
chosen. This is where the regulation explanation moves into an institutional explanation. The case 
of the trap-explanation also moves into an institutional explanation, because exactly the limited size 
of organic agriculture states that the trap remains an issue and we must search for an explanation for 
why organic agriculture remains a weak alternative to conventional agriculture. This could lead us 
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explanation. Having eliminated these three explanations with reference to the niche position of 
organic agriculture, we now have the demand explanation, where the quasi-monopoly explanation is 
part, together with the new value explanation and the institutional economic explanation. In the 
latter, we have argued that the new technology explanation and pressure from the outside 
explanation is part. The demand explanation stands strong and becomes even stronger when the 
quasi-labelling-monopoly-explanation is incorporated. The demand-explanation also has the 
strength that it incorporates the new value explanation easily with reference to changing 
preferences. However, the lack of an answer as to why preferences change indicates that, from a 
critical realism point of view, we must seek behind the demand explanation in order to acquire a 
deeper explanation. Such a search may or may not lead to one explanation or the other. The final 
explanation is the institutional explanation. We can argue that the demand explanation – and 
consequently the new value explanation – by definition and initially cannot be rejected as being part 
of the institutional economic explanation. This makes the institutional economic explanation a 
potentially broader explanation than a demand explanation. In order to avoid any missing links in 
order to understand organic agriculture, the institutional economic explanation offers the most 
cautious kind of explanation. Such a fact supports the idea that a further search for understanding 
organic agriculture may represent the most appropriate explanatory framework. This is why we find 
that organic agriculture must be understood on the basis of an institutional economic explanation 
in which the demand explanation is explicitly claimed to matter. This does not mean that we can 
neglect that “the black box” for explaining consists of nine elements. Opening the black box 
demonstrates that the complexity is made known. However, we have found an adequate theoretical 
point of departure for the empirical inductive research – empiric indicators I.  
Compilation, Conclusion and the Second Search for Empiric Indicators  
When we dwell into the theoretical foundation for the above nine explanations the reference to 
empiric indicators becomes more complex. In the table below, we have compiled the rules of the 
game among the theoreticians. We tentatively distinguish between three categories of rules: 
agricultural rules, economic rules and general rules. We make a further tentative sub-categorisation 
of the rules with reference to the accumulation of production, the allocation of production, land and 
nature.  
We start with Table 2, where we list the identified rules of the game found in our 
theoreticians as outlined in the thesis. 
 
Table 2 - Tentative list of the central rules of the game as stated by our theoreticians – 
empiric indicators II 
 
Rules  Characteristic  Main Theoretician 
Agricultural 
rules 
 
 
 
 
 
Accumulation 
A non-mainstream idea of productivity 
 
Mainstream idea of productivity 
Farming is extensive 
Farming goes from extensive to intensive 
Co-existence of farm systems  
Farm systems have different calculations 
 
Georgescu-Roegen, Norgaard, Chayanov, 
Social Traps, Hvelplund  
Main-stream approach, Smith, Ricardo 
Veblen, Georgescu-Roegen 
Cochrane, Thünen 
Chayanov, Norgaard 
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Limits on farm size 
Farmers do not flow freely 
Dependent farmer 
Independent farmer 
Farmers have great cupidity 
The only productive sector  
Specialisation 
Organic agricultural principles for accumulation, 
allocation and nature 
 
Allocation 
Farmers are price takers 
Limited demand 
Increase in agricultural prices 
Increase in agricultural prices until equilibrium 
Differential rent 
 
Land 
Scarcity of land and monopoly price 
Land does not flow freely 
Land eats up capital 
Ownership of land matters 
Land is superior security 
 
Nature 
Nature matters 
 
The idea of the limitations of nature 
 
Agriculture working against nature 
Variety in agricultural production due to nature 
Scarcity of biodiversity 
 
Chayanov 
Chayanov 
Veblen, Cochrane, Norgaard 
Cochrane, Norgaard 
Veblen, Malthus 
Physiocrats 
Thünen 
Ingemann 
 
 
 
Veblen, Cochrane 
Smith 
Ricardo 
Smith 
Ricardo 
 
 
Veblen, Cochrane 
Thünen 
Thünen 
Physiocrats 
Smith 
 
 
Physiocrats, Malthus, Ricardo, Geogescu-
Roegen, Cochrane, Norgaard 
Georgescu-Roegen, Ricardo, Cochrane, 
Norgaard 
Norgaard,   
Smith 
Cochrane 
Economic rules  Accumulation 
New technology and the two treadmills 
The credit treadmill 
Division of labour 
Financial capital as an influential actor 
 
Economic subsidies to farmers 
 
Allocation 
All politics is business 
 
 
Cochrane 
Veblen 
Smith 
Veblen, Cochrane, Chayanov, Norgaard, 
Ingemann 
Cochrane 
 
 
Veblen 
 
General rules  Accumulation 
The institution of property rights 
Value system 
The potential of external pressure 
Nature vs. population 
Agriculture the only productive sector 
Transaction cost and marginality 
Reinforcers 
 
Veblen, Physiocrats 
Norgaard, Cochrane, Veblen 
Veblen, Thünen 
Malthus, Norgaard, Georgescu-Roegen 
Physiocrats 
Von Thünen 
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The actor cavalry change 
The interplay between actors constitutes the rules 
of the game 
 
Institutions dealing with social conflict 
 
 
Allocation 
Reinforcers 
Allocation fight, political system and 
maximisation of profit 
Political system and maximisation 
Demand/Deliberative decision of man 
Veblen, Cochrane 
Veblen, Georgescu-Roegen, Physiocrats, 
Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, Social Traps, 
Ingemann, Hvelplund 
Veblen, Georgescu-Roegen, Chayanov, 
Physiocrats, Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, 
Social Traps, Ingemann, Hvelplund 
 
Social Traps 
Smith and Ricardo 
 
Chayanov 
Georgescu-Roegen, Cochrane 
 
We tentative assume that the rules of the game represent the empiric indicators for any study about 
structural change and the appereance of new social phenomenon. Consequently, this includes 
organic agriculture and  the COP-study of the evolution of the market for organic food.  
We have found that all theoreticians find that politics (in the broad sense), accumulation and 
allocation cannot be meaningfully separated. Politics influences social structural change. Research 
has demonstrated that politics represents a potential for contributing to a transformation (e.g. 
Chayanov, Social Traps, the physiocrats, Smith, Ricardo, Thünen, Georgescu-Roegen, Norgaard) 
and counteracting a transformation (e.g. Malthus, the physiocrats, Smith, Ricardo). This indicates a 
theoretical link between politics, structural change and transformation. Generally, all of the classical 
theoreticians have an explicit focus on policy, politics and polity as the instrument which shall 
secure an optimal accumulation of capital. Georgescu-Roegen suggests a bioeconomic policy 
programme and Norgaard supports him. As a whole, all of our theoreticians find the agricultural 
politics inadequate and there are several suggestions for new politics. An interesting approach to the 
link between policy, politics and polity and agricultural structural change and transformation comes 
from learning theory. Changes in policy, politics and polity can be activated both before an actor or 
the society enters a trap or at the time when an actor or the society is in the trap. Accordingly, the 
policy, politics and polity of the past have become crucial for understanding any present and future 
process of change and transformation. The assumption is that the economy is a process of continual 
traps. There are seven instruments for escaping social traps: information, regulation, manipulation, 
extra-punishment, insurance, competition and authority.  
There is a broad agreement that the actions of actors are teleological. The agreement about the 
core means that structural change and transformation is a result of the teleological actions of the 
actors. The teleological aspect behind the actions can e.g. refer to a question about obtaining 
insights about the preferences of the actors and the expectations of the actors in relation to the 
outcome of their specific actions. 
We can conclude that the economic theory analysed generally finds that the decisive meaning 
for structural change in society, and consequently agricultural structural change, relates to the 
distribution of capital. Despite the fact that agriculture depends upon a number of specific 
conditions rendering it complex to reach such a conclusion, agricultural structural change is caused 
by anything but agriculture itself. Agriculture is subordinated to a range of general material and 
immaterial structures in society with reference to organisation and power. The understanding of the Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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process of structural change indicates that the deepest understanding can be found within the 
perspective of: 
 
1.  Social economic power 
2.  Social economic organisation 
3.  Actor interest 
 
The perspective of social economic power, social economic organisation and actor interest unites 
the classical economists, institutional and evolutionary economics, ecological economics and the 
majority of agricultural economics. From such conclusion the establishment of empiric indicators 
for the COP-project has a further reference, where the outlined rules of the game shall be 
subordinated. Because of the increased complexity a choice of how to make it simple becomes the 
next task. 
Compilation, Conclusion and the third Search for Empiric Indicators  
The next conclusion is that the research at hand demonstrates the need for a broad focus. Hvelplund 
finds that an explanation for the niche position of organic agriculture must be understood within the 
framework that organic agriculture within an epistemological context is organisationally homeless. 
Ingemann finds that the agricultural economic substance builds upon the negotiated economics of 
agriculture, a differentiated understand of (large) scale, the incentives of agricultural actors and the 
legislative framework for agricultural actions and, finally, the fight between different notions. These 
are the central elements for understanding agricultural structural change, where the result is the 
creation of three asymmetries. Implicitly, it must be assumed that these asymmetries also cover 
organic agriculture. The Danish main-stream approach focuses on a number of other aspects in 
order to explain agricultural structural change. Again, we must assume that it applies to organic 
agriculture. The combination of the Hvelplund, Ingemann and the main-stream approach is found 
when Veblen and his mismatches are involved. The mismatches are an analogy for the asymmetries 
in the Ingemann approach; however, the difference is that Veblen has a broader focus. He 
concentrates on the general conditions for the structural change of the economy and implicitly 
assumes that these conditions also apply to agriculture. We have a methodological relationship 
between Veblen and the main-stream approach. The focus is broad rather than narrow with respect 
to agriculture. When comparing Veblen and the Ingemann approach, Veblen captures a greater 
number of mismatches, both with a narrow address to agriculture as well as with broad reference to 
the general institutional economic set-up. The research demonstrates that instead of operating with a 
narrow focus, which was our point of departure, research must be elaborated with a broad focus. 
Our initial choice not to focus solely on organic agriculture has found support from an economic 
theoretical perspective; however, the choice to focus on agriculture versus organic agriculture does 
not find support in the research. The delimitation tends to exclude important elements of 
explanation and remove focus from the most deep-lying reasons for agricultural structural change. 
Stated alternatively, the discussion about definitions of organic agriculture, which we initially 
delimitated us from, is far from being a central discussion towards understanding organic 
agriculture as an expansion of the framework to embrace the entire economy. Referring to empiric 
indicators the consequence is that the COP-choice of indicators need to be broad too. Does the 
research provide us with a more precise recommendation for empiric focus? Research Fellow Ole Horn Rasmussen 
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The research demonstrates that the economic theoretical framework of explanation 
becomes indistinct because organic agriculture becomes established as a niche. This leads to 
problems for empirical research, because the theoretical rationale that the research must be based 
upon is incomplete. Research in organic agricultural risks becoming theoretically homeless. If an 
institutional economic theoretical approach to an explanation is not elaborated, the research aimed 
at understanding organic agriculture risks at best having faith in an invisible hand – if we are to 
relate to Adam Smith and our postulate about his inconsistency. We find that the research in organic 
agriculture simply requires a theoretical framework with an as yet non-evolved conceptual 
apparatus. We find that research in organic agriculture must search far beyond organic agriculture 
in order to find such a concept. The research demonstrates that not even a general agricultural 
economic theoretical framework is sufficient, because the basic relationship remains unidentified. 
We have a theoretical demand for the evolution of a framework for the processes of change in 
society. We are dealing with a need for a general theory about social change based on the 
evolution of mismatches. 
Because of the tentative distinction between structural change and transformation, the 
research demonstrates that focus must be directed towards changes in material and immaterial 
structures. When we focus on the change of material structures, the indication is that accepting a 
radical change to a central rule leads to transformation; theoretically, the idea of transformation 
becomes mechanistic and leaves us with a concept with which it is not possible to distinguish 
between structural change and transformation. By maintaining transformation as a theoretical 
concept, attention is directed towards change in immaterial structures, because here change in 
structures can lead to transformations at both the general systems and subsystems level. 
The concept of transformation renders it possible to challenge the concept of structural change 
and shift attention away from e.g. short-term changes and instability in the economic system and its 
subsystems. With reference to the Hvelplund approach, the concept of transformation moves focus 
from the second to first order. By applying a transformation perspective, economic theory will be 
able to operate more radically, where it is obvious that the interrelation between economics and the 
concept of politics will become more intertwined. Transformation can be produced in case it is 
decided.  
Exactly because of the COP-project focus on transformative capacity the empiric indicators 
must: 
 
1.  Focus on change in immaterial structures 
2.  Focus on first order indicators in the Hvelplund sense 
 
Having established such conclusion the apparatus of the nine explanations and the rules of the game 
get support in the process to create and use empiric indicators. The COP-project must focus on 
social broad, immaterial and first order empiric indicators.  
The pluralism of economic theoretical explanations of organic agriculture is a 
weakness if one only expects a single explanation. Synchronously, the ambiguity tentatively implies 
that economic theory alone is unable to understand but only contribute to an understanding of 
organic agriculture. This tentatively implies that other disciplines must be brought into the game. 
Further research may benefit from cross-disciplinary collaboration in which the nine explanations 
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potentially relevant. Despite the pluralism of economic theoretical explanations, the conclusion is 
that further work towards understanding organic agriculture may gain from being grounded in an 
institutional economic explanation, where the theoretical universe formulated by Veblen, 
Georgescu-Roegen and Chayanov, interpreted and presented shortly in this research report and in 
detail in the dissertation (Rasmussen 2007), constitutes a potentially interesting foundation. Fixating 
the concept of transformation in the study of organic agriculture, the theoretical approach 
automatically provides an explicit focus on organic agriculture as an agricultural transformation 
with an unexploited potential. The empirical focus is steered by the theoretical findings, where the 
most important task is possibly an answer to why organic agriculture remains a niche? The first 
steps toward an answer have been initially elaborated in the research report by pointing out the 
existence of institutional barriers; however, a more structured search for answers is missing. The 
radical element is the theoretical message that the transformation of agriculture towards a total 
transformation to organic agriculture alone is a question of decision. We have demonstrated that 
understanding organic agriculture in the light of the concept of transformation leads us to a broader 
social organisational framework than would be the case if we had neglected the transformation 
concept. Simultaneously, and as added value, a consequence of the general broader theoretical 
framework is that the economic theoretical framework can be applied to understand social 
phenomena other than organic agriculture. 
As argued,changes to the rules of the game do not come about automatically. The 
research hints that the source of radical change is above all a result of changes to immaterial 
structures. The most obvious source of radical change to the rules of the game is the institution of 
politics. The link to transformation converts economic theory in a more relative direction. By this, 
the ordinary sense of economics and its more or less mechanical ideas of automatic economic laws 
are challenged. The institution of politics becomes important and within an isolated perspective of 
transformation, economic theory is reversed to be an auxiliary tool for understanding social 
processes of change in the economy rather than the tool that understands the social processes of 
change in the economy. When the perspective is transformation, as a minimum, the explicit 
involvement of theories about the political processes of decisions must be implemented. The issue 
is to qualify the teleological motives in the concrete context, where the behaviour of decisions and 
in the final analysis power of decisions form a crucial frame of reference. 
Our theoreticians demand focus at the micro, meso and macro levels, respectively, as 
relevant to understanding the process of change. By combining the three levels of analysis with 
agricultural organisation, the understanding of organic agriculture is combined to form a general 
understanding of the social processes of change. Such understanding could not be arrived at on the 
basis of a simple theoretical model.  
 
Section six 
Conclusion - Model for Conceptual Framework  
What is the adequate theoretical model from the perspective of economics for the COP-project? As 
indicated, the Veblenian focus on intangible versus tangible capital is essential in order to capture 
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Aalborg University, Denmark.  
    Department of Economics, Politics and Public Administration 
  101 
we suggest to turn the attention towards change in intangible capital. Exactly here it is possibly to 
create a link to the concept of transformation. Such choice makes it possibly to unify a pluralistic 
approach for the COP-study. The idea of a pluralistic approach refers to the assessment that organic 
agriculture must be understood within a broad theoretical as well as empiric framework. Recent 
research on intangible capital by Tomer (Tomer 2007) provides part of such framework. Combined 
with the framework as outlined shortly in the research report with reference the dissertation 
(Rasmussen 2007) the following model represents a general model of reference    
 
Figure 12: Proposal for The Conceptual Framework in the COP-study  
 
 
Supply and demand in an economy are the superficial terms for the economic process, where 
accumulation and allocation of capital constitute the real foundation. Politics enters the economic 
process and contributes with the idea of democracy. With reference to the Veblenian Economics, 
we have two universal mechanisms : 1. The market and the price system, and 2. Interstitial 
adjustment. This is the general model for any capitalistic society and reflects as such how to 
integrate a political focus in any social science analysis. Without such framework of reference, the 
analytical result risk to become biased or even result in wrong conclusions. A study of the evolution 
of the organic food market with an explicit choice of focus on the political influence point of 
departure has to be the economic process. The organic food market is formed by this process and 
the contextual political dimension is part of the process. The idea of push and pull strategies offers a 
potential framework to arrange the discussion (Hamm 2002: ; Rufin 2002: ; Lampkin 2003). From 
Georgescu-Roegen, we have the idea that the thoughts of man rest on a dialectical concept with an 
element of randomness. GR’s dialectical concept can be simply illustrated by this quote with 
reference to consumer choice: “…where we take for granted that between ‘preference’ and ‘non-
preference’ there must be ‘indifference’” (Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 47). Exactly because of his 
concept of dialectic, the idea of “Random” is at the centre of his theory, and GR stresses that it is in 
the nature of change that we cannot predict future events. The actual world is an order, which 
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cannot be represented by a strict, causal analytical formula. As GR states, “...the economic process 
as a whole is not a mechanical phenomenon” (Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 139). This differentiates the 
theory of man from the conventional rational man. Because politics are based upon this assumption, 
politics in general become wrong.  
Having established the theoretical framework for the model the next issue is how to arrange the 
indicators? The establishment of a second and a first macro order with reference to Hvelplund may 
assist us in this process. The argument is the idea of the focus on policies as an element with a 
transformation capacity. The idea of policy, politics and polity is further strengthened with the 
adoption of the institutional framework elaborated by Halpin and Daugbjerg (Daugbjerg 2007) 
which exactly focuses on the idea of differential institutional capacity. Methodologically, it is a 
process involving both a deductive and an inductive dimension. It is precisely within this process a 
selection of indicators is to be found. Such research process consists of a trial and error process, 
because we simply don’t know exactly where to focus. The research in the area of organic 
agriculture is rather lightweight. This brings me to conclude: The double concept of push and pull 
in the above model may tentative be translated into empiric indicators, where the research argues 
for a multiple framework that satisfies: 
 
-  Focus on the nine explanations for understanding organic agriculture with point of 
departure in the institutional explanation and with an explicit integration of the demand 
explanations  
-  Focus on rules of the game with explicit address to change in first order, immaterial 
structures and rules dealing with social power, social organisation and actors interest 
-  Integration of the two Veblenian mechanisms in the dynamic analysis 
-  A broad empiric focus with reference organic agriculture 
-  A methodological broad focus with reference to a cross-disciplinary study 
-  Focus must be an answer to the question why organic agriculture still is a niche? 
 
Initially two descriptive indicators may be point of departure: 
 
-  the evolution in organic land 
-  the evolution in the retail market for organic food 
 
Exactly because of the comprehensive list, we must identify a method that unite the need for a 
simplification and maintains the complexity of the subject. In order to understand the evolution 
point of departure is a comparative study of:  
 
-  the evolution in the societal institutional set-up 
 
Exactly this indicator must be arranged into a mixture of sub-indicators and a comparative test 
including an evaluation of the test must be implemented. This is the task for next phase of the 
project. 
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